112 So. 348 | Ala. | 1927
The legal proceeding had, in the nature of civil action, was in an endeavor to fix the value of appellants' property for the tax year 1925. The statutes having application are found in the general revenue bill approved August 22, 1923. Gen. Acts 1923, p. 172, § 32 et seq.
There are assignments of error based on the refusal of requested charges, and when the instruction sought invades the province of the jury it should be refused. McMillan v. Aiken,
It is provided by statute, sections 32, 34, Acts of 1923, pp. 172, 173:
"* * * Persons having in their possession goods, wares or merchandise belonging to another, and subject to taxation in any county, city or town in Alabama, where said property is located, when the owner of the property does not reside in the county are deemed to be owners of the property in their possession for the purpose of assessment, and unless such goods, wares or merchandise have been otherwise listed for taxation the same shall be assessed to the person, firm or corporation who has such goods in their possession; and in no case shall the assessment be less than sixty per cent. of the fair and reasonable market value of the average amount of goods, wares or merchandise so held during the twelve months next preceding the first day of October when same are due to be assessed for taxation. * * *
"For the purpose of assessment, real and personal property shall be estimated at its fair market value, according to the best judgment the assessor and the board of review can form upon information, inspection and otherwise, taking into consideration, if real estate, its location, whether in town, city or county, and whether it is vacant, or is occupied or in use, and if occupied and in use, the rent derived therefrom, its proximity to local advantages, its quality of soil, growth of timber, mines, minerals, or coal beds, and the amount and character of the improvements thereon; and mineral and timber interests when they have been severed in ownership from the soil, by sale or otherwise, shall be separately assessed."
Refused charge 1 was therefore misleading. This is without regard to the omission of the word "take" after the words "assessed at" and before the words "into consideration." The word "that" as used in the context of charge No. 1, found in the bill of exceptions, was, by misprision in transcribing, written for the word "take." In a pleading the context would correct such error in transcription. However, the record proper uses the word "take" instead of "that."
The assessment of adjoining and similar property was inter alios acta. The issue was a percentage of the "fair market value" of the real estate, taking into consideration "its location, whether in town, city or county, and whether it is vacant, or is occupied or in use, and if occupied and in use, the rent derived therefrom, its proximity to local advantages, its quality of soil, growth of timber, mines, minerals, or coal beds, and the amount and character of the improvements thereon." Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Schmidt,
"In fixing the taxable value of lands, it would perhaps be proper to receive evidence of the value of similar property under similar conditions, as a feature of the 'surroundings' within the meaning of that expression as used in the statute, and as affording a criterion from which the value of the property in question could be deduced. Johnson v. West,
The inquiry of the reasonable market value of other like property in the same community is admissible for the purpose of testing the witness giving the opinion evidence of the market value and as affording a criterion from which the value of the property in question may be deduced. Ala. Min. Land Co. v. County Com'rs,
We are not impressed with the insistence of the state's counsel that refused charges 2 to 6, inclusive, invade the province of the jury. It was the request of the effect of the statute. Section 7656, Code of 1923; Dean v. County Board, etc.,
Proceeding to consideration of the other rulings on evidence, it is insisted that error was committed in allowing a witness on redirect examination to say that appellants' property "is the most prominent corner in town." It was a shorthand rendition of fact by witness Fendley, in connection with the other evidence of "location" of the property, whether in "town, city or county," and how located. Acts of 1923, p. 173, § 34.
We have sufficiently indicated that no error was committed in the testimony of Hearn and Brice as to recent sales of real property in the same general location of the city and county, improved and unimproved, and by this cross-examination to test the judgment of the witness as to values. For reasons indicated in authorities we have cited, no error was committed in not permitting appellants to introduce the tax sheet of 1925 on the two-story building of Cowden Rasco. There was no error in allowing one of the defendants, J. P. Bynum, to give the cost of show cases, fixtures, and personal properties in the place of Bynum Bros. and thereafter to state the value thereof in 1925.
The court permitted the state to introduce the original assessments of Bynum Bros., of date of December 29, 1924, showing the return by J. P. Bynum of the estimated value of their stock of goods at $5,800; fixtures, safe, etc., $500; lot 16, block 2, $1,000; brick building, $2,000. This was the pleading so to speak on which the appeal was based, including the tax assessor's value of assessments of the last two properties, respectively $2,000 and $4,000, and that fixed thereon by the board of review. Dean v. Board of Education,
The case will not be retried, yet it should be noted as to costs under Acts of 1915, p. 598, that in State v. Donaldson,
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SOMERVILLE and BROWN, JJ., concur.