Byrd v. Keene Corp.Byrd v. Keene Corp.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Pollak
MEMORANDUM
LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge.Two motions are currently pending in this asbestos action. Both were filed by defendant Keene Corporation (“Keene”) and only affect the interests of third-party defendant EGNEP (Pty.), Ltd. (“EGNEP”). One is a motion to vacate the Order entered by this court on March 7, 1984, pursuant to Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), which dismissed this action due to a settlement of the action by the parties. The other motion is a request for entry of default judgment under
Keene’s original motion for entry of default against EGNEP and Cape Industries, Ltd.—another third party defendant—filed in October 1983 was denied on November 29, 1983 because there was no evidence that third-party defendants had been served with a copy of the summons and third-party complaint in accordance with
A settlement conference between plaintiff and Keene was held in chambers on January 12, 1984, after which a settlement agreement was reached between these two parties in the amount of $57,500. Keene notified EGNEP of the settlement in a letter dated January 13, 1984 which also demanded that EGNEP pay the settlement amount to plaintiff. Keene’s letter advised EGNEP that, if EGNEP did not comply, Keene would then move for entry of judgment against EGNEP for the settlement amount and associated costs.
Keene filed an affidavit for entry of default by the Clerk of the Court under
On March 2, 1984, counsel for Keene sent a letter to chambers stating that the action had been settled and requesting the entry of an order dismissing the action under Local Rule 23(b). Such an order was filed on March 7, 1984.
On March 12, 1984, Keene filed a request for entry of default judgment pursuant to
The motion to vacate this court’s Order of dismissal of March 7 requests that the Order be clarified to state that only the claims of plaintiff against Keene have been settled while the third-party claims remain active. Although the March 7 Order does not directly state that the third-party claims are dismissed, it is possible to interpret the Order to that effect. Therefore, I will order that the March 7 Order of dismissal be amended to state that only those claims by plaintiff against defendant Keene are dismissed under Local Rule 23(b).
The motion for default judgment raises more substantial issues. Default judgments serve as deterrents to delay in judicial proceedings, but their use must be balanced against the strong judicial policy favoring trial on the merits. 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2681 at 402 (1983).
After an entry of default, and after the plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in support of the amount due, a default judgment may be entered in one of two ways. These two distinct methods for obtaining a default judgment are described in subsections (1) and (2) of
Relatively few cases have raised the question of what qualifies as a “sum certain” for the purposes of
[Third-party plaintiff] cannot satisfy the certainty requirement simply by requesting a specific amount. He must establish that the amount requested is reasonable under the circumstances.
10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2683 at 415 (1983). In light of the fact that third-party defendant’s interests were not directly represented in the settlement negotiations which led to the sum requested by defendant, it is necessary for defendant to present independent evidence of the reasonableness of this amount before a default judgment can be entered in this case against EGNEP. Thus, the settlement in this case is not an appropriate basis on which to award a default judgment under
Furthermore, Keene’s claims against EGNEP are for either indemnity or contribution. Of course, the default entered by the Clerk of the Court did not distinguish between these claims. However, the amount of any default judgment will be dependent upon the basis for liability—if EGNEP is only liable for contribution, the judgment should only be entered against it for an appropriate proportion of the settlement negotiated between plaintiff and defendant (assuming that defendant can also establish that the settlement itself is reasonable).
Since the default judgment cannot be entered under
In the present case, there are at least two matters which require further investigation prior to the entry of a default judgment. First, there must be an evaluation of the reasonableness of the amount of the settlement. Keene must show that plaintiff would have been entitled to at least that amount in damages if plaintiff had established Keene’s liability at trial. *13Keene is only entitled to a default judgment to the extent that its injury—the amount of the settlement—is reasonable. Thus, if plaintiffs damages are shown to be less than the amount of the settlement, the default judgment cannot be greater than plaintiffs actual damages. Second, there must be an evaluation of whether EGNEP is liable under a theory of indemnity or contribution. If EGNEP should only be held liable under the latter theory, then there must be a determination of the proportion of a reasonable settlement for which EGNEP should be responsible.
This matter will be referred to United States Magistrate William F. Hall, Jr. for a hearing on these two issues and for the preparation of proposed findings of fact and recommendations as to the appropriate amount of a default judgment in this case pursuant to
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s motion to vacate this court’s Order of March 7, 1984, is DENIED. However, the Order of March 7, 1984, is AMENDED to state that the dismissal under Local Rule 23(b) only applies to the claims brought by plaintiff against defendant Keene Corporation.
2. Defendant’s request for entry of default judgment is REFERRED to United States Magistrate William F. Hall, Jr. for a hearing on the issues identified in the Memorandum and for the preparation of proposed findings of fact and recommendations as to the amount of a default judgment pursuant to