C.B. v. StateC.B. v. State
Lead Opinion
Aрpellant was convicted of battery on an employee of the school district. Because the evidence does not support the conviction, we reverse.
At trial, the defеndant’s teacher, who was the victim in the case, testified as follows:
“[C.B.] came in the classroom ... and I asked him to hand me the lighter that he had in his pocket. He said he didn’t have one. I asked him agаin to turn over the lighter and when I did, he was a — was a little angry and he went to throw the lighter. He didn’t really throw it at me, but it did hit me.”
She said that the lighter hit her “[w]here my ankle would be in my shoe,” “[s]o I didn’t have any bruising.” Further explaining, she sаid that “he did not throw it at me. I don’t believe that he meant to hit me, but he did throw the lighter toward me and it did hit me.” As she described it, the lighter bounced off the floor and hit her.
An assistant teacher, who was in the classroom when the incident occurred, testified that the teacher “asked for the lighter and [C.B.] went to go and put the lighter to the floor.” She said he “just threw it down like — -‘cause he didn’t want to give it ... so he just threw it down. And it ricocheted and that was all that was, was done.”
C.B. testified that:
“I was angry because ... I was sitting on my desk and these girls were going through my pockets. So then that’s what kinda made me angry, because I was telling the teacher about the girls going through my pockets, cause the girls have no right going through looking in my pockets.”
He further said that he “wasn’t even paying attention to where I was throwing it, just tossed it to the — towards the ground.” Hе said that he threw the lighter, but “did not intentionally throw it at the teacher.” He explained that he did not throw it overhand but “towards the ground.” He
At the close of the state’s case, and again at the end of all the evidence, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed to prove a prima facie case of battery. He contended that battery is a specific intent crime and that there was no evidence that defendant intended to strike his teachеr. The state argued that proof of the intent to do the act that resulted in the teacher being struck by the lighter was sufficient. The trial court denied the motion. Ultimately the court adjudicated defendant delinquent for commission of the battery.
Section 784.03(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes (2000), defines battery as occurring when a person “[ajctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person agаinst the will of the other.” As a general intent crime, the battery statute “prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act.” Linehan v. State,
In this case, it is not enough to sustain a conviction that the defendant intentionally threw the lighter at the floor; the state was also required to prove that the defendant threw the lighter in such a way that it was substantially certain that it would hit the teachеr’s ankle. The teacher did not think her student meant to hit her with the lighter. The assistant teacher said the defendant “just threw it down and it richo-cheted.”
The evidence of the defendant’s intent was circumstantial. The evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, because it was consistent with the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defendant threw the lighter at the floor and hit his teacher only because of a crazy bounce. See State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989) (stating that “[wjhere the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot bе sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”).
This was not a case of transferred intent, where the defendant aimed the lighter at A but missed,. hitting B. In such a situаtion, the law considers the defendant just as guilty of battery as if he had actually harmed the intended victim. See La-Fave & Scott, CRiminal Law § 35. Here, there was no intended victim, only the floor.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Section 784.03(1) defines battery thus: “[t]he offense of battery occurs when a person ... actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other.... ” In Linehan v. State,
“A ‘general intent’ statute is one that prohibits either а specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act (e.g., damage to a building is the natural result of the act of setting a building afire). A person’s subjective intent to cаuse the particular result is irrelevant to general intent crimes because the law ascribes to him a presumption that he intended such a result. ‘[A] man is to be taken to intend what he does, or thаt which is the*1074 necessary and natural consequence of his own act.’ R. Perkins, PeRkins on Criminal Law 748 (2d ed.1969), citing Harrison v. Commonwealth,79 Va. 374 , 377 (1884). Thus, in general intent statutes words such as ‘willfully’ or ‘intentionally,’ without more, indicate only that the person must have intended to do the act and serve to distinguish that conduct from accidental (noncriminal) behavior or strict liability crimes.”
“Specific intent statutes, on the other hand, prohibit an act when accompanied by some intent other than the intent to do the act itself or the intent (or presumed intent) to cause the natural and necessary consequences of the act. ... Thus, to be a ‘specific intent’ crime, a criminal statute which contains words of mental condition like ‘willfully’ or ‘intentionally’ should include language encompassing a subjective intent, for example, intent to cause a result in addition to that which is substantially certain to result from a statutorily prohibited act.”
“To the extent that Russell v. State,373 So.2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), may appear to be inconsistent with our present holding, we recede from Russell. Russell found that the inclusion of the word ‘intentionally’ in section 784.03 ... made battery a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication was a defense. Upon reflection against the background of the foregoing considerations ... wе find no realistic distinction, for the purpose of determining ‘general’ and ‘specific’ intent requirements, between the words ‘willfully’ and ‘intentionally’ in the context of those words as used in the battery and arson statutes.” [c.o.]
As indicated the second district had earlier held exactly the opposite, saying that battery was a specific intent crime in Russell v. State,
“Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the сrime of battery on a police officer, Russell v. State,373 So.2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), as in other crimes requiring specific intent.”
While our holding in Mellins was primarily involved with the issue whether voluntary intoxication is a valid defense to the charge of bаttery, it is inescapable that our premise for approving the defense was our legal conclusion that battery is not a general intent crime. We then relied on Mellins and its rationale in Gonzales v. State,
Twelve years after Gonzales, the supreme court directly confronted the general-specific intent issue in Frey v. State,
“To determine whether resisting arrest with violence is a general intent or specific intent crime, we look to the plain language of the statute:
843.01 Resisting officer with violence to his person. — Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the lawful execution оf any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree....
§ 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1993).
*1075 “The statute’s plain language reveals that no heightened or particularizеd, i.e., no specific, intent is required for the commission of this crime, only a general intent to ‘knowingly and willfully’ impede an officer in the performance of his or her duties. In fact, the statute is similar in formаt to the statute defining arson, which we held to be a general intent crime. Only if the present statute were to be recast to require a heightened or particularized intent would the crime of resisting arrest with violence be a specific intent crime. Our holding is in harmony with our precedent. [FNB]
[FN3] ... We disapprove Gonzales v. State,488 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), wherein the court ruled that ‘resisting an arrest with violence[ ] is a specific intent crime.’.... [e.s., c.o.]”
Frey,
The crime at issue in the present case is defined as “actually and intentionally [e.s.] touching] or striking] another persоn against the will of the other.... ” In Frey, the crime was defined as “knowingly and willfully [e.s.] resisting].... ” The adverbs, “knowingly and willfully,” were deemed insufficient in Frey to require a showing of specific intent because they disclosed “no heightened or particularized, i.e., no specific, intent [requirement] for the commission of this crime.... ”
As the court explained in Linehan, “[a] person’s subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrelevant to generаl intent crimes because the law ascribes to him a presumption that he intended such a result.”
Contrary to all of the foregоing, the majority has made battery a specific intent crime by insisting that the state adduce evidence that, in throwing down the lighter, C.B. intended to touch his teacher without her consent or, as they put it, knew that it was virtually certain that the touching would occur. As I understand the cases and the battery statute, it is enough if the state shows that C.B. intended to throw an object that was thrown in her direction and eventually struck her.
Notes
. Gonzales expressly relied on Mellins.