This is a certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District. The certificate is as follows:
"Appellee instituted this suit in Justice Court against C.E. Slayton Co., a firm composed of C.E. Slayton and Earnest Slayton, as one of the defendants, and Virge Murray as the other defendant, claiming damages against all of the defendants for the conversion of personal property. Upon a trial of the case in Justice Court, appellee recovered judgment on the 30th day of January, 1903, against C.E. Slayton Co., and Virge Murray for $90. Slayton Co. within ten days from the date of the judgment filed an appeal bond for the purpose of appealing the case to the County Court, which bond was made payable to W.F. Horsey alone.
"On June 18th appellee filed his motion in the County Court to dismiss the appeal from the Justice Court because the bond was not made payable to Virge Murray, as well as to appellee, which motion the court sustained and dismissed the appeal by its judgment.
"By reason of the conflict between the decision of this court in the case of Baldwin v. White, 26 S.W. Rep., 455, and following cases, Martin v. Lapowski, 11 Texas Civ. App. 690[
"Question 1. Did the County Court err in dismissing the appeal?
"Question 2. Can one of several defendants in justice court where such defendants are not adversely interested, appeal without naming his codefendants in judgment obligees in the bond?"
We are of the opinion that both questions should be answered in the affirmative. We think the opinion of Mr. Justice Stephens in the case of Martin v. Lapowski, 11 Texas Civ. App. 690[
The statute prescribes, in effect, that in order to appeal from a justice's judgment, "the party appealing" shall give bond "payable to the appellee." Rev. Stats., art. 1670. By "appellee" is meant the party against whom the appeal is taken — that is to say, the party who has an interest adverse to setting aside the judgment.
In this case, the judgment was rendered against Slayton Co. and against Murray as wrongdoers, and if both the firm and Murray were liable at all they were severally liable to the plaintiff, and neither had any interest in a judgment for or against the other. *Page 344