*3 LYNCH , Circuit Judge . The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires that students with certain disabilities be provided a "[f]ree appropriate public education" (FAPE) in the "[l]east restrictive environment" (LRE) appropriate for each student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (5). Under the IDEA and Massachusetts law, the individualized education programs (IEPs) of certain disabled students must also contain postsecondary transition goals and services based on age- appropriate assessments. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2.
Appellants are C.D., a resident of Natick, Massachusetts, who qualified as a child with a disability under the IDEA, and her parents. They challenge this circuit's prior interpretations of these IDEA requirements as incomplete or as inconsistent with the IDEA and current Supreme Court case law. The parents seek reimbursement for at least three years of C.D.'s education in a specialized private school. Rejecting these challenges, we affirm the district court, which upheld a decision of the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) ruling that the Natick Public School District (Natick) had complied with the FAPE, LRE, and transition requirements in proposed IEPs for C.D. See C.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.D. II), No. 15-
13617-FDS,
I.
The IDEA offers states federal funds for the education
of children with disabilities in exchange for the states'
commitments to comply with the IDEA's directives, including its
FAPE and LRE requirements. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy,
A FAPE "comprises 'special education and related
services' -- both 'instruction' tailored to meet a child's 'unique
needs' and sufficient 'supportive services' to permit the child to
benefit from that instruction." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137
S. Ct. 743, 748 – 49 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26),
(29)). "The primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE is an IEP."
D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito,
The IDEA also requires states receiving federal funds to educate disabled children in the "[l]east restrictive environment" appropriate for each child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). The statute mandates at § 1412(a)(5)(A):
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. The Supreme Court has characterized this LRE mandate as
embodying a "preference" for "mainstreaming" students with
disabilities in "the regular classrooms of a public school system."
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03 (1982); see also
Endrew F.,
IDEA's preference for mainstreaming "is not absolute." T.M. ex
rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist.,
The final IDEA requirement at issue here is the instruction at § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) that certain students' IEPs "include[] . . . appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment, and . . . independent living skills" along with "the transition services (including courses of study) needed to assist the child in reaching those goals." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)-(bb). Massachusetts has made these transition requirements applicable starting at age fourteen. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (making this requirement applicable "beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the child is 16"). Because C.D. was fourteen or older when the IEPs at issue were proposed, these requirements applied.
II.
C.D. has borderline intellectual functioning and significant deficits in language ability. She attended public school in Natick through fifth grade. For middle school, she attended McAuliffe Regional Charter Public School in Framingham, Massachusetts, where she took all of her classes except math in a regular classroom setting. To assist C.D., two private tutors hired by C.D.'s parents attended C.D.'s middle school classes with her.
The summer before C.D. entered high school, her parents worked with Natick to develop an IEP for C.D.'s ninth grade year at Natick High School. C.D.'s parents wanted C.D. to continue her education in a regular classroom setting, with the help of the same private tutors. School officials explained that only Natick employees were allowed to teach or tutor students in Natick's classrooms.
Natick was concerned that larger class sizes and more advanced content in high school would make it difficult for C.D. to access the general education curriculum. It considered placing C.D. in replacement classes in which a modified general education curriculum is taught by a special education teacher. Ultimately, Natick, in its proposed IEP, chose a third option.
The school presented C.D.'s parents with a proposed ninth grade IEP, for the 2012-2013 school year, that placed C.D. *8 in regular classrooms for her elective courses but in a setting called the ACCESS Program for her academic courses. The ACCESS Program is a self-contained special education program located at Natick High School and designed for students who, like C.D., have cognitive and communication deficits. ACCESS offers a significantly modified curriculum, and its students typically earn certificates rather than high school diplomas.
C.D.'s parents rejected the IEP, saying that the ACCESS Program was an overly "restricted environment" and that C.D.'s placement there would "hinder" her academic and social growth. They enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep School, a private school that specializes in educating students with disabilities.
The summer before C.D. was to enter tenth grade, Natick presented to C.D.'s parents an IEP for the 2013-2014 school year that again placed C.D. in the ACCESS Program for her academic classes. C.D.'s parents again rejected the IEP, giving the same reasons, and enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep.
Before the next school year, the IEP Team reconvened, this time with the benefit of a fresh set of assessments of C.D. Based on these assessments and on reports of C.D.'s progress at Learning Prep, Natick proposed a new IEP for the 2014-2015 school year that placed C.D. in a mix of ACCESS classes, replacement classes, and general education classes. C.D.'s parents rejected this IEP for two reasons. As they saw it, the proposed schedule *9 left inadequate time for speech and language services. In addition, Natick had not yet conducted a formal postsecondary transition assessment. As to C.D.'s postsecondary transition, the 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and initial 2014-2015 IEPs had stated the parents' goal that C.D. graduate from high school and had provided transition and vocational services from the school's learning center.
Natick then performed a formal transition assessment and presented a revised 2014-2015 IEP. This final IEP proposed the same mix of classes, but extended C.D.'s school day to allow for speech and language therapy as well as career preparation services. C.D.'s parents rejected this IEP, and C.D. attended Learning Prep for the 2014-2015 school year.
In 2014, C.D.'s parents filed a complaint with the BSEA seeking reimbursement for C.D.'s tuition at Learning Prep. To qualify for reimbursement, the parents had to show that Natick's IEPs for 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 "had not made a free appropriate public education available." [2] See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). After a hearing in May 2015, a BSEA Hearing *10 Officer denied the parents' request for reimbursement. The Hearing Officer concluded that the IEPs were "reasonably calculated to provide [C.D.] with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment." And the Hearing Officer found that the facts and testimony presented did not support the parents' arguments that the transition assessments and plans were inadequate. [3]
C.D.'s parents sought review of the BSEA's decision in
federal district court. The district court denied the parents'
motion for summary judgment and their supplemental motion for
summary judgment. See C.D. I,
III.
C.D.'s parents now argue that the district court applied
the wrong legal standards. They say first that Endrew F. defined
"progress appropriate" as "appropriately ambitious" and
"challenging" so that the district court was required to ask, in
*12
evaluating whether a FAPE was offered, whether the IEPs contained
sufficiently "challenging objectives." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at
1000. Next, the parents urge us to adopt, and contend that the
district court should have applied, a multi-part test from Daniel
R.R. v. State Board of Education,
Our review of the district court on these legal issues
is de novo. See Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch.,
A.
Until
Endrew
F.,
the
Supreme
Court
had
"declined . . . to endorse any one standard for determining"
whether the services offered in a student's IEP amounted to a FAPE.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993. This circuit, along with several
others, said that to offer a FAPE, an IEP must be "individually
*13
designed" and "reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful
educational benefit." D.B., 675 F.3d at 34-35 (citing D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ.,
C.D.'s parents say that our Johnson decision restricted
its view to Endrew F.'s language about "progress appropriate in
light of the child's circumstances," Endrew F.,
Under both Endrew F. and our precedent, a court
evaluating whether an IEP offers a FAPE must determine whether the
IEP was reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational
benefit in light of the child's circumstances. See Johnson, 906
F.3d at 195; cf. K.D. ex rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist.,
The district court also did not err in applying that
standard to the facts in the record. The parents maintain that
C.D. would not have made appropriate progress in the ACCESS
Program, but the district court reasonably concluded that the
*16
record supported the BSEA's finding that C.D., given her diagnosed
intellectual disability and serious language deficits, could be
expected to make meaningful progress in the ACCESS program and
general education electives. See C.D. II,
B.
C.D.'s parents argue next that the 2012-2013 and 2013-
2014 IEPs violated the LRE mandate by proposing to place C.D. in
the ACCESS Program, which the parents view as overly restrictive.
They urge us to adopt, and argue that the district court should
have applied, the multi-step test from the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Daniel R.R. to evaluate this claim. See
Courts that use the Daniel R.R. methodology evaluate
compliance with the LRE mandate in two steps, asking first "whether
education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary
*17
aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily," and, if the
child cannot be educated in the regular classroom, asking second
"whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum
extent appropriate." Id. at 1048. In answering the first
question, Daniel R.R. instructs courts to consider whether the
district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in
a regular classroom; the benefits, both academic and non-academic,
available to the child in a regular class compared to the benefits,
both academic and non-academic, available in a more restricted
class; and the effects of inclusion on other children in the
regular classroom. Id. at 1048-49; see also Oberti by Oberti v.
Bd. of Educ.,
The parents frame their claim as presenting the
following question, which they say is one of first impression in
this circuit: When does a school's decision to educate a child
with disabilities in a setting other than the regular classroom
violate the IDEA's LRE mandate? Several other circuits, the
parents observe, have used the Daniel R.R. test to evaluate
parents' claims that their children should be mainstreamed. See
*18
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17; T.M.,
The text of § 1412(a)(5)(A) and prior precedent provide the guidance we need to evaluate whether Natick complied with the LRE mandate here. In eschewing the Daniel R.R. test because "[t]he Act itself provides enough of a framework," we join the Seventh Circuit. See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to adopt the Daniel R.R. test).
C.D.'s parents argue that the Daniel R.R. test adds
needed "complexity" to the statute's terms. But determining an
appropriate placement for a disabled child is already a complex
task. It is one that "involves choices among educational policies
and theories -- choices which courts, relatively speaking, are
*19
poorly equipped to make." Roland M.,
We proceed to review the district court's decision under § 1412(a)(5)(A) and our cases interpreting it. Again, the IDEA mandates, at § 1412(a)(5)(A):
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a *20 child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Our cases have "weighed" this
preference for mainstreaming "in concert with the" FAPE mandate.
Roland M.,
The district court correctly identified this legal framework. Quoting Roland M., the district court explained that "'[m]ainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill substantive educational criteria.' Rather, the benefits to be gained from *21 mainstreaming must be weighed against the educational improvements that could be attained in a more restrictive (that is, non- mainstream) environment." [12] C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Roland M.,
We see no error in the district court's appropriately deferential analysis. As we have emphasized, the IDEA vests state and local educational officials, not federal courts, with the primary responsibility to make placement decisions consistent with § 1412(a)(5)(A).
C.
C.D.'s parents next argue that the district court ignored the plain language of the IDEA in affirming the BSEA's ruling that the IEPs complied with the statute's transition provision. Not so.
We have previously held that the IDEA "does not require a stand-alone transition plan." Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist. (Lessard I), 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008). Nor does the statute require that the underlying transition assessments take a particular form. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). Indeed, there is no restriction on the means of gathering information about a student's interests or abilities that may be relevant to the development of postsecondary transition goals. See, e.g., Mass. Dep't of Elementary & *23 Secondary Educ., Transitional Assessment in the Secondary Transition Planning Process, Technical Advisory SPED 2014-4, at 1- 3 (Apr. 9, 2014) (declining to adopt 'a restrictive approach which might seem to imply the required use of highly specialized formal assessments for each student").
The district court did not err in articulating or
applying these transition requirements. It discussed the
statute's assessment and planning dimensions, it cited repeatedly
to Massachusetts' guidance implementing the federal provision, and
it relied on case law correctly applying the transition
requirement. See C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *19, *21 (citing
Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg'l Sch. Dist.,
IV.
Affirmed.
Notes
[1] Roland M. interpreted the IDEA's predecessor statute,
see
[2] The transition planning and transition assessment requirements are procedural. Only certain procedural flaws, such as those that result in the denial of a FAPE or "a deprivation of educational benefits," are actionable under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 195 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying this harmless error principle to a claimed violation of the transition requirements).
[3] The Hearing Officer also rejected other arguments not presented on appeal.
[4] The district court first remanded in part to the BSEA for the Hearing Officer to confirm that she had applied a standard consistent with Endrew F.
[5] The district court held that any challenges to the
initial 2014-2015 IEP were mooted by that IEP's replacement with
the final 2014-2015 IEP. C.D. I,
[6] Other circuits that use a "meaningful benefit" standard
have held the same. See L.H. v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ., 900
F.3d 779, 792 n.5 (6th Cir. 2018); Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of
Educ.,
[7] C.D.'s parents argue that, in evaluating the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 IEPs, the BSEA misapplied the First Circuit's FAPE standard by omitting the word "meaningful" from its analysis. But the BSEA did not overlook that operative word.
[8] Natick and the BSEA argue that C.D.'s parents waived
their argument based on Daniel R.R. by neglecting to "set forth
[its] multifactor test" before the district court. But we deem
sufficient the parents' reliance on Daniel R.R. in the district
court; the parents' motions cited to and the district court quoted
from Daniel R.R. See C.D. II,
[9] The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the Sixth
Circuit's test from Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983), which asks "whether the services which make . . . [an
alternative] placement superior could be feasibly provided in a
non-segregated setting." Id. at 1063; see also DeVries v. Fairfax
Cty. Sch. Bd.,
[10] See, e.g., C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch.
Dist.,
[11] We have recognized that educating students with
disabilities with their nondisabled peers can have benefits for
disabled students' social and communication skills. See Lenn v.
Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1090 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1993)
(citing Oberti,
[12] The parents argue that the district court "erred where it did not even articulate the need to balance non-academic benefits against the putative academic advantages of a substantially separate classroom." But the district court properly understood the balancing inquiry outlined in Roland M.
[13] C.D.'s parents' dispute of a related factual finding made by the BSEA in its initial ruling on the LRE issue is misplaced. The district court ultimately reviewed the facts as clarified by the BSEA.
[14] Specifically, C.D.'s 2012-2013 IEP stated that C.D.'s parents hoped she would receive a high school diploma and vocational training. The IEP outlined educational goals and services that would have helped C.D. make progress toward that diploma, and it also provided for vocational services from the school's learning center. The 2013-2014 IEP was similar, and it added opportunities to meet with the school's guidance counselor and career specialist to discuss post-secondary plans. The final 2014-2015 IEP further proposed educational and vocational services and set out specific goals related to job readiness, job coaching, and independent living.