ClabksoN, J.

From tbe facts appearing on this record, we think it immaterial to decide whether tbe petition of J. N. Bryant and George H. Howell, trustee, was a special or general appearance. Buncombe County v. Penland, ante, 299 (304). Tbe defendant corporation was in tbe bands of receivers. Bryant and Howell, trustee, filed a petition in tbe cause praying that they be permitted to appear specially for tbe purpose alone, of securing an order to proceed to foreclose tbe deed in trust securing tbe $15,000 and interest less payments already made. Pelletier v. Lumber Co., 123 N. C., 596 (600); Bolich v. Ins. Co., 202 N. C., 189 (792); Blades v. Hood, Comr., 203 N. C., 56 (59); see concurring opinion of Clark, J., in Pelletier case, supra; Leah v. Armfield, 187 N. C., 625.

Tbe court below granted tbe petition of Bryant and Howell, trustee. It further ordered tbe trustee to pay tbe sum of $3,000 into court and upon sale of tbe property, tbe title to said sum to be hereafter adjudicated. Tbe order further provided “And this cause be retained for further orders.” Tbe sole question presented was tbe order as to tbe *595 sale of tbe property, under tbe deed of trust. Bryant and Howell, trustee, appeared in tbe receivership action and it makes no difference if tbe appearance is special or general and petitioned for a sale of tbe property, when tbis was granted it was incumbent tbat Bryant and Howell, trustee, report to tbe court tbe sale for confirmation or rejection and if tbe price was inequitable, inadequate and would result in irreparable damage, tbe court in its equitable jurisdiction bas tbe right to order resale so tbat tbe property shall bring a conscionable price. In Woltz v. Safe Deposit Co., ante, 239: Tbe constitutionality of chapter 275, Public Laws of 1933, entitled, “An act to regulate tbe sale of real property upon tbe foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of trust,” is upheld and tbe reasons given therefor. Whitaker v. Chase, ante, 335; Hopkins v. Swain, ante, 439. Until final confirmation of tbe sale of tbe property made by Bryant and Howell, trustee, tbe receivers may — with tbe consent of Bryant and Howell, rent tbe property and tbe fund arising out of rental, held to discharge tbe liens on tbe property or paid ultimately to tbe parties entitled thereto, under tbe decree of tbe court. Tbis course can be pursued, as it is contended on tbe argument, tbat tbe hotel property is a summer resort hotel and there is urgency in tbe matter. If tbe procedure is not followed as herein indicated, under tbe facts and circumstances of tbis case, tbe beneficent provisions of chapter 275, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1933, will be nullified and the equitable arm of tbe court paralyzed. Hon. John D. Bellamy, one of tbe nestors of tbe "Wilmington bar, on tbe argument in tbis Court eloquently portrayed bow tbe equities of tbe creditors and tbe Hotel Company would be wiped out — if equity did not step in and give relief. Tbe stockholders consisted of nearly 100 citizens of Wilmington, who paid in nearly $100,000. Tbe general unsecured creditors amounted to $2,700. Tbe taxes unpaid, $3,100. As said, tbe land when sold under tbe Bryant and Howell, trustee, deed of trust for tbe $15,000 and interest and insurance advanced, less installments paid, should be reported to tbe court so tbat it can be determined if tbe price is not inequitable, inadequate and would not result in irreparable damage. Courts of equity, irrespective of tbe statute of 1933, have tbe inherent right to pursue tbe course as herein indicated. We think tbat tbe order affected a substantial right and an appeal was proper. In accordance with tbis decision, tbe judgment of tbe court below is

Modified and affirmed.