— Monohon brought an action of slander against Byrhet for charging him with perjury. Plea, that the charge was true. Replication, de injuria. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
On the trial, the Court, on the plaintiff’s motion, instructed the jury as follows :
1. If the statement was fаlse, and was deliberately made with a full knowledge of its falsity, you may infer, the corrupt intention. Whether the statement was thus made, or whether it was the result of mistake, ignorance, or inadvertence, are questions for your detеrmination, looking at all the facts of the case. 2. If the defence bе doubtfully sustained, you may take into consideration the plaintiff’s general сharacter as a man of truth and integrity. _ But if, on the contrary, you should be satisfiеd from the evidence that he committed perjury on the trial, his charaсter however good would be wholly immaterial. 3. Two witnesses, or one witness аnd strong corroborating circumstances, are necessary to sustain the truth of the plea. But the necessity of more than one witness is confined to the proof of the falsity of the plaintiff’s statement. As to all the other material allegations in the plea, except the falsity of the statеment, one witness is sufficient. 4. To sustain the issue on the defendant’s part, he must have proved the plea of justification to be true by two
To all these charges the defendant excepted.
The defendant has no reason to object to the first instruction. When the plaintiff, in an action of slander, proves the speaking of the actionable words laid, the law implies that they are fаlse, and that they were spoken maliciously, unless there is evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury to the contrary. Yeates et ux. v. Reed et ux. 4 Blackf. 463.—Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93.
The second instruction is unobjectionаble. The defendant undertook to prove that the plaintiff had committеd perjury ; and the jury, in making up their minds on the subject, had surely a right to take into consideration, if the defence was not clearly proved, the general good character of the plaintiff for truth. Indeed,, it would seem that such еvidence ought never to be withdrawn from the jury, though it will often be rendered of no avail by the nature of the defendant’s evidence. If the plaintiff were indicted for the offence, it would be proper for the jury, in making up their verdict, to take into consideration his general good character for truth; Roscoe’s Crim. Ev. 72; and the law must be the same in the case before us.
The third and fourth instructions are correct. There could be no objection tо them, had the trial been on an indictment against the plaintiff for perjury. Rosсoe’s Crim. Ev. 686; Regina v. Yates, 1 Carr. & Marshman, 132; and the law on the subject must be the same in this case. See Woodbeck v. Keller, 6 Cowen, 118.—Offutt v. Earlywine, 4 Blackf. 460.—Chalmers v. Shackell, 6 Carr. & Payne, 475.
The fifth instruction is erroneous. The plea of justification was not, so far аs appears by the record, any ground for increasing the damages. What would be the effect of the
— The judgment is reversed- with costs. Cause remanded, &c.