Jimmy Byrnеs appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in his action challenging the denial of his application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found Byrnes’s subjective complaints of diabetic episоdes incredible. Byrnes argues the ALJ failed to make the findings necessary to support his rejection of these complaints. Byrnes also contends the ALJ should reopen his prior application to determine whether his period of disability should run from the date of his initial application rather than from the date of this second application.
We remand for further findings consistent with our decision in Bunnell v. Sullivan,
FACTS
Byrnes first filed an аpplication for SSI benefits on June 20, 1988, alleging he was disabled by diabetes mellitus. His application was denied, and he never appealed. He then filed a sеcond application on April 15, 1990, again alleging disability based on diabetes mellitus. His application was denied at the initial and reconsideration stages.
Byrnes then filed a request for a hearing. That request was granted. At the hearing, Byrnes testified to the effects of his hypoglycemic (abnormally low levels of glucose) and hyperglycemic (abnormally high levels of glucose) episodes:
Well, you know, I get real shaky and sweaty and just real weak. You know, I— there’s [sic] lots of times I don’t know I’m getting lоw. That’s why I carry my blood kit with me. I take my blood on an average of eight, maybe eight times a day, probably average. [S]ometimes more.
When asked how long these attacks lasted, Byrnes answered:
Well, depending on how bad it is, yоu know, hours — sometimes a few hours, sometimes half a day or a day or longer.Depends on how bad I am.... I’ve had diabetes so long, usually feel terrible 90 percent of the time, it seems like, or 99 percent of the time. So I don’t know — you know, I just always feel bad.
The ALJ denied Byrnes’s claim. The ALJ determined that Byrnes’s diabetes was “coming under cоntrol,” and that Byrnes retained a residual function capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work. With respect to Byrnes’s subjective complaints of hypoglycemic and hyperglycemic episodes, the ALJ concluded they were “not corroborated by the medical evidence.”
The ALJ’s decision becаme the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services when the Appeals Council declined to review it. Byrnes then brought this action in the district cоurt seeking judicial review. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court affirmed the Secretary’s decision. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s judgment upholding the Secretary’s denial of benefits. Flaten v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
DISCUSSION
Byrnes contends the ALJ improperly evaluated his subjective complaints of hypoglycemic and hyperglycemic episodes. Specifically, Byrnes arguеs that the ALJ deemed his complaints incredible, without making underlying findings as required by Bunnell v. Sullivan,
The government counters that had Byrnes followed his doctors’ advice and quit smoking, his diabetes would have been controllable. Because he chose not to, argues the government, the ALJ appropriately concluded Byrnes’s subjective complаints of uncontrollable diabetes were incredible.
We turn first to the government’s counterargument. The SSA regulations provide that if a claimant “do[es] not follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason,” he will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530. However, before basing a denial of benefits on noncompliance, the ALJ must “examinе the medical conditions and personal factors that bear on whether [a claimant] can reasonably remedy” his impairment and must make specific findings. Dodrill v. Shalala,
Because the ALJ made no finding that “[Byrnes] was nоt complying with [his] prescribed treatment program[,] that [he] lacked good cause for failing so to comply,” or that if he stopped smoking he could return to wоrk, we “decline to review the record to ascertain whether substantial evidence might support these findings not made.” Rousey,
Turning now to Byrnes’s contentiоns, we agree that the ALJ made inadequate findings to support his conclusion that Byrnes’s subjective complaints of uncontrollable diabetic episodes were incredible.
[0]nce the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain. Furthеr, although an adjudicator may find the claimant’s allegationsof severity to be not credible, the adjudicator must specifically make findings which support this conclusion.
These findings, properly supported by the record, must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejectеd the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.
Bunnell v. Sullivan,
Bunnell controls our disposition of this issue. Although the Bunnell court couched its holding in terms of subjective complaints оf pain, its reasoning extends to Byrnes’s subjective complaints in this case. The existence and severity of a person’s reaction to hypoglycemia or hyрerglycemia, like the existence and severity of pain, are subjective phenomena, the extent of which cannot be objectively measured. See id. at 347; Fair v. Bowen,
The gоvernment does not dispute that Byrnes suffers from diabetes mellitus and associated symptoms. The medical evidence supports Byrnes’s allegations of uncontrolled diabetic episodes. What is in dispute is the frequency and severity of these episodes.
The ALJ found that “[wjhile [Byrnes’s] attorney argues that [Byrnes] would not be capablе of performing basic work-related activities at any exertional level on a regular and continuing basis, the medical evidence of record simply does not corroborate this assertion” and that “[Byrnes’s] testimony concerning the severity of his pain and limitations was not corroborated by the medical evidencе of record.”
Such findings do not meet the Bunnell standard, because we cannot determine whether the ALJ rejected Byrnes’s “testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discount [his] testimony.” Bunnell,
Byrnes contends the ALJ on remand must reopen Byrnes’s prior аpplication to determine whether his period of disability should run from the filing of that application on June 20, 1988, rather than from April 15, 1990, the date he filed his present, seсond application.
We decline to address this contention. If Byrnes is denied benefits by a decision that complies with Bunnell’s, requirements, and that decision becomes final, the question of the date from which benefits should be payable will never arise. On the other hand, if Byrnes should be granted benefits, the ALJ can then make the initial decision whether grounds exist to reopen the earlier application. It would be premature for us to consider the reopening issue at this time.
In view of our remand, we also do not reach Byrnes’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s treatment of the vocational expert’s testimony and the ALJ’s application of the Medical/Vocational Guidelines.
REMANDED.