Plaintiff-Appellant C&H' Nationwide,’ Inc., appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing C&H’s garnishment action against Appellees Wesley Kennemer. and Curley Joe Trucking, Inc. (No. 99-10121), and the district court’s subsequent award of attorney’s fees to Appellees (No. 99-10381). We dismiss appeal 99-10121 as moot, reverse the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Appellees, and deny all motions carried with the case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant C&H Nationwide, Inc. (“C&H”), and Appellees Wesley Ken-nemer and Curley Joe Trucking, Inc. (“Ap-pellees”), make another appearance before us, albeit with a much smaller entourage. In this latest battle in an ongoing feud, we are called upon, ultimately, to answer one simple question: Are Appellees entitled to $1,472.50 in attorney’s fees? Unfortunately, answering that question requires that
C&H used to operate a motor carrier business. As we understand the arrangement, C&H entered into contracts with others, including Appellees (the “Owners-Operators”), to supply the trucks and drivers for the enterprise. Under these contracts, C&H forked over a portion of its take in exchange for the equipment and services. Unfortunately, C&H did not fare so well in the trucking business and consequently closed its doors in late 1988.
In 1989, we decided, in an unrelated case, that motor carriers who had billed at negotiatеd rates lower than tariff rates filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission could bill shippers for the difference. See Supreme Beef Processors v. Yaquinto,
The disgruntled Owners-Operators filed suit in state court seeking damages for C&H’s failure to pay the contracted amount of the claims and for its failure to give proper notice before terminating the contracts when it closed down in 1988. The Owners-Operators dismissed their suit, however, as part of settlement negotiations between the two sides. The negotiations proved fruitless, and eventually C&H filed suit seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations under the contracts. The Owners-Operators counterclaimed.
After a bench trial, the Owners-Operators were awarded damages, and C&H was awarded a total of $213,847.64 in costs and attorney’s fees. See District Court Order entered Dec. 8, 1998, at 1. In a subsequent appeal, we reversed part of the district court’s judgment. See C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. McDonald, No. 98-10564, at 4,
Prior to our decision in C&H v. McDonald, C&H sought to enforce its awards by garnishing accounts hеld by Appellees at Defendant Norwest Bank — Texas, N.A. (“Norwest”). At the time, Kennemer had over $4,000 on deposit in a checking account at Norwest, which amount Norwest sequestered in its garnished funds account. Appellees moved to dismiss the garnishment action, alleging that it was prohibited by section 31.008 of the Texas Finance Code.
Appellees have moved this court for damages and costs for a frivolous appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38; C&H responded to each motion and moved the court to award it attorney’s fees in the amount of $500 for effort expended in responding to Appellees’ frivolous motions. These motions have been carried with the cases.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Resolution of this case turns on the district court’s interpretation of section 31.008 of the Texas Finance Code. This court reviews questions of law, such as the proper construction of a statute, de novo. See Woodfield v. Bowman,
III. JURISDICTION
Ours is a court of limited jurisdiction. Among the limitations is the requirement that there be a live case or controversy between the parties. See Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards,
The “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits federal courts from considering questions “that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice,
Appeal 99-10121 deals directly with the issue at the heart of this case, whether the district court correctly concluded that section 31.008(b) precludes C&H from garnishing Appellees’ bank accounts. As far as we can tell, there is no answer that we could give to this question that would affect the right of C&H to enforce its remaining judgment against Appellees. The district court dismissed C&H’s garnishment action without prejudice, leaving C&H free to reapply for a writ of garnishment under section 59.007 at any point since it became effective in September of last year.
B. Appeal 99-10381
Appeal 99-10381 asks whеther, under Texas law, Appellees are entitled to attorney’s fees in this case as parties against whom a garnishment action was wrongfully initiated.
IV. SECTION 31.008
At the time of the district court’s ruling, section 31.008(a) provided, inter alia, that a “writ of garnishment may not be ... served on a financial institution ... to collect a money judgment ... against the financiаl institution before ... all appeals have been foreclosed by law.” Tex. Fin. Code § 31.008(a) (repealed 1999). Section 31.008(b) further provided that “[tjhis section affects a[ ] ... writ of garnishment ... served on a financial institution for the purpose of collecting a money judgment ... against a depositor of ... the financial institution.” Id. § 31.008(b) (repealed 1999) (emphasis added). The dispute here centers on whether section 31.008(b) precluded C&H from serving a writ of garnishment on Norwest to collect its judgment against Appellees.
C&H argues that former section 31.008(b) is ambiguous on its face because it is not clear from the statute what “affects” means. Moreover, it asserts that the language of section 31.008(b) was the product of a drafting error. C&H insists that the legislative history of section 31.008 supports this assertion and that section 59.007 was enacted, in large part, to
Appellees’ rebanee on United Services is problematic in two regards. First, Appellees misconstrue the language of United Services. In that case, we stated, “A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one accepted meaning.”
Appellees’ further citation to Ex parte Vaccarezza,
The intention of the Legislature is the aim of statutory construction, and where, though not expressed, it is clearly manifested by implication from the language used, we cannot say that it should not have effect. That which is not expressed in words may be plainly imported by implication. And, again, Chief Justice Moore, in the case of Russell v. Farquhar, 55 Tex. [355], 359 [1881 WL 9786 (1881)], lays down the rule for the construction of statutes very clearly, as follows: “If courts were in all cases to be controlled in their construction of statutes by the mere literal meaning of the words in which they are couched, it might well be admitted that appellants’ objection to the evidence was well taken; but such is not the case! To be thus controlled, as has often been held, would be for the courts in a blind effort to refrain from an interference with legislative authority by their failure to apply well-regulated rules of construction, to, in fact, abrogate their own power and usurp that of the Legislature, and cause the law to be held indirectly the contrary of that which the Legislature had, in fact, intended to enact. Whbe it is for the Legislature tо make the law, it is the duty of the courts to try out the right of intendment of statutes upon which they are called to pass, and by their proper construction to ascertain and enforce them according to their true intent; for it is this intent which constitutes and is in fact the law, and not the mere verbiage used by inadvertence or otherwise by the Legislature to express its intent, and to follow which would pervert that intent.”
Id.
, The Texas Code Construction Act
. In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous*496 on its face, a court may consider among other matters the:
(1) object sought to be attained;
(2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3) legislative history;
(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;
(5) consequences of a particular construction;
(6) administrative construction of the statute; and
(7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.
Tex. Gov.Code § 311.023. The Texas Supreme Court has recently commented on the Texas Code Construction Act:
Under the Code Construction Act, ... courts may consider prior law, the circumstances under which the law was enacted, and legislative history among other matters to aid them in construing a code provision “whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face.” But prior law and legislative history cannot be used to alter or disregard the express terms of a ... provision when its meaning is clear from the code when considered in its entirety, unless there is an error such as a typographical one.
Fleming Foods v. Rylander,
Even if former section 31.008 were clear on its face, C&H’s allegation that section 31.008(b) is the product of a drafting error allows us to look past the literal language of the provision. When viewed in context of the entire statute, however, we conclude that the meaning of former section 31.008(b) is not clear. Just exactly how a limitation on the ability to serve a writ of garnishment on a bank to collect a judgment against that bank (section 31.008(a)) “affects” garnishments served to collect a judgment against a depositor of the bank is ambiguous. If the legislature had intended to prohibit garnishments against depositors until all appeals had been exhausted, it cоuld have clearly provided that a writ of garnishment “may not be ... served ... before ... all appeals have been foreclosed,” as it did in section 31.008(a).
Legislative history indicates that the provision, as enacted, was the product of a drafting error. Section 31.008 was enacted in 1997 as part of the original adoption of the Texas Finance Code. See 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1008, § 1 (West). It derived from Texas Civil Statutes article 342-609, and the Texas legislature did not intend to significantly alter the substantive content of the provision along the way.
A review of section 59.007, the successor to section 31.008, supports the conclusion that the provision was not intended to have an impact on garnishments against bank customers. Section 59.007(b) deleted the “affects” language at issue here and provides instead that writs of garnishment against depositors are controlled by another section of the Finance Code that deals mainly with notice requirements.
Finally, interpreting former section 31.008(b) as Appellees suggest we do would lead to the result that nо writs of garnishment could be served on financial institutions to collect money judgments against anyone until all available appeals had been exhausted. This construction is a drastic departure from existing law and settled expectations. It could, potentially, force a judgment creditor to wait years before being able to collect a judgment rendered in his favor without the protection of á supersedeas bond. In the faсe of an ambiguous statutory provision, we are loathe to impute such an intent to the Texas legislature without clearer indication in the legislative history that such was their true objective.
After reviewing the legislative history, prior and subsequent provisions governing the same transactions, the object sought to be- attained in passing the original provision, and the consequences of construing the provision as Appellees suggest, we easily conclude that legislative intent was to protect financial institutions from default by prohibiting, prior to the exhaustion of available appeals, a writ of garnishment from being served on a financial institution to secure a money judgment against.the institution itself, while at the same time leaving judgment creditors free to secure a money judgment against depositors of the financial institution through a writ of garnishment. Section 31.008 should not have been сonstrued to preclude the writ of garnishment served on Norwest in this case. .
Based on this construction, the district court’s construction of the statute was in error, C&H’s garnishment action was not wrongful, and the order awarding attorney’s fees to Appellees must be reversed.
V. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS AND MOTIONS
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides .that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” Appel-lees argue that C&H’s case is frivolous, entitling Appellees to damages and costs under Rule 38. In its responses to Appel-lees’ motions, C&H argues that the motions are themselves frivolous, entitling it to attorney’s fees of $500.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS No. 99-10121 as moot, REVERSE the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Appellees in No. 99-10381, and DENY all motions carried with the case. In No. 99-10121, each party shall bear its own costs; in No. 99-10381, Appellees shall bear the costs.
Notes
. Section 31.008, the statute in force at the time, provided:
(a) An attachment, injunction, execution, or writ of garnishment may not be issued against or served on a financial institution in this state to collеct a money judgment or secure a prospective money judgment against the financial institution before the judgment is final and all appeals have been foreclosed by law.
(b) This section affects an attachment, injunction, execution, or writ of garnishment issued to or served on a financial institution for the purpose of collecting a money judgment or securing a prospective money judgment against a depositor of оr deposit account in the financial institution.
Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 31.008 (West 1998) (repealed 1999).
. Appellees moved for an award of attorney’s fees on the ground that such fees are recoverable in Texas as actual damages for wrongful garnishment. See Wesley Kennemer and Curly Joe Trucking, Inc.'s Motion to Award Attorney Fees, filed Dec. 17, 1998, at 1.
. Section 31.008 was repealed on May 31, 1999. See 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 344, §§ 9.002(2), 9.004(a) (West). Section 59.007, which replaced section 31.008, see id., § 2.016, became effective on September 1, 1999. See id. § 9.004(b). Section 59.007 provides:
(a) An attachment, injunction, execution, or writ of garnishment may not be issued аgainst or served on a financial institution that has its principal office or a branch in this state to collect a money judgment or secure a prospective money judgment against the financial institution before the judgment is final and all appeals have been foreclosed by law.
(b) An attachment, injunction, execution, or writ of garnishment issued to or served on a financial institution for the purpose of collecting a money judgment or securing a prospective money judgment against a customer of the financial institution is governed by Section 59.008 and not this section.
Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 59.007 (West Supp.1999). Section 59.008 deals generally with notice requirements. See id. § 59.008.
. As we explain, infra, the provision at issue here, section 31.008(b), was not carried over into section 59.007.
. C&H did not appeal the district court’s implicit determination that under Texas law, attorney’s fees are available as actual damages fоr the wrongful issuance of a writ of garnishment. Even though we question the correctness of that determination, see Beutel v. Paul,
. The Code Construction Act applies to section 31.008. See Tex. Fjn.Code Ann. § 1.002 (West 1998).
. Section 31.008 was simply a recodification of section 8.002 of the Texas Banking Act of 1995 without substantive change. See 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 914, § 1 (West) (adopting section 8.002, which was codified at Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 342-8.002 (West repealed 1997)); 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1008, § 6(a) (West) (repealing section 8.002); id. § 1 (stating that the purpose of the Finance Code adopted by chapter 1008 of the 1997 Session Law was, in part, to revise “the state’s general and permanent statute law without substantive change”) (codified at Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 1.001 (West 1998)). Indeed, section 31.008(b) read exactly as section 8.002(b) had. Section 8.002, in turn, was based on Texas Revised Civil Statute article 342-609 and was intended to clarify, but not signifiсantly alter, that provision. See Tex. Banking Act of 1995, Tex. Dept, of Banking Leg. Proposal at 26 (1995) (“Section 8.002 is based on current Article 342-609 without significant change but including clarifications. Generally, a bank is not required to post security for a judgment to prevent execution while the judgment is being appealed. National banks have a similar provision in 12 U.S.C. § 91.”); Tex. H. Fin. Insts. Comm. Rep. (Substituted) C.S.H.B. 1543, at 13 (1995) ("Section 8.002 is based on current Article 342-609 without significant change but including clarifications.”).
. Article 342-609 provided, in pertinent part:
*497 ATTACHMENT, INJUNCTION, OR EXECUTION
Sec. 1 An attachment, injunction, or execution may not be enforced against a financial institution unless there is a final judgment in the proceeding in which the attachment, injunction, or execution is issued.
Sec. 2 For the purposes if this article, a judgment is final if all appeals have been exhausted or foreclosed by law.
1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1196, § 6 (West). Article 342-609 had a minor amendment in 1993. See 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1050, § 8 (West). That amendment is not material to our discussion.