*1 Dist., No. 30220. Fourth Div. Three. Dec. [Civ. 1983.] BYRD,
LILLIE MAE Cross-complainant Respondent, al., JEWELL BLANTON et Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Counsel Moore, Jr., Howard Cross- Darryl Parker and Joanne Morrison for defendants and Appellants. Tucker,
Rutan & Wallace, Jr., for Theodore I. and William T. Eliopoulos Cross-complainant Rеspondent.
Opinion SONENSHINE, J. Blanton, inter- claiming Jewell est in mother-in-law, in the name of her Lillie Mae filed a Byrd, complaint constructive fraud alleging asking and civil conspiracy court to title and to restore it forc- quiet to her. Byrd cross-complained detainer, ible damages. possession premises (ejectment) money Byrd was heard the court found summary proceeding against first and on the action for forcible detainer but granted judgment ejectment. $9,350 com- damage award of resolution of stayed Jewell’s pending plaint. the court erred in the statute of limitations appeals, arguing finding
contained in Civil Code section 51271 barred assertion of her an interest in statutory
1All to the Civil otherwise indicated. references are Code unless
Facts a residence in La- Blanton Byrd and her son purchased Joseph Beach, but title Each down payment, Cаlifornia. contributed guna together taken in resided in the They alone.2 Joseph’s *3 when mar- made until 1964 Joseph and each toward the payments mortgage living and New continued Byrd ried Jewell he and his bride moved to York. when Joseph in the made the from 1964 to 19683 and payments Byrd. Pay- with and Jewell returned to California and took residence up made refinances) on the were thereafter ments several mortgage (including Blantons. In March of title from executed a deed his Joseph changing alone to deed. suc- joint with his mother who recorded the tenancy Joseph June, cumbed to Jewell retained May cancer died intestate. who in- lawyer community property failed to file an action to recover terest. She then filed the action from which hired other counsel who cross-complaint severed.
The court did the community not make а to the exact amount of as finding conclude, to the that interest but did “it would court appear of a those would have created some kind payments during court, the one interest 5The applying property.”4 to limitation to Jewell assert this of section refused allow interest as a defense to the ejectment action.
Discussion the statute to this Is of limitations contained in section 512 applicable transaction? to be 2Byrd estranged testified afraid responsibility she feared for her
put on title. Byrd The court did not 3Joseph may $50 sent been income. a month and there have rental findings on is not relevant make the exact amount of contributions and as this appeal issues on we decline to exact amount of the contributions. determine the Marriage support correctly 4In of relied on In Moore this conclusion the court re of progeny. and its 618 P.2d 5113.5 part: provided Sections pertinent “Except 5Section reads in as property, real whether either has the and control of the personally to both either or spouses or on or after but agent, community real duly join executing any authorized which such must sold, year, any longer period than one or is property or therein is leased encumbered; however, nothing contained shall be con conveyed, provided, or herein any lease, real or of mortgage, conveyance, strued to or transfer of howevеr, wife; also, that the sole provided, interest in real between husband and contract, lease, husband, title to mortgage deed of the the record or 172a, authorities, Examination of the including construction of logical section 5127 and the fam public underlying policy law statutes of ily diсtate our conclusion: The statute limitations one-year contained in section 5127 is a bar when not as here the takes place without the or and the consent of the trans knowledge nonsigning spouse feree has other the marital Any interpretation relationship.7 would bad fаith place and bona fide transferees on the same footing. lessees, urges one-year only statute limitations applies purchasers the mar- good encumbrancers in without faith relation, and riage because had Byrd *4 lessee, property, encumbrancer, purchаser, to a good knowledge or in of the faith without relation, presumed January shall be be to prior to valid if executed lease, contract, that the holding sole deed the mortgage, spouse, or of either record title to lessee, encumbrancer, community property real purchaser, good to a or in faith without relation, the marriage presumed of be if shall to be valid executed on or after 1, section, any affecting any 1975. No action to avoid instrument mentioned in this property standing alone, by of spouse record in the of eithеr executed the alone, year filing shall be commenced the expiration after the of one from record of situate, in county such instrument the in land recorder’s office the in which the is and no any section, any action property standing to avoid instrument in affecting mentionеd alone, record in the name of the by husband which was the husband alone and executed filed effect, for record to county the time office in the this act takes in the recorder’s in situate, year which the land is expiration shall be after the one from the date commenсed on which this act takes effect.” 172a, 1917, 6Civil Code section provided: management enacted has the in “The husband the community control of with him property join executing real but the wife must instrument, any by community which property any such real therein is or leased for sold, encumbered; however, a longer period year, provided, than conveyed, one or is or lease, contract, husband, that holding the sole mortgage or deed of the the record title to encumbrancer, community lessee, property, good real to a purchaser or faith withоut valid; the marriage presumed be but relation shall to be no action to avoid year such shall expiration filing instrument be commenced the from the after of one record of such instrument in the county recorder’s office in the in which the land is situate.” In adding dealing interspousal 172a was amended clause and in- a with transfers serting “also” between the “provided” existent and “however.” In read: 172a “The the of the real husband has and control wife, property, by join but personally duly agent, the either or must with him in authorized instrument, executing any by any or which such real interest therein is sold, encumbered; longer leased provided, than or year, conveyed, one or however, lease, nothing that herein to a mortgage, contained shall be construed to conveyance, any or transfer of real property or of interest in real between husband wife; also, however, lease, contract, provided, mortgage the sole or deed of the husband, lessee, property, purchaser record title to to encumbrancer, good presumed faith shall be without of the section, to affecting any be valid. No action any to avoid mentioned in this instrument property standing alone, of record in the name executed husband alone, filing shall be commenced after of one for record of expiration from such in the county in which the land is situate . . . .” recorder’s office purchaser. 7We do not reach issue of a bad donee to a bona fide See faith (1932) Mark (requiring v. Title Guarantee & 122 wife Cal.App. Trust Co. P.2d 839] [9 to purchasers original position). restore innocent to their donee,8 and was a the statute is to this transaction. Byrd simply inapplicable statute, (1943) relies on the Strong v. languаge citing Strong Cal.2d P.2d and Horton v. Horton [140 However, the latter are authorities distinguishable 605]. either on their facts or in of the code at the time sections light were they decided.
In Strong, husband title to He later married 1925. and community funds were to make the used mortgage payments. In deed grant both wifе recorded signed by husband and chang- title to divorced, husband’s ing mother. 1938 the wife was award- parties ed the home and husband’s mother title action wife. brought quiet against The trial court awarded the to The Court wife. reversed Supreme in an Justice “the wife opinion Traynor, finding: adequately signified hеr consent the transfer the husband the deed . . . . by signing [f] of section purpose 172a was to a wife a veto give over power convey- Stewart, ances of community (Stewart to her property disadvantageous (249 supra 197)]) Cal. 318 P. and since she can exercise this power effeсtively by deed, there is no need for more elaborate refusing sign procedure.” 540, 543-544.) (Strong v. Strong, supra, opin- “Defendant, ion moreover, continues: her under section 172a asserts rights *5 too late. At the time the this section provided no action to avoid a conveyance which сommunity wife had not joined ‘shall be commenced after the one expiration year from the filing record of such the recorder’s office county (Stats. 1917, which the land 829.)” (Id.., 544.) is situate.’ at p. p. The Strong decision of her may to foreclose Jewell’s assertion appear interest, but the facts are so different in the instant case that we do not feel bound the statute of Jewell did not limitations discussion. transfer, it, know of the did not execute or consent to and there can be no argument detrimental reliance who knew of the by Byrd and Jewell’s lack of consent. 172a at the time Strong Additionally, was written of the gave and control management community prop- and wife erty had no interest. equal
The husband in knowl- Horton to his brother without the gifted property estate, he ex- edge of wife. Husband retained a life signature testifying death, ecuted the he deеds save costs. his brother’s probate Following and wife an action to issue de- brought urged by title. quiet principal title, fendants was no to attack wife’s lack of she had legal claiming standing in a an bring deeds title action. conceded she had quiet They right property. 8At least as to the Blantons’ interest action to avoid the deeds but did not exercise it. The court disregarded contention and affirmed the lower court’s title in judgment quieting plain- tiffs. The one year limitation was did discussed it not as the although deeds were not recorded until trial. Horton, husband and wife avoidance of the deed sought and return of
the entire seeks to invalidate the deed only as to her share of the community interest. Most in Horton there importantly, no mention of the brother’s any community belonging as, nonsigning spouse case was decided in again, light of husband sole having control of the сommunity property. purpose limitation contained in section 5127 is to “third protect who parties might on the rely (Schindler recorded instruments.” v. Schin (1954) dler 566].) Statutes of limitation “are designed to promote justice the revival of by preventing hoary claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded and witnesses have (Liberty Mut. disappeared.” Ins. Co. v. Fales 505 P.2d 213], added.) italics This “an on notice within places opposing party reasonable time that a (Id., 718.) claim is him . . . .” at pending against p. These fraud, statutes were enacted to prevent not to provide protective shield for its perpetration.
To extend the shortened limitation to all executed gift conveyances spouse record title would be A unfair. could patently donee, with a conspire convey of record in standing the spouse’s name and await quietly of one before the passage donee asserts We find it ownership. unlikely intended to Legislature *6 a provide nonsignatory spouse merely with the of an annual protection pe- rusal of the county recorder’s files for a the record рossible construction spouse. that would create a wholly unreasonable “[A] effect or an absurd (Barnes result should not be v. Chamberlain given.” (1983) 147 417].) 762 at Cal.App.3d p. we
Lastly, must construe the of the limitation section application of 5127 “with reference to the whole of law of whiсh it body is so part as all Chamberlain, bemay (Barnes harmonized and have effect.” v. supra, 767.) the evolution of our Throughout day present statutes, law family the trend has been toward achieving greater equality between Wife spouses. was given and “present, existing, equal” in and, property by of section 161a in 1927 adoption 1975, was granted equal management and control. There can no be longer the inference of dominion in the era of and Strong prevalent Horton. While in one name appears of record property standing spouse’s validly alonе, alienable section 5127 the other requires limitation The one bona fide spouse’s signature. period only protects transferees with no who have no reason another suspect is signature necessary. find the
We limitation is not a bar to Jewell’s community claim. The alone stood in the name of her husband and was to a donee conveyed by him alone without her or consent who knew of the relation and the lack of nonsigning spouse’s consent. for and judgment possession (ejectment) damages premises reversed. to recover her costs on аppeal. J.,
Crosby, Wallin, J., Acting P. concurred. A petition was denied and the rehearing on follow- ing then rendered: opinion
SONENSHINE, J. on Respondent contends petition rehearing court the law misinterpreted Strong Strong Cal.2d ante, on had no by stating, “wife page present and equal interest” Hоwever, in the community respondent fails to note the property in Strong was to husband conveyed adoption of Civil Code section 161a. “The of the husband wife must rights be measured by the statutes effect when the . . . .” (Id., 543.) at p. The wife in had no interest in the Strong equal community property before the court. Court was denied
Respondent’s petition hearing by Supreme Mosk, J., March should be 1984. was of the that the petition opinion granted.