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C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4
75 P.3d 194
Idaho
2003
Check Treatment

*1 G, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, CANYON HIGHWAY DISTRICT 4, Defendant-Appellant.

NO.

No. 28128. Idaho,

Supreme Court of

Boise, May 2003 Term.

July *2 (Patricia), (Martin) and Patricia Galvin

vin wife, only the shareholders are husband G, owning & G’s each 50% of C of C & Road, winding The Old Middleton shares. curves, north very sharp ran road with two edge along the of C & G’s and south western 1980’s, early to mid By the property. had Middleton Road condition of the Old point that it was neces- to the deteriorated sary resurface it. At various to rebuild and early the mid 1980’s and times between 1990’s, representatives of the Martin and Highway possibility District discussed the moving the Middleton Road east so Old run- follow the section line north/south ning through property. &C G’s Canyon on a 1921 resolution Based Commissioners, County Highway District easement, believed it had a 50 foot 25 feet White, Peterson, Morrow, Gigray, Ross- side, the section line. As a result each over man, Rossman, P.A., Nye Nampa, ap- & easement, alleged Highway Dis- pellant. Gigray argued. F. III William trict assumed it could build road over Davison, Cox, Boise, Copple, Copple & crossing line C & with- section G’s respondent. Cunningham Heather A. ar- compensating & C & believed the out C G. G gued. representations regarding Highway District’s investigating the easement without further. KIDWELL, Justice. 1991, Highway contracted In late District (C G) G, Canyon Inc. & sued the surveyor mark location of a with a District) Highway (Highway District No. Road, proposed Middleton which was to New Highway for inverse condemnation after the along run the section line run- north/south through proper- District built a road &C G’s ning through property. Decem- C & G’s On ty compensating High- without C The & G. 24,1991, Highway ber District’s Board way ground District defended on the & GC (Commissioners) approved Commissioners failed to file its case within the statute of Due to construction of New Middleton Road. However, period. limitations the district easement, alleged none of the affected court found the statute of limitations was not compensated for their owners were triggered Highway until complet- District land. project, brought ed the construction C Middleton Road Construction of the New four-year & suit within the limitation G’s began January objected to 1992. Patricia period. prove district failed to construction of the road all times relevant. its other affirmative and & G was defenses District, According to the Martin damages, together awarded with costs and aspects involved in different attorney fees. The District filed project, particularly in the reloca- struction appeal. judgment of the district irrigation required by canals the con- tion of court is affirmed. road’s struction. In order to lessen the grade, Highway District asked C & G to I. along easement grant more than the 50-foot AND

FACTS PROCEDURAL steep portion of the road that traversed BACKGROUND property. hill on C & G’s C & G refused By request. October operates owns and a farm on 260 Canyon County, progressed had acres in Idaho. Martin Gal- construction point align- jury began that the New Middleton Road’s trial on the issue of the value of C property were ment and width across C & G & condemned On December By verdict, jury’s established. November on the based construction judgment in district court entered a favor of *3 The the road’s subbase. New Middleton $430,204.64. C & in the amount of On G 1993, May opened public Road was for use in 21, 2002, February the district court entered paving oiling but was not until judgment awarding attorney a fees and costs August 1993. to C & G. 1997, January In approached timely ap- The District filed this surveyor developing property. At about its peal. time, that C & G learned there was no 31,1997, January easement for the road. On II. against seeking C & G filed suit the district damages Sep- for inverse condemnation. On STANDARD OF REVIEW 24, 1998, Highway tember District filed The date for when a cause of action summary ground judgment motion for on the may question accrues be a of fact or law. applicable four-year statute of limita- McDonald, 277, 279, v. 136 Idaho 32 Jemmett tions, (2002), § ran Idaho Code 5-224 before (2001) Cox, 669, (citing P.3d 671 Reis v. 104 18, complaint. C & G filed its On November (1982)). 434, disput Idaho If no P.2d 46 1998, granted the district court exist, ed issues of material fact when cause summary judgment motion for on question of action accrues is a of law for that, 6, 1992, by the basis November con- by determination this Id. Court. progressed struction on the road had point that C & G was aware of the nature only This Court will set aside the and extent of the clearly findings district court’s of if erro fact triggering placing the limitation of action and 52(a) (2002); McCray neous. I.R.C.P. v. Ro complaint beyond four-year peri- & G’s C senkrance, 509, 513, 693, Idaho 20 P.3d od. (2001); v. re Williamson 24, 1998, & filed a On November G McCall, 452, 454, 19 P.3d reconsider, citing motion to additional au- (2001). deciding findings of fact whether thority proposition for the that the statute of erroneous, clearly determines are begin running May until limitations did not findings supported are sub whether opened when the road was stantial, competent evidence. In re William 13, 1999, January the district court use. On son at 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence is granted & motion for reconsideration C G’s competent if a reasonable substantial and of limitations was on statute ground accept rely on it. trier of fact would triggered until District Findings competent Id. based on road, completed construction of the evidence, conflicting, even if will not be dis brought complaint within the time Lance, appeal. Bolger v. 137 Ida turbed period. 792, 794, 1211, 1213 ho parties stipulated the facts of the

The case, including III. took 3.16 acres of C & G’s constructing the New Middleton ANALYSIS 20, 1999, Road. the district On December For Inverse Con- A. C & G’s Action court conducted a trial on the issues of bench By demnation Is Not Time Barred District’s affirmative defenses § 5-224 Limitation Of Ac- I.C. quasi equitable estoppel, estoppel, tion. January district waiver. On High- party disputes the finding the Neither facts court entered its decision Therefore, & filed its way prove any of its affir- this case. whether C G District failed to lawsuit within the stat- inverse condemnation mative defenses. On December takes where the question limitations is a law over case ute of project. of a construction exercises free review. land means which this Court damages Farbers sued the State the statute of limita- I.C. 5-224 contains resulting construction of their claim. tions for an inverse condemnation The Farber’s claim a road intersection. Id. Dep’t. Transp., v. Wadsworth issue on in tort and the relevant sounded 439, 441-42, (citing 3-4 they filed notice under appeal was whether Comm’rs, McCuskey Canyon County designated period. time ITCA within the (1996)). § 5- I.C. they could not Id. The Farbers contended action for ... “[a]n [inverse states: and, damages extent of their there- know the ... must be commenced within demnation] fore, the notice under the ITCA (4) years four after the cause of action shall *4 completion construc- triggered until of have accrued.” 400, P.2d at 687. tion. Id. at argues District district the Farbers, erroneously project com- Agreeing relied on the the this Court held with 398, pletion period rule of Farber v. 102 Idaho under the ITCA was not the notice (1981), a completed 630 P.2d 685 to determine when triggered until the State the 402, for claim inverse condemnation accrues. Ac- P.2d at project. struction Id. at 689. Farber, District, rule, cording the a adopting project completion the the addressing case the issue of when the notice distinguished Farber from an Farber Court provision case, of Idaho Ralphs City Spirit Tort Claims Act earlier ITCA v. of (ITCA) triggered, Lake, 225, (1977), in application is has no 98 Idaho 560 P.2d 1315 and argues case, this case. The un- Washington approvingly cited Centralia, 523, City Sandpoint, der Tibbs v. Gillam v. Wash.2d of 1001, (1979), (1942) (overruled 603 P.2d a claim part in on 400, for inverse condemnation a accrues when grounds). other Id. at 630 P.2d at 687. property is and owner aware the nature In Ralphs, plaintiff filed notice of his tort damages. extent of his or her damages claim too late because the arose consistently event, District asserts this Court has single plain- from a which notified the applied the Tibbs standard to damages, plaintiff determine tiff of all his and the wait- when statute triggered of limitations is beyond period notice claim. ed file his for of inverse 401, claims condemnation and there at at Id. 630 P.2d 688. The Farber is no valid reason to create a different stan- govern- Court the nature of the reasoned dard in this case. wrongdoing, continuing ment’s a construction project, required a standard for de- different argues progeny C & G Tibbs and its do not termining period trig- when the notice was apply because none of those cases involved a gered.1 physical taking. urges direct C & G reasoning Court to follow the district court’s adopted project The Farber then Court apply “project completion” rule of completion promulgated by the rule Wash- Otherwise, claims, private Farber. Gillam, ington Supreme it was Court. Id. subjected govern- citizens whose land is to a takings determined that when a claim based ment construction will be forced to on the occurs means of a Constitution bring they their claims before the full know government project, construction the statute damages. extent of their of limitations for inverse condemnation does Farber, holding completion project. This in not accrue until of the Court’s 399, 686, Gillam, provides Washington at 630 P.2d at instruction 128 P.2d at 663. The determining Supreme for when the of limita- reasoned that the statute Court triggered justified waiting pro- tion is an inverse condemnation owner was until the anomaly purposes project completion (holding period 1. This rule was an that the notice the usual standard for when the notice triggered customarily triggered upon the oc- ITCA is purposes Magnu of the ITCA. act, See wrongful even if the full extent currence of d’Alene, Properties P'ship City son v. Coeur known). damages is not 166, 169-70, 971, Idaho 59 P.3d 974-75 ject promotes completed bringing project completion suit for wise. The rule before damages completion, judicial economy certainty, because until there was which bene- takings parties no reliable method to determine the extent of fits all involved case. damages. (quoting Foley v. Id. Cedar Additionally, under Idaho Code 7-711 (1907)). Rapids, 133 Iowa 110 N.W. 158 (2002), government takes a citizen’s when real he or she entitled sever- The Father also that in a reasoned damages taking ance when the results wrongful gov- situation where the act was a separate parcels Covington of land. See project, “project ernment construction County, 137 completion” rule better suited the Jefferson argument, At oral C & G’s because, requirement notice ITCA’s only a fraction counsel indicated small pursu- until the all the acts State damages jury total awarded were construction, ant to the contract it made for of the actual taken. A sub- value parties could not assess the extent of damages stantial amount of the were due to damages. at Fur- Id. Although of & severance thermore, the Father Court reasoned if a damages may severance be estimated before party present with a occurs, obviously they can be more claim, government might complete better accurately satisfactorily determined after attempt clearly settlement the basis *5 completion of construction. ascertainable facts. Id. The Father Court reasoning independent poli- also based its analysis not be taken as a- This should considerations, cy primarily the need cer- McCuskey re- reversal of where claims, tainty efficiency resolving apply project completion fused to Father’s setting a a which dictated standard forth an rule to determine when inverse condem- clearly triggers ascertainable date that nation claim accrues. 128 Idaho requirement. notice Id. at ITCA’s plaintiff In McCuskey, P.2d at 105. P.2d at 689. analogize the nature of asked this Court to Farber, government’s wrongdoing in a reasoning find the of Father and its We tort, continuing to that of an inverse condem- “project completion” proper rule the stan- McCuskey nation. The Court reasoned determining a claim for in- dard when plaintiff provided compelling no reason to purposes verse condemnation accrues for from the standard established in deviate the statute of limitations. A landowner sub- provides compelling Tibbs. C & G rea- jected taking property by or of his her Today’s McCuskey present. failed to sons project a construction should holding not on the nature of the based bring required prematurely to an be Rather, government’s wrongdoing. it damages claim before inverse condemnation public policy requires on sound based fully assessed. See U.S. v. Dickin- be adoption project completion rule. son, 745, 67 91 L.Ed. 331 U.S. S.Ct. Also, today’s holding read to should not be a Neither should landowner be disrupt progeny, the rule of Tibbs and its engage piecemeal litigation forced to or apply to to claims of inverse which continues judicata by suing pre- risk the effects of res involving condemnation not a construction rather, maturely; a citizen whose project. of a construction land is taken means completion project right has the to wait until Substantial, Competent B. Evidence before his or her inverse Supports Finding That The claim accrues for of cal- demnation Highway To Prove District Failed culating Id. Fur- the statute of limitations. Quasi The Affirmative Defense Of thermore, Highway District’s erroneous Estoppel. it had an easement over the section belief Quasi party estoppel prevents a in this case. It line caused the confusion asserting right, to the detriment precedent for this Court to would be bad party, which is inconsistent with government’s misrepresentation, another condone the mistaken, previously Floyd taken. v. Bd. innocently by holding position other- albeit this, competent evi- County, Based on Bonneville Comm’rs of finding court’s supports the district dence (citing E. that: Neibaur, Agric. Idaho Credit Ass’n. (1999)). posi- not take an inconsistent Plaintiff did

Quasi estoppel applies tion, be un knowledge when it would of the facts and his with party it was rights, regarding conscionable to allow the to be es- whether or not compensation for the tak- change they entitled to seek topped positions to from one merely property. Plaintiff be- ing of its acquiesced they accepted or from one incorrect as- Highway lieved the quasi estoppel apply, For to benefit. Id. Highway District had an that the sertion gained party estopped to be must have either Assuming Plaintiff could easement.... advantage against party, pro some the other acquiesced held to be have disadvantage party, or duced to the other an District’s incorrect assertion that it had party the other must have been induced to Plaintiffs easement across change positions. Id. not be for Plaintiff unconscionable The district found the Dis- that the District did now assert prove trict defense of failed affirmative and that Plaintiff not have such easement quasi estoppel prove because it failed to compensation is therefore entitled position regarding taking property. took an inconsistent of its G compensa- whether or not C & G would seek Therefore, find- we affirm the district court’s tion for the ing prove that the District failed simply district court found C & G believed quasi estoppel. the elements representation that the Is Entitled To An Award Of C. C & G along owned an easement the section fine. Attorney Appeal. Fees On *6 found, assuming The district also even prevailing A condemnee is entitled District, acquiesced Highway to it attorney appeal. to an of fees on award is not now unconscionable for C & G to Jardine, State ex. Rel. Smith v. Highway assert District had no easement (1997). 1137, 1141 The compensation. and seek awarding attorney ap on rationale for fees finding regarding The district court’s peal prevailing to is so the condemnee Highway prove quasi failure es- deprived part just of condemnee is not substantial, toppel supported by competent is compensation or she is entitled to which he evidence. None of the District offi- result, under the Constitution. Id. As a C & cials testified that C & G donated or consent- condemnee, G, prevailing as is entitled to gratuitous taking property. ed to the attorney appeal. an award of fees on of Several District officials tes- moving

tified Martin was favor of the road. IV. However, may while Martin have favored CONCLUSION road, moving the such an not attitude does reflect donative intent or intent not to seek private prop- When the takes compensation for C & G’s taken erty by means of a construction with- knowing Pa- The Commissioners testified to proceedings, out condemnation the statute of tricia, shares, who half owns of C & G’s limitations, bringing of an in- opposed the New Middleton Road. All the claim, triggered upon verse condemnation is property they were affected owners testified result, completion of construction. As a compen- not told the January complaint for inverse High- sate them for their land because the timely condemnation was filed because the way District owned an easement. Patricia Highway substantially com- District did not legal testified she was threatened with action plete May until construction of road one of the Commissioners if she continued finding court’s that the district prove opposing the New Middleton Road. District failed to its affirmative defense quasi estoppel supported by upon is We are now called decide G, competent prevail- evidence. C & as the whether in a situation like this a landowner ing party, attorney entitled to an award might bring as be allowed to suit soon as appeal. fees and costs Assuming inundation threatens. that such sustained, an action would be it is' not a SCHROEDER, WALTERS, Justices good enough why reason he must sue then and Justices Pro Tem SCHWARTZMAN have, moment, or that statute of and HOHNHORST concur. against run him.... limitations SCHWARTZMAN, Justice Pro Tem dealing problem When with a specially concurring. arises under such diverse circumstances opinion I concur in the of this lead Court. procedural rigidities should be avoided. Adopting “project completion” puts rule holding All that we are here when majority Idaho in line with the courts the Government chooses not to condemn upon called to determine the time the statute bring taking by land but to about a begins physi- of limitations to run in a direct events, continuing process physical taking/inverse cal condemnation case. required owner is not to resort either Dickinson, United States 331 U.S. piecemeal premature litigation or to to as- (1947), S.Ct. 91 L.Ed. 1789 the Su- just compensation certain for what is preme cogently set forth both the really taken. legal reasoning policy sound consider- supporting ations this rule: 747-749, 1384-1385, Id. at 67 S.Ct. at could, course, have Government (internal L.Ed. at 1793-1794 citations and appropriate proceedings, taken to condemn omitted); Inn, quotations Pierpont see also chose, early flowage as as both land and Cal.Rptr. Inc. v. Cal.2d By proceedings easements. such it could have fixed the time when the case, Certainly, in this Dis- taken. trict could have fixed the time when the It The Government chose not to do so. by instituting an action was taken events, physical thereby left the may to condemn whatever interest C & G putting on the owner the onus of determin- However, have owned in the land. it volun- ing process the decisive moment *7 tarily chose not to do so. acquisition by the the United States when taking longer in fact of could no be contro- Despite its choice not to institute condem- versy. ... claim traces back to the [T]he proceedings, nation the Amendment, prohibition of Fifth nor nevertheless asserts that & G be should private property shall be taken for estopped pursuing rightful its claim use, just compensation. without The Con- by even if that claim is not barred the statute preserve practical stitution is intended to of limitations. The District’s mis- rights, and not to maintain the- substantial (easement) rights perception theory- of the most ridden of ories. One hardly inure to to allow should its benefit legal concepts is a cause of action. This effect, In estoppel. such an C & G was told shifting meanings recognized Court has its “go fight city disagreed hall” if it with the danger determining rights and the contention that District’s erroneous upon of a cause of action based definitions in and could it had an easement concept unrelated to the function which the paying just upon it- build road without' particular in serves situation. any compensation. party If should receive expresses a .... Fifth Amendment quasi equitable estoppel, benefit of an or principle of fairness and not a technical otherwise, being then would favor its used I enshrining procedure rule of old or new de- against the Government’s affirmative regarding causes of action —when niceties raising fense of the statute of limitations born, they they proliferate, are whether place the first under the circumstances- de- they and when die. runway decision, by an that is- sioned extension scribed herein. Given our caused aircraft municipal airport which sue is now moot. over-fly Adopting routinely their farmstead. Pro Tem concurs. Justice HOHNHORST approach taken the U.S. Court proceedings brought in similar Claims HOHNHORST, specially Pro Tem Justice government, the court against the federal concurring. in value should be held that the diminution Schwartzman, Judge fully in Like I concur “[Ajfter full extent of the determined majority opinion. join spe- I also in his enjoyment impairment plaintiffs’ use and only separately cial concurrence. I write for apparent.” property] become [the invasive, purpose pointing out that quoting Aaron v. Idaho at 603 P.2d 1001 uncompensated takings which entail the con- States, 798, 802, 160 Ct.Cl. 311 F.2d United private public improvements struction of (Ct.Cl.1963). property have distinct characteristics which McCuskey, simply took its apart and set them from both non-invasive concerning of valu- holding in Tibbs the date “regulatory” takings. so-called There are double-duty to fix pressed ation and it into recog- practical policy sound reasons for the date of accrual for statute-of-limitation nizing presents these distinctions. This case purposes in inverse condemnation cases. example a classic of these differences and readily why explain principles serves to history, several In view of this observa- McCuskey Canyon County set forth in First, abundantly tions seem fair. those who Commissioners, 912 P.2d 100 today’s are critical of decision on the basis Sandpoint, and Tibbs v. McCuskey surreptitiously overrules of (1979) inappo- are Tibbs are to be reminded that while and/or site. McCuskey fairly praised decision be singular efficiency creating single its First, it should be noted that the Court pur- date for both limitation and valuation does and has not overruled either symme- poses, it achieved this administrative Tibbs; rather, McCuskey or the Court has try by shortening gov- the time within which distinguished presented the facts here from responsible ernmental authorities can be held Tibbs, presented McCuskey those violating state provisions of both the types has clarified the of cases to which prohibit and federal constitutions which McCuskey apply. and Tibbs just property without com- McCuskey the Court determined that pensation. gov- actions inverse condemnation are Secondly, critical of the those who are year erned four “catch-all” limitation majority’s apply the rationale of decision § set forth I.C. 5-224. 5- While Farber v. provides applies that actions to which it (1981) on the basis that Farber involved the (4) years “[MJust be commenced within four *8 filing of a issue of the time accrued,” the cause action shall have after of claim under the Idaho Tort Claims notice specify it does when “the cause of action limitation, Act, rather than statute accrued” in order to the statu- shall have set McCuskey that the court in should remember tory period of limitation in motion. Tibbs, premised holding upon its which ad- McCuskey, this un- resolved valuation, the issue of the date dressed certainty by “borrowing” from its earlier de- pur- of accrual for limitation not the date Tibbs, cision in Tibbs. the Court was logic in poses. There is at least as much upon called to determine the date as of which relying upon Farber when a determine subject property which is the of an inverse period commences to run. limitation taking should be valued. Unlike the situa- Third, here, important presented plaintiffs in Tibbs it is to note that eases tion physical an actual invasion like property claimed their had been taken as a which involve readily occurred here can be dis- probable of increased noise and re- that which result takings height tinguished from like strictions on the of construction occa- non-invasive not, Tibbs, land, regulatory takings nominal amount at that involved stake matter, justify McCuskey. practical If one as a the commence- like involved disre- condemnation gards the fact that of ment of full-blown inverse Tibbs involved the date action, valuation, including cost of em- the associated and instead treats it as if it were surveyors ploying experts, and able valuation intended to the date of accrual for establish recovery potential counsel. The of sub- purposes, it limitation makes some sense compensation for additional sever- stantial plaintiffs obligation tie the to file his non- entirely damage change ance can this calcu- invasive inverse condemnation claim at the lus. point in time when “the full extent of the impairment plaintiffs enjoyment use and At Such seems to be the case here. oral apparent.” ... became 100 Idaho at jury argument, counsel noted that while Similarly, 603 P.2d 1001. in cases like $212,000, damages totaling awarded

McCuskey, “taking” where the consists of the concerning the own evidence value adoption or enforcement of governmental relatively actually amount of land occu- small regulations preclude plaintiff from which by fair market value pied the roadbed had a using any economically land for his viable $12,000. remaining approximately, purpose, it makes sense to hold that $200,000, attributable to the severance loss “[Bjecame plaintiff claim accrues when the of & farm- suffered to the remainder C G’s government’s aware of the full extent of the represented the ver- land more than 94% of interference ...” 128 Idaho at dict. difficulty that, the ratio- even under

By comparison, a en- case which instead McCuskey, the “full extent nale of Tibbs and physical an tails actual invasion of impairment” with severance associated related, produces property two but distinct damage ordinarily will not to the remainder first, obvious, forms of harm. The and most public project be ascertainable until the deprivation is the of the fair market value of begins. compel and its use To actually public the land consumed produce which is un- landowner to evidence second, improvement. The less-obvious but necessarily conjectural attempt pre- an equally important element of loss is the eco- can be dict his loss either its existence before injury upon any adjoining nomic inflicted amount can be measured confirmed or its invaded, actually which is not just to represents a result which is neither plaintiffs ownership. which remains wrongfully been de- the landowner who has principle It is a that where well-established prived which of his nor public’s use of the condemned land di- just pay compensation required must adjoining, untak- minishes the value of other require taking. It is not unreasonable en the owner is entitled to recover governmental entity violated a has (typically as this loss referred to “severance right citizen’s basic constitutional to remain damage”) in addition to the value of the subject to suit until the occurrence of actual 7-711(2). See, e.g., invaded land. I.C. wrongful loss to its conduct attributable Canyon Irr. Co. v. Twin Falls Canal View Adopting the time of be verified and valued. Co., (1980); 619 P.2d 122 as the of accrual of a project-completion date Symms State ex. rel. Mountain in- claim for inverse condemnation which Home, accomplishes physical invasion volves simple goal. *9 Finally, majority other states frequently the vast It is the case that while issue, actually occupied by public which have been faced with the same of land value states, minor, relatively including our sister western have improvement is the sever- completion remaining property to fix the date of damage elected ance purposes. limitation as the date of accrual for caused use is See, County, occupied e.g., DeAlfy Properties land itself v. Pima the value of the exceeds 37, 522, (Ariz.App. if Ariz. 985 P.2d 524 by magnitudes. may It well be that 195 Inn, 1998); occupied Pierpont Inc. v. 70 Cal.2d value of the loss were limited to the 521, 737, 282, 744-45 Cal.Rptr. (overruled

(1969) grounds); part on other Colorado,

Shockley v. Public Serv. Co. of den.); 1183, (Colo.App.1974)(cert.

P.2d Minot, 570, City

Maragos v. 191 N.W.2d Centralia, (N.D.1971); v. Gillam 663-64 Wash.2d

(overruled Wyo part grounds); on other

ming Hwy. Dept. Napolitano, v. State Today’s (Wyo.1978). de

P.2d 1350-51 brings Idaho into line with this well-

cision majority rule.

established reasons, those set forth in

For these majority opinion Judge Schwartz- concurrence, join I in the deci- special

man’s holding that

sion to affirm the district court’s & inverse condemnation claim was not

C G’s

barred the statute of limitation. Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

STATE of DORSEY, Defendant-Appellant.

John M.

No. 27373. Appeals of Idaho.

June 2003.

Rehearing Aug. Denied

Case Details

Case Name: C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 29, 2003
Citation: 75 P.3d 194
Docket Number: 28128
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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