C. H. Pitt Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
October 9, 1969
381 Pa. 381
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice JONES took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Robert A. Doyle, with him Duff, Grogan & Doyle, for appellant.
Ralph H. German, with him William S. Smith, and Houston, Cooper, Speer & German, for appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE EAGEN, October 9, 1969:
C. H. Pitt Corporation (Pitt) owns and operates the Carlton House Hotel, which is situate on land abutting on part of Court Place, Sixth Avenue, Bigelow Boulevard and Grant Street in the City of Pittsburgh. Pitt is the named insured in a comprehensive liability insurance policy issued by the Insurance Company of North America (I.N.A.). In this policy the insurer agreed to pay to the insured all sums which it became “legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury . . . or destruction of tangible property . . . caused by an occurrence1 . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the premises . . . and all operations necessary or incidental thereto.” The policy defined “рremises” as the hotel building “and includes the ways immediately adjoin-
On June 13, 1966, while said policy was in force, Mrs. Gloria F. Pifer parked an autоmobile equipped with paraplegic controls at or near the Bigelow Boulevard entrance to the hotel. She left the keys in the automobile and notifiеd the doorman, Grover Lee Johnson, that she was about to enter the hotel to visit a guest and would remain there for approximately one hour. About two hours latеr when Mrs. Pifer had not returned, Johnson entered the automobile and began to operate it to provide space for the movement of another vehicle. After he activated the ignition system and shifted the gear selector arm into “reverse“, the automobile jumped backward at a high rate of speed across the cartway of Bigelow Boulevard and continued at a high rate of speed “across the cartway of Grant Street.” Although Johnson stepped on the brake, the аutomobile continued moving and collided with the front end of an automobile operated by Ralph Stock.
After this collision, both automobiles came to rest. Thereafter, Johnson shifted the gear arm to the “drive” position without touching the accelerator and the Pifer automobile immediately proceeded forward аt a high rate of speed in a southbound direction on the left-hand side of Grant Street for about two blocks, where it collided with an automobile owned by the City of Pittsburgh and occupied by two city policemen. This collision drove the police vehicle into an automobile owned and operated by Edward Heintz.
Subsequently, the two pоlicemen sued Pitt in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to recover damages for personal injuries. Heintz and his wife, residents of Chicago, Illinois, instituted an action against Pitt in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to recover for personal injury and property damage.
I.N.A. was notified of the claims, but denied coverage. Pitt then filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking a declaratory judgment (1) that under the terms of the policy, it was insured against loss resulting from the claims, outlined before; and (2) that I.N.A. was legally obliged to defend the suits arising out of these claims. I.N.A. filed an “Answer Raising Questions of Law” contending that proceedings for a declaratory judgment did not lie. The court ruled that such proceedings were proper and dismissed legal objections thereto. I.N.A. then filed an “Answer on the Merits.” Later the case was called for trial before a judge, sitting without a jury, where some testimony was taken, but most of the facts were stipulated of record by the parties.2 In thе stipulation, the parties did not agree (1) as to the exact location of the Stock automobile when it was hit by the Pifer automobile (they did agree, however, thаt the collision “did not take place on the premises of the hotel“); (2) whether or not Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment while operating the Pifer automobile; (3) as to the specific manner in which the Stock automobile, the police car and the Heintz automobile were operated at thе relevant time; and (4) that Johnson‘s operation of the Pifer automobile was the legal cause of the collisions.
In its conclusion that a declaratory judgment will lie even though there is a dispute as to relevant facts, the lower court was in error. Loftus v. City of Carbondale, 435 Pa. 288, 256 A. 2d 799 (1969); Bierkamp v. Rubinstein, 432 Pa. 89, 246 A. 2d 654 (1968); and Mains v. Fulton, 423 Pa. 520, 224 A. 2d 195 (1966). But, argues Pitt, all facts necessary to the determination of coverage were included in the stipulation of the parties and the facts in dispute were not required for a decision of this issue. Even assuming this to be so, still the proceeding did not lie.
A declaratory judgment proceeding should not be entertained if there exists another established and appropriate remedy. Bierkamp v. Rubinstein, supra; Mains v. Fulton, supra. Hеre a more appropriate established remedy is available to protect fully the rights of all involved. If the insurance company is in violation of its contrаct, an adequate remedy at law exists whereby any and all resulting loss can be recovered.
Judgment vacated and proceedings dismissed.
Mr. Justice POMEROY dissents.
Mr. Justice JONES did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
I believe that the entertaining of declaratory judgment proceedings was properly for the discretion of the trial judge, and therefore I dissent.
It is аn ongoing source of amazement to me that a majority of this Court can continue to ignore the explicit language of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
Since the only issues of fact in this case are irrelеvant to the determination of the question presented by the declaratory judgment suit, I believe that a declaratory judgment does lie. Although it would have been within the discretion of the trial judge to refuse to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings, see Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. P.T.C., 435 Pa. 316, 255 A. 2d 516 (1969) (concurring opinion), he was not required to do so, and I would affirm his decision.