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Buzbee v. Donnelly
634 P.2d 1244
N.M.
1981
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*1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 634 P.2d 1244 be, is, hereby matter and it Bell, referred to this BUZBEE, Reggie D. and Richard Disciplinary Court’s Board with direction Chapman, Richard Petitioner and immediately assign Hearing it to Com- Intervenors, C, Shantz, (Ben mittee Southern District S. Chairman) Disciplinary Counsel is di- DONNELLY, Hon. Thomas A. Hon. Lor- immediately petition rected to file a insti- Garcia, enzo F. Hon. Bruce E. Kauf- tuting proceedings formal hereon before man, Respondents. Judges, District hearing such committee. Mexico,

STATE of New Plaintiff-Appellee, CHAPMAN, al., Richard Nave et Flores, al., Narciso Telles et Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 13789. Supreme of New Mexico. In the Matter of Harold M. Sept. 1981. MORGAN, Esquire. Rehearing Denied Oct. 1981.

No. 13231.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept.

Disciplinary Proceeding.

IT BEEN MADE HAVING TO APPEAR

TO THE COURT affidavit of Glen L.

Houston, Law, Attorney respon- that the

dent, MORGAN, HAROLD M. has served

the time prescribed practice heretofore

under probationary supervi- conditions 13, 1980,

sion by August our Order of fully 625 P.2d and has com-

plied probation; with the conditions of his

NOW IT IS ORDERED HAROLD MORGAN,

M. Esquire, hereby he probation from

released and the conditions respect

thereof with prac- to his license to

tice law in the courts of this state.

694 *2 certified them to Court. the cases and Gen., Bal- Bingaman, Atty. Charles

Jeff this Court on Fe, came to Prosecutor, Three other cases donado, Sp. Santa Deputy and were consolidated prohibition writs plaintiff-appellee. Ap- from the Court with the two cases Defender, Martha Bigelow, Public John in five the issues Thus we address peals. Defender, Mark Daly, Appellate A. Asst. anticipation in-depth basis cases on an Director, Donatelli, Penitentiary Defense arising in subse- issues and similar the same Winterbottom, De- Asst. Public Richard A. *3 the decisions cases. We affirm quent riot fender, Fe, Chapman petitioners for Santa issues raised. courts on the all the trial Flores. & Richard Chapman, Herman Nave Richard MacAllister, Fe, appel- for Bruce J. Santa Cojby were in- Dennis and Michael Buzbee lant Sandoval. Larry first-degree murder of dicted for Walker, ap- Albuquerque, for William G. Antunez, Paul Jesus Jose Wayne Smith. pellant Chavez. Chavez, Casaus, Narciso Telles Lorenzo Driscoll, appel- for Albuquerque, Charles in- were Jose Moisés Sandoval Flores and lants & Casaus Sandoval. of Ra- first-degree murder for the dicted Buz- Herman Richard mon Acuna Madrid. Walker, peti- for Albuquerque, L. John Reggie bee, Chapman Richard Nave Buzbee. tioner jointly, but will be tried were indicted Bell Fe, Isaacs, Pines, Garvin A. Ellen Santa first-degree murder of for the separately, Okl., Colby. City, appellant for Oklahoma Donald Gossens. Garcia, Jr., Albuquerque, pe- for Narciso The issues are: titioner Bell. prior self-serv- Whether defendants’ 1. Prosecutor, Baker, Sp. Richard Chief C. presented of innocence must ing claims Prosecutor, Baldonado, Deputy Sp. Charles jury the recent statute grand under to the Prosecutor, Lauer, Sp. Theodore E. Asst. present requires which Fe, Judges. respondent District Santa directly he is aware that of which evidence Gen., Atty. Jean Bingaman, Jeff Carol must the evidence negates guilt, or whether Gen., Brooks, Attys. Asst. Vigil, Topp Heidi being statutory test of the other also meet Fe, curiae. Santa for amicus would be admissible evidence such as trial. OPINION evidence, pros- known to the Whether 2. EASLEY, Chief Justice. ecutor, contradictory to evidence which is jury, qualifies as grand to the that came to us on submitted Decisions in five cases directly negates guilt and that interlocutory appeals prerogative writs jury. grand to the opinion. Eight de- must be submitted are consolidated in this counts of charged fendants are with ten Whether the refusal during that occurred first-degree murder jury prior state- grand Penitentiary riot of the New Mexico State they are inno- by defendants ments thirty- a total of February in which cent, testimony contradicted and other persons three were killed. grand who testified before witnesses of the defend- a violation cases, moved to constitutes In all the defendants jury, a fair trial. process rights to indictments, claiming ants’ due dismiss the exculpato- knowingly withheld prosecutors that the 4. Whether evidence jury, in viola- ry grand from the jury witnesses grand promised each 31-6-ll(B), tion of N.M.S.A.1978 Section placed back in the would not be that he in all (Cum.Supp.1980). The trial courts must be penitentiary system, New Mexico motions to dismiss. cases denied defendants’ grand jury as evidence presented to the it af- directly negates guilt, because granted appeals were interlocutory Two credibility witnesses. fects Appeals, which consolidated allegedly exculpatory continuing evidence in There has been a over debate each of types: sys these cases is of three the years, particularly in the federal tem, they relationships statements of defendants in which concerning respective de- nied involvement any killings Judicial Branches to Executive and they jury. claimed never entered claim that grand Cell Block federal Some homicides; (2) powers site of prior discretionary these the court statements has broad supervise jury; others assert that witnesses and other witnesses Executive, jury are inconsistent is an arm of testimony with agen basically since it a law enforcement some of which Court, Supreme witnesses, cy. reflected on the The United States credibility of Calandra, (3) promises United 414 U.S. made to jury witnesses that, (1974), pointed out they gave statements, if they pre-constitutional not be returned to the penitentiary of New institution, given constitutional stature Mexico other satellite facility. relegated by the Fifth Amendment but not The District Attorney admits that he was *4 position any the Constitution to a within aware of the withheld question evidence in government. the three branches of the and presented that it was not grand to the grand jury “The federal is a constitutional jury. It is the position State’s ” right fixture in its own . . . . Nixon v. prosecutors present had no these Sirica, (D.C.Cir. 487 F.2d 712 n. 54 types of evidence. 1973); Chanen, United 549 F.2d HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (9th Cir.), (1977). For eight years, over hundred since the Assize of English Clarendon in fact, In under the common law and con- grand institution of the jury has been in provisions, grand jury stitutional is con- Holdsworth, existence. I W. History of independent agency sidered to be an from English Law 1956). 321—23 rev. ed. Depart- both the Executive and the Judicial Britain, Over the centuries in Great the ments, with “both court and grand jury not only served to discover and play[ing] supportive complementary and present persons for trial suspected of crimi- Chanen, supra roles.” at 1312. wrongdoing, nal protect but also served to Chanen, the court held that courts against oppressive citizens actions upon should not encroach the manner in the Crown. prosecutor presents govern- which the Blackstone, describing the function of grand jury ment’s “unless there case to jury “they only said: are to hear doing is a clear basis in fact and law for evidence on prosecution: behalf of the for so”, prove readily because it “could subver- the finding of an only indictment separation pow- sive of the doctrine of accusation, enquiry nature of an which is ers.” at “But Id. 1313. under constitu- determined; afterwards to be tried and and scheme, grand jury tional is not and grand jury enquire upon are captive should not be of the three oaths, their whether there be sufficient branches.” Id. upon cause party to call to answer it.” The framers of New Mexico Constitu- Blackstone, IV W. Commentaries on the grand jury tion saw fit to create the under England, Laws of The Rights, the Bill placing instead of jury was abolished in Great Britain in 1933. Department under the or the Ju- Executive

The jury’s historic diciary. functions were N.M.Const. art. 14. Our Con- § found early our settlers provision to be basic to stitution that a also contains protection liberties, charged by individual and in- defendant criminal grand jury transplanted by grand jury here as a formation as well as indict- closely-guarded ment, institution in provides the basic law as to the make- details country. of our procedures. up of the and its so, warrant a were consist- conviction. If its indict- made Generally, the additions at the practices merely puts ment the accused to trial. ent law with the common was written. The difference between the function time our State Constitution jury the trial and the function herein- Except statutory provisions, grand jury is all the between difference discussed, and decisions after laws the basic deciding deciding merely a case and governing remarka- grand juries have been a case should be tried. bly fed- similar and the between the states eral Mr. Justice Holmes authored Holt system. consid- Federal constitutional States, ger- erations make United 218 U.S. 31 S.Ct. the federal decisions (1910), charged every L.Ed. 1021 in which it was mane to most case. There is a vast law, be- the indictment should be dismissed body hopeless of case some of it had been incompetent representative conflict. We cause cases to the general principles. relief, saying: “The abuses of denied responsibilities in- practice would be enhanced if criminal changed very infrequently have very ground.” upset on such dictments could years little over the and continue to include at 4. The United States Id. at both the determination whether there is also refused to invali- Supreme Court has probable person cause that a committed a date an indictment from protection crime and the of citizens from obtained considered evidence that had been arbitrary oppressive acts of their Amendment, Ca- violation of the Fourth Calandra, government. supra. landra, supra, in which evidence had regarded primary “has been as a secur- been Fifth obtained in violation of the ity against hasty, innocent malicious *5 Amendment; States, and Lawn v. United oppressive persecution; it serves the 339, 311, 355 78 2 L.Ed.2d 321 U.S. S.Ct. society invaluable function in our of stand- (1958). ing between the accuser and the ac- ” 375, Georgia, cused . . .. Wood v. 370 following represent general U.S. cases 390, 1364, 1373, 82 8 L.Ed.2d great weight authority S.Ct. 569 rule or of (1962). given Wide latitude has been system. government need not federal grand juries investigate activity. criminal percipient testify produce witnesses to be Generally, grand jury system is unre- grand jury. v. fore United States technical, by procedural strained and Short, (9th 1974). 493 F.2d 1170 Cir. An evidentiary governing rules the conduct of right accused has no to be called as a wit Calandra, criminal supra. trials. considering that is ness before a. Salsedo, his indictment. United v. States The traditional role of the is (9th 1979). 607 There is a F.2d 318 Cir. by Mr. described Justice Jackson in his dis- strong presumption regularity accorded senting opinion Texas, in Cassell v. 339 U.S. findings grand juries. United 282, 302, 629, 639, 70 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed. 839 West, (8th Cir.), v. 549 F.2d 545 cert. States (1950): denied, 97 51 U.S. S.Ct. accuse, power Its only is not to convict. (1977). prosecutor is L.Ed.2d 806 A federal Its indictment does not even create a prosecution the hand of the President in the presumption guilt; charges all that offenses, and the courts are not to inter proved jury, must later be before the trial discretionary fere with the free exercise of beyond and then a reasonable doubt. powers in his control over jury need not be unanimous. prosecutions. v. criminal United States It does not hear both sides but denied, Cox, (5th Cir.), cert. 342 F.2d 167 evidence, prosecution’s and does not face Hauberg, Cox U.S. S.Ct. problem of a choice between two ad- (1965). 14 L.Ed.2d versaries. Its to indict if the is evidence, prosecution’s unexplained, Generally, courts have been most cautious un- invalidating alleged unsupported, contradicted indictments practice prosecutor. Court held that abuses of criminal jury misconduct of States, if could v. United 312 would be enhanced indictments Beatrice Foods Co. denied, Cir.), upset (8th ground. cert. 373 U.S. on such a The Court F.2d 29 (1963). Costello added: Samango, 607 F.2d United States thing true where as here all The same said, (9th 1979), court “The Court’s Cir. grand jury was in evidence before the dismiss an indictment on power “hearsay.” the nature of If indictments misconduct is fre ground prosecutorial open challenge on the were to be held rarely invoked.” Dis quently discussed but inadequate or in- ground that there was those few in missal has been limited to competent evidence before the clearly where the has stances resulting delay great would be jury, the grand jury process. 8 Moore’s abused the result of such a rule would indeed. The Practice, ¶ Federal 2d Edition 6.04[1] be that before trial on the merits a de- always on a kind of fendant could insist knows that government Even where preliminary compe- trial to determine the partially perjured an is based on indictment tency adequacy of the evidence be- must consider whether testimony, the court required This is not fore the perjured testimony is material. United Amendment. An indictment by the Fifth Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 Cir. legally constituted and un- returned 1974). Perjured testimony does not call for an information grand jury, like biased testimony before the where the dismissal prosecutor, if valid on its by the drawn allegedly per excluding the face, enough call for trial of the compe testimony,, sufficient jured showed The Fifth Amend- charge on the merits. probable cause. prove tent evidence nothing more. requires ment States, F.2d 128 Coppedge v. United at 408-09. 83 350 S.Ct. (D.C.Cir.1962), U.S. (1963). Only in a 10 L.Ed.2d per- there were no stated that The Court case, knowing flagrant perhaps permit- a rule to establish suasive reasons matter, has material perjury, relating to a a rule challenges; such ting such jury should the been history whole counter to the would run in valid judge trial dismiss an otherwise institution; jus- that neither apparently unbi dictment returned concept requires a fair trial nor the tice *6 grand jury. ased To hold otherwise found that change. The Court such a presented in allow a mini-trial as to each right to strict would have a defendants Kennedy, dictment. United States trial of the case to all of observance 1977), F.2d 1329 Cir. fair designed bring to about a the rules S., Myers v. U. 98 S.Ct. U.S. entitled, how- are not verdict. “Defendants (1978). ever, would result in inter- to a rule which nothing assur- to the delay but add minable Supreme Court In 1956 the United States Id. at 76 S.Ct. of a fair trial.” ance be a land- proven handed down what has to 409. in- bearing mark on the issues decision States,

volved here in Costello United from the United is the last word Costello (1956). 100 L.Ed. 397 on the issues stated. Supreme Court whether a single presented The issue was of low- of decisions out There are hundreds trial may required defendant to stand attempting apply to Cos- er federal courts only and a conviction be sustained where patterns. Some varying factual tello to hearsay evidence was Supreme cases these and later grand jury. Costello claimed a violation will be later ana- claimed as relevant are rights his Fifth Amendment under process issues. context of due lyzed in the section. controlling remains a long as Costello So legally prosecutor can have no opinion, Mr. Justice The Costello Court discussed divulge exculpatory Holt, duty opinion supra, in which the enforceable to Holmes’ grand jury to a A A. Evidence before the only need convince a upon may indict. which it find an indictment He need not also convince a court that a testimony the oral of witnesses under grand jury’s indictment was fair. Given documentary any physi- oath and or other law, contrary the current state of the jurors. cal evidence exhibited All Supreme conclusion short of a Court deci- legally evidence must be such as would be statutory authority sion or is neither le- upon admissible trial. gally pragmatically nor binding. B. It is the Note, Jury: Grand A Prosecutor Need Not it, weigh all evidence submitted to Evidence, Exculpatory Present 38 Wash. & and when it has reason believe that Lee L.Rev. competent other evidence is available may explain away disprove or backdrop,

With this historical we examine charge or accusation or that would make ways statutory in which New Mexico’s unjustified, then, an indictment it should diverge general and case law from the rules produced. target as indicated the above order the evidence cases. target shall be notified of his status and departure very significant One from the given an opportunity testify, if he doctrine, giving law prosecutors common so, desires do unless the almost total discretion as to the kind of determines that notification result in evidence that can be submitted to the flight, endanger persons, other obstruct 1854; jury, February was the Act of justice, or the is unable with 66; 3128, 3129, p. 1853-54 N.M.Laws at §§ diligence notify person. reasonable said provided 1915. It was N.M.S.A. prosecuting attorney assisting evidence”, i.e., “legal given by such as wit- shall evidence that nesses, “produced and sworn before them directly negates target grand jury]”; legal documentary [the where he is aware of such evidence. evidence could be submitted. 3128. “Le- § (Emphasis added.) gal evidence” and “the best evidence in degree, hearsay exclusion of or sec- Although it is not material to our decision ondary evidence” is admissible. 3129. § here, in 1981 further This version of the law was in effect for 115 A, above, amended Section to eliminate the years, until it slightly modified 1969 requirement “legally evidence be ad- N.M.Laws, ch. § upon missible trial” and added this clause: sufficiency competency “The of the evi- amendments of added “other physical types upon evidence” to the two evi- dence which an indictment is returned is, previously approved, subject witness shall not be to review absent a evidence, testimony documentary showing part of bad faith on the expanded permissible prosecuting attorney definition of evi- assisting provide Thus, dence to that “all evidence must be jury.” (Cum.Supp.1981). Id. New legally upon such as would be admissible gone Mexico has full circle back to the *7 N.M.Laws, supra. trial.” 1969 places common law. This amendment our position in much the same as adopted Amendments in 1979 did not system those in the federal and makes the change “legally the require- admissible” opinion case law set out in this even federal However, paragraph ment. in a significant more in the future. section, Legislature same added a new provision requires prosecutor that 1. DEFENDANTS’ SELF-SERVING grand jury any submit to the evidence of DECLARATIONS OF INNOCENCE “directly, negates which he is aware that guilt” 31-6-ll(B), of the defendant. § question The first is whether defendants’ (Cum.Supp.1980). The full N.M.S.A.1978 self-serving declarations innocence text reads: should have been grand jury. jury directly negating guilt;

31-6-11. Evidence before as evidence or

699 prosecutor whether the was correct in with- that the statements are inadmissible as holding hearsay, except certain they them because were not under situations evi- pertinent are not here. such that See State v. as would be admissible at trial. Duran, 35, (N.M.App.), 91 P.2d 36 N.M. 570 claim statute Defendants that the mandates denied, 3, (1977), 91 N.M. cert. negating guilt directly that evidence must denied, 1615, 98 cert. 435 56 submitted not it whether or would be Hunt, (1978); L.Ed.2d 65 83 N.M. State trial, language admissible at that the new denied, (Ct.App.), 497 P.2d cert. 83 modifies and controls the old. (1972); N.M. P.2d State statutory The issue calls for construction Snow, 1177 (Ct.App.), 84 N.M. 503 P.2d Legislature to determine what the intend- 503 P.2d 84 N.M. ed. We must these and examine related Russell, (1972); 37 N.M. State v. perspective give statutes historical Davis, (1933); 30 N.M. P.2d meaning. words their usual Arnold v. (1925); Klasner, 234 P. 311 State v. State, P.2d 1210 145 P. 679 and 2 Wharton’s Our statutes in have past very been Evidence, 1972); Criminal ed. § targets investigation favorable to of an as (1967 29 Am.Jur.2d Am. § Evidence & compared to jurisdictions. They some other Supp.1981). explains Wharton that “A self- have limited the kinds of evidence that serving declaration is excluded because grand jury. be submitted to the The 1969 nothing guarantee there is its testimonial types amendment added to the of evidence trustworthiness. If such evidence were ad prosecutor. that could be introduced missible, open the door be thrown ” presume Legislature We can that the knew abuse. . . . Id. at 98. obvious meaning at words used that prosecutor properly We hold that time when it said: “All evidence must be they because withheld the statements were legally upon such as would be admissible such evidence would be admissible at not as reasonably trial.” The law well was settled We affirm the decisions of the trial trial. at that time as to what evidence was admis- regard. in this courts in a sible trial. The must have advisedly acted when it left that same sen- 2. CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE tence in the statute when amendment WITHHELD incorporated section in into the Defendants claim that the indictments adding provision should be dismissed because directly “shall evidence ne- withheld other from the ” target. gates guilt of the . . . jury of which he was aware that contradict- evidence submitted to the ed The definition of evidence before a prose- is that The essence of this claim grand jury having been established for ten cutor must submit all evidence to the years as evidence that would be admissible guilt negate tends to of de- trial, requirement on the addition of a fendants, regardless whether it is direct directly negating guilt be sub immaterial, circumstantial, material or or vary mitted did not definition. As it and whether admissible inadmissible at here, on the we bears issue hold that trial. statute as a whole means present evidence, shall that would be admis withheld statements We summarize the trial, directly negates sible as follows: target. witness, testify 1. A before who did *8 grand jury, identify a defendant did not but question There is no being impli- one of those in his statement as they guilty claims are not

defendants’ cated. directly negates guilt. ques their The next is whether is such 2. A a defendant in tion the evidence as witness identified testifying but had admissible at trial. answer is before the identified the same defendant in the fact that changed his the law was then prior statement. allow evidence that would be admissi- trial, ble at Legislature we believe the witness, 3. A testify who did not before thinking in terms catego- of the traditional grand jury, in said a statement that the ries of evidence. The common sense way a murder was carried out was different explanation for the use of the words in than what by was described other witnesses question is that the intended to before grand jury. permit the use of negating direct evidence witness, 4. A who testified before the guilt indirect, prohibit and to the use of or grand jury, persons named other partici- as circumstantial, negating guilt. evidence pants but not the defendant. which, Direct 5. A evidence is evidence if witness whose testimo- ny believed, implicated proves a defendant the existence of the fact given pre- had vious statement in without presumption. People which he was inference or confused Thomas, as to identity 1014, of the v. Cal.App.3d defendant. 151 Cal. Rptr. (Ct.App.1979); Thomp v. State 6. Statements the killers were son, (Tenn.1975); 519 S.W.2d 789 v. Frazier masked. State, 576 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). S.W.2d 617 7. Statements that a defendant was Direct knowledge gained evidence is actual for a killing, while at a but through a witness’ senses. v. Hub State witness did not see the partici- defendant bard, 143, (1943); 351 Mo. 171 S.W.2d 701 pate in killing. see also v. Farrington, State 411 A.2d 396 witness, A8. who testified before the (Me.1980); Musgrove, v. State 178 Mont. grand jury, changed but his mind or made a (1978). 582 P.2d 1246 mistake as to the identity perpetra- Lewis, The court in State Neb. prior tor in his statement. (1964), 128 N.W.2d used the follow- Although this indirect or circum ing stated, definition: “Otherwise direct ev- stantial be inconsistent with proof idence is by of facts witnesses who that presented inquire we saw acts done spoken, or heard words while directly whether it negates guilt. Basic to proof circumstantial evidence is of collater- the analysis of this issue is a determination al facts and circumstances from which the of the legislative specifying intent that mind infers the conclusion that the facts directly negating guilt should be sought to be established fact existed.” furnished the jury. A logical most Mills, United Textile Newberry Workers v. assumption is that the intent was also to Inc., F.Supp. (W.D.S.C.1965). proscribe the use of evidence indirectly neg All of the withheld evidence in our ating guilt. When a statute uses terms of case, self-serving other than the art, statements interpret we these terms in accordance defendants, is circumstantial in nature. with interpretation case law statutory or directly negate It does not words, definition of those any. if See State defendants. It must be aided Aragon, inferences (1951); 55 N.M. presumptions. Grissom, State v. had no 35 N.M. 298 P. 666 (1931); Ortiz, under the statutes to Burch v. submit this evi (1926); States, P.2d 908 dence to the Bradley v. United 410 U.S. Our decision on this issue in part differs theory expressed with the in dicta Neither the give Appeals Herrera, statutes nor case law Court of us any help with specific definition of the N.M. 601 P.2d 75 (N.M.App.1979), and ' term “directly negating” However, guilt. cases, followed in later which holds that given history here, knowingly withholding statutes exculpatory evi- hearsay secondary evidence were dence from a denies the defend- specifically not years allowed for 115 ant process. due obviously That Court

701 right tending to order produced the that “evidence it holds view explain has reason to believe will negate” guilt, “exculpatory” away evidence and the charge. The all Court Johnson ruled directly negating guilt have the that an 11, subject indictment was to dismissal Harge, v. 94 N.M. meaning. same State prosecutor the knowledge had such evi- (N.M.App.1979). 606 P.2d The terms 1105 dence, it, produce but did not even though synonymously also have been used neither the defendant nor the Sanchez, 95 Appeals Court in State v. requested that presented. reject it be We 27, (N.M.App.1980); 371 N.M. 618 P.2d reasoning would force a Lampman, v. P.2d 95 N.M. 620 to engage game guessing a toas what Gonzales, (N.M.App.1980); 1304 State v. 95 bits pieces might and of evidence tend to be (N.M.App.1981). N.M. 624 P.2d 1033 exculpatory at trial then demand that “Exculpa- In Gonzales the stated: produce all of for it tory reasonably evidence is evidence tend- grand jury, requested by whether or not guilt.” ing negate Withholding such evi- grand jury. process dence violates due defendants’ fact, In for evidence to be admissible at rights, v. Payne, Court said. State 96 defendant, trial on behalf it must all (N.M.App.1981). 630 P.2d 299 innocence, is, be relevant to his must State, opinion Our in Maldonado v. reasonably guilt. Thus, to negate tend did not address apply the Johnson standard would be to directly. issue many saddle the State in instances with the Prior to the enactment of the statute presenting burden of the defendant’s whole question, our courts were concerned case to the well as as the State’s “exculpatory” with evidence in the context case. This would lead to ridiculous conse- dispute our here. Until the quences many be a subversion of “directly” negating guilt used the term purposes traditional there no need to define terms. It is jury system. We adopt refuse such plain that there are least two distinct position. drastic and unwarranted evidence, e., types exculpatory i. direct Much of the withheld circumstantial exculpatory evidence ex- and circumstantial evidence would have reflected on credi culpatory plain evidence. Since the mean- bility of the witnesses who testified before ing statute is that Defendants would have us obligated grand jury only because this evi dismiss indictment evidence, exculpatory direct we hold that it purpose. was not for was not error for him to withhold circum- of flagrant prosecutorial the absence stantial evidence. evi- That responsible that was misconduct dence was inadmissible to same extent defendant, jury indicting a we decline to secondary hearsay as evidence under adopt a rule indictment is bad be Payne, the old statute. To the extent testimony it is on cause based of witness Gonzales, Sanchez, supra; supra; supra; credibility may subject whose later be supra; Herrera, Lampman, Harge, supra; question. Sullivan, United States supra; contrary are our and other cases (5th 1978). F.2d 121 Cir. “Such rule of issue, opinion they hereby specif- on this are independent judicial law would necessitate ically overruled. review of the credibility of wit rely heavily Defendants on Johnson nesses, infringe upon an exercise that would Court, Superior Cal.Rptr. P.2d independence the traditional (1975), in which that court based its Guillette, jury.” United F.2d grounds statutory decision on and declined denied, (2d 1976), Cir. cert. process protection equal consider due (1977); 54 L.Ed.2d 102 very Brown, issues. Our statute is similar to the F.2d United States v. Cir.), one that was considered in Johnson in that 439 U.S. gave law California *10 349, Lawn, In supra at 78 S.Ct. at CONSIDERATIONS DUE PROCESS Court the United States stated Su- claim that Defendants the failure preme times Court had several ruled that present to all the evidence in by legally a an “indictment returned consti- question jury grand violates their grand jury, tuted like an infor- nonbiased rights Fifth fair trial. Amendment a if prosecutor, mation a valid on drawn our decision on first two Although face, enough its is to call for a trial of the points effectively disposes the issues on charge on and satisfies the re- the merits we feel statutory grounds, constrained quirements Fifth Amendment.” questions process the due in order

address (Citing Holt, supra.) clarify position that re this Court’s in gard. We are aware of the 1981 amend Blue, In 384 U.S. United States ment which eliminates the sentence that (1966), S.Ct. the Su- required all evidence to be such as would be that, government preme if the Court held Thus, trial. we admissible at look at the acquired in incriminating evidence violation with federal case law new interest. presented and Fifth Amendment Supreme The United States has Court grand jury, evidence to defend- held primary that a quash ant was entitled to the indict- is to protect the innocent oppressive from ment, would, most, but be entitled to prosecution. v. Georgia, supra. Wood suppress trial. the evidence at function, recognizing this “While the Su- Supreme Court refused extend the preme repeatedly Court has nevertheless grand jury proceedings exclusionary rule to shaped holdings prevent its so as to litigious Calandra, potential supra, in because of the jury grand proceedings.” interference with injury to and the historic role functions of Comment, Jury, 11 Rutgers-Camden Grand grand holding such jury, action Calandra, (1980); L. J.' supra; seriously impede would de- Dionisio, United States v. lay proceedings, disrupt halt the 764, 773, (1973); 35 L.Ed.2d Costel- investigations, orderly progress of necessi- lo, Walsh, Keeney supra; American litigation tate of issues tan- extended Jury Bar Principles, Association’s Grand primary objective, gentially related to the However, Idaho L.Rev. 545 one case interruption. protracted and result in particular, Brady Maryland, 373 U.S. (1963), L.Ed.2d 215 the law of the land. Costello is still which not mention grand does evidence in a ruling Supreme requiring There no Court jury context, having profound a influence presented. exculpatory evidence to be That on some lower federal courts. After exam- withholding ex- Court has never ruled ining per- further the rationale we grand culpatory from a vio- supports Supreme ceive present Court’s rights process to a fair target’s lates due rulings, we will discuss theories devel- requires the dismissal of trial and that this oped Brady. from However, a few fed- lower indictment. so, have courts done eral courts and state Supreme United States prosecutorial upon flagrant generally based Dionisio, supra at stated: S.Ct. at resulting in unfairness to de- misconduct Any holding that would saddle majority of cases the vast fendants. jury with minitrials and preliminary question the refused to the courts have assuredly showings impede its in- integrity jury indictments. frustrate in- vestigation public’s expeditious terest in the fair and adminis- cases have ad- recent federal Numerous laws. tration of the criminal miscon- prosecutorial dressed the issue present types various rules, failing duct exclusionary Courts do not want jury and suppression whether hearings, or evidence to the evidentiary rules were warrant- disrupt delay the indictments mini-trials to dismissals of jury’s Walsh, Keeney supra. requirement under the function. ed. There is no negating perhaps knowing perjury, relating federal laws or rules that evidence matter, shall be submitted to a a material has been requirement, Mexico such Since New has jury). the grand solely in these cases are examined relation of Appeals The Tenth Circuit Court has questions arising process to due out of a steadfastly “pierce refused to the armor” of type failure evidence. *11 and has held that “indicted court, Cederquist, in United v. States right not a challenge defendants do have (9th 641 1981), recognized F.2d 1347 Cir. grand jury.” fairness a United that an indictment be dismissed for Thomas, (10th States v. 632 F.2d 846 prosecutorial upon misconduct based 1980). heavily Cir. The court relied on Cos- Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or refusing an tello in to dismiss indictment upon pow- the court’s supervisory inherent by grand jurors handed down who were ers but stated that constitutionally- exposed concerning to news stories local independence grand juries based traffic, allegedly heroin which biased the prosecutors necessarily a limits court’s re- Hubbard, members. v. 603 United States view of the grand jury proceedings. Evi- (submission (10th 1979) F.2d 137 Cir. circumstantially was withheld which hearsay conjecture grand jury negated criminal intent. The court held indictment); does not warrant dismissal that dismissal required only flagrant is in Addington, United States v. 471 F.2d 560 cases in the grand jury has been (10th 1973). Cir. overreached or in significant deceived some way and prosecutor’s where the DeVincent, conduct The Court in United States v. significantly infringed upon ability 1980), (1st pointed 632 F.2d 155 Cir. out that grand jury independent exercise its position to accede to the defendant’s judgment. indictment dismissed failure to submit evidence would involve considerable Other cases are: United v. Lasky, States duplication endanger of effort and would (9th denied, Cir.), 600 F.2d 765 cert. 444 compliance with the various time limits. U.S. 100 62 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 405 (1979) (prosecution required is Implicit in the decisions of most of the present jury with evidence which courts that have addressed the issue of the negate would tend to guilt); United States prose dismissal of an indictment because of Trass, (9th v. (the 644 F.2d 791 1981) Cir. cutorial misconduct or basic unfairness that not present need all available process, concept violates due is the exculpatory or all information material must prejudice substantial the defendant bearing credibility on the of potential wit province of be demonstrated before the nesses); Wander, United States v. 601 F.2d jury is invaded. Russell independent grand (3d 1979) (speculative 1251 Cir. views States, 82 v. 369 U.S. S.Ct. United credibility on the of witnesses (1962); v. 8 Bird L.Ed.2d 240 United States submitted); need not be United v. man, 1979), (3d de 602 547 Cir. cert. F.2d Ciambrone, (2d 1979) (an 601 F.2d 616 Cir. nied, 62 indictment is not defective because a de (1980); v. Add L.Ed.2d 668 United States did fendant not have an opportunity to ington, supra. present his version of the facts before the that have dismissed indict- courts jury. had failed to prose- generally recognized have ments advise the the defendant right cutor’s use some discretion threatened, had been which motivated him presentation a of evidence to testify falsely trial.); at a prior United not entitle but have ruled that does Kennedy, (9th Cir.), States v. 564 F.2d 1329 in engage him it or to fundamen- S., to mislead Myers v. U. 435 U.S. Ciambrone, tally supra; (1978), (dismissal unfair tactics. L.Ed.2d 541 Comment, only Examples flagrant Jury, supra. is warranted Grand a case of matter, (1) “fundamentally failure unfair tactics” are: State, (Alaska 1979); fels v. on ba- obtaining an indictment prosecution Harwood, P.2d Or.App. perjurous; and known to be sis of evidence (Ct.App.1980). leading prosecution eye-witness it has received rather believe however, significant, Second It Id.; hearsay testimony. United States than only decision in Circuit’s Ciambrone Basurto, 1974); 497 F.2d Cir. sug- finding the circuit level that federal (2d Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 United States divulge exculpatory prosecutor must gests a 1972). Cir. that find- information to Note, Ciambrone, supra Wash. & However, supra, ing dicta. the court give than “Rather the Lee L.Rev. contrary view and ruled took standing, the Estepa constitutional attorney possible to reveal the rule failure of the Estepa holding justified its against the defendant’s second circuit existence of threats power supervisory of its misleading as an extension life fell far short of'the kind of *12 Id.; Estepa, su- courts.” deception would warrant over the district conduct or pra. dismissal of the indictment. have dismissed holding grand jury “None of the courts that Cases must Supreme Court’s exculpatory information are: address the be advised of indictments Provenzano, not F.Supp. a court should holding United v. 440 in Costello that States because (S.D.N.Y.1977); facially indictment 561 United v. Phil dismiss a valid States Co., (N.D. inadequate evidence.” lips F.Supp. grand jury Petroleum 435 heard 610 Note, 117 Okl.1977); Air Lee L.Rev. supra v. Braniff 38 Wash. & United States Inc., ways, F.Supp. (W.D.Tex.1977); (1981). 428 579 DeMarco, F.Supp. United v. States 401 505 attempt- courts have A few lower federal aff’d,

(C.D.Cal.1975), (9th 550 F.2d 1224 rule, or circum- to extend the Costello ed Cir.), denied, cert. 434 U.S. it, principles enunciat- by applying the vent (1977). 83, 83 Maryland, 373 U.S. Brady in v. ed (1963). The It 215 majority is claimed that view will 10 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. has prosecutor Brady held that the power result in the effec- in erosion of the to a exculpatory evidence divulge grand jury, by allowing tiveness of the a a requests defendant withholding when that to mislead it rel- defendant Brady does trial. specific material before tending negate evant evidence the de- ought to Comment, type of evidence guilt. Jury, address what fendant’s Grand su- not jury. It is a grand before a pra. submitted be efforts to In their discovery case. pre-trial Other cases in which indictments were are guidelines than liberal develop more Basurto, v. su- dismissed are United States Costello, are look- some courts in indicated Gallo, pra; F.Supp. United v. 394 310 States this, courts have To do ing Brady. Basurto, (D.Conn.1975). supra, pros- In with a jury proceeding equated a prior ecutor unin- learned to trial that an trial. co-conspirator, dicted who had testified reasoning, as to follow We decline defendants’ activities before the The determination flaws. jury, has some obvious respects. had lied in material prosecutor’s of a materiality of a breach of notify did not the court or evidence to favorable duty to disclose proceeded to perjury is different trial. The court held that the Due Process defendant is at trial because than it stan- violated context Clause of the Fifth Amendment is is different. Galtieri required proof of partially where the is based on dard indictment 1978). (5th Cir. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 v. perjured testimony, perjured tes- cause, probable is jury standard material, timony jeopardy has is and when a reasonable proof beyond it is at trial v. Gold- while attached. See United States quantum of materiality and man, (S.D.N.Y.1978); F.Supp. Frink doubt. cause, justifying probable State, 1979); to show (Alaska evidence Gief- indictment, closure a is far less than constitutional error. United the return necessary Weidman, prove is at trial to a defendant’s Cir.), 572 F.2d 1199 in- guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An S.Ct. is a accusation of dictment formal L.Ed.2d 113 Blea, guilt. See Brady, in Agurs, as the Court was not A (Ct.App.1973). P.2d stricter test of evidentiary question affecting ruling on an materiality withheld placed is on evidence trial but one involved finding from a because its of the case. probable cause harder to overcome is much Agurs, The Court established three by the withheld evidence than verdict materiality levels for the excluded evi- guilt beyond reasonable doubt dence at trial: that which the Thus, at trial. quantum and materiali- knew in which case the perjured, ty suppressed re- required conviction aside if there is a medial court must set greater action at the jury level. testi- This is evident in our case. “reasonable likelihood that the false Each of the mony judgment defendants has been could have linked effected with the Id., murder one or more of the jury.” 427 U.S. at by eye-witness testimony. 2397; victims Defend- (2) specific which there evidence for protestations ants’ of innocence and other request. pretrial “[Ijmplicit has been a circumstantial evidence was materiality con- requirement of withheld. Even if the withheld evidence suppressed might cern that *13 gone had plain it is that have effected the outcome of the trial.” Id. the indictments still fully sup- would 2398; 104, (3) general at 96 at a S.Ct. ported probable on the of issue cause. made, request request or no has been However, it equally is clear that withhold- test is whether the omitted evidence creates ing some of at a defendant’s reasonable doubt as trial would a taint verdict. guilt that did not otherwise exist. Brady, request a was for made state- dealing “We are with the defendant’s ments, prosecution but the failed to disclose Due right a fair trial mandated to Brady before or during compan- trial his Clause of the Fifth Amend- Process ion’s statement in which the latter confess- at 96 at 2399. ment. ...” Id. S.Ct. ed to killing Brady being compa- apply The would construction prosecuted. Supreme Court held that Amendment rable clause in Fourteenth suppression of evidence “favorable to applicable trials in state courts. the defendant request on proc- violates due probative if no Court held that evidence has ess where the evidence is material either to significance, be served to purpose no would guilt punishment, or to irrespective of the suppression. new of order a trial because its good faith bad prosecution.” faith that if the omitted necessarily It follows Id., 373 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1196-97. doubt that evidence creates a reasonable Brady adopts concept fairness, a rather exist, constitutional er- did not otherwise dwelling prosecutorial than misconduct, on that ror has been committed. This means prejudice focuses on to the defendant. must be evaluated in the omission Brady prosecution’s established the con- If there is context of the entire record. obligation stitutional to disclose evidence no about whether reasonable doubt that would be material defense of the con- or not the additional evidence is accused. The lower federal courts immedi- sidered, justification is for a new there no ately standards, started fashioning but it trial. was not until United Agurs, States v. 427 112-3, Id. at S.Ct. at 2402. 96 U.S. 96 (1976) S.Ct. Supreme that the in United States Court The Tenth court identified the crite- Circuit Jackson, (10th Cir.), ria be used v. to decide whether 579 F.2d 553 evidence is sufficiently denied, S., “material” to make its nondis- Allen v. U. U.S. Su- process question. The United States placed the (1978), has 58 L.Ed.2d a due not mandated that preme Court has to establish on the defendant burden circumstances violation exists under process under the failure to disclose Costello, supra. We find no ours. process. due See such as is a denial of Agurs test (10th Harris, so. compelling 462 F.2d 1033 reason do v. States

United Brumley, 466 v. 1972); United States Cir. Chance, v. This ruled Court 1972), cert. (10th F.2d 911 Cir. an indict 221 P. 183 37 L.Ed.2d regular court and duly returned into ment challenged with re its face cannot on Gaston, 608 F.2d 607 v. In United States evidence. degree spect to the kind 1979), held that in deter- (5th the court Cir. there would further held that The Court of evi- mining whether the nondisclosure authority statutory autho be clear have to a strict process, of due rises to denial review, in its ab rizing such People materiality applied. standard sence, power to re are without the courts Filis, Misc.2d 386 N.Y.S.2d competency sufficiency, legality or view the Wander, Trass, supra. supra; Unit- (1976); upon which an indictment the evidence Gardner, (9th F.2d 770 Cir. provid ed States court review There is no returned. 1980) prosecution is uncer- holds that if the in our statutes. ed informa- materiality tain about to the decision subscribe We still submit possession, within its tion up indict- opening We hold Chance. court for an in that information to the trial orderly challenge would halt the ments for inspection and evaluation. United camera ex- would cause investigations, progress Brown, F.2d 1274 Cir. unimportant issues and on litigation tended 1978). public’s interest frustrate the Ap- by our language used administration expeditious fair and exculpatory evi- withholding peals, an intrusion It would be laws. criminal process due dence violates defendant’s provinces of the constitu- separate into the effect, per sanc- se rights, in establishes offices of the tionally independent *14 any evi- event, tion of dismissal if exculpatory prosecutor. jury and the withheld. This leaves knowingly dence is trial. be cured at would misconduct claimed the ab- considering whether no room for jury grand should that the We have said affected the outcome sence of prosecutor and of the not the tool whether proceeding or of the spirit letter and by the he must abide any prejudice, suffered both the defendant precluding the laws, one including the jurisdic- required in most other of which are obtaining when inadmissible use of jury challenges grand permit tions that Maldonado, That supra. indictments. indictments. But, hold- are further we true here. holds interest an auto- public To serve the not reach so does to do ing that failure under these cir- matic sanction of dismissal circum- under the dimensions constitutional public cumstances is to disservice another amendment Although the stances. by frustrating prosecution of crimi- interest evidence, there admissible require does Birdman, supra. ruling nals. Such 31-6-6, in change made Section was no lead our case to windfall dismissals provides for which N.M.S.A. against indictments these defendants where they will an oath jurors to take grand inconsequential slightest even the bit of evidence”, change and no “legal receive withheld. exculpatory evidence has been 31-6-ll(B), sets which made in Section overrule reject We this view of the law and right to order “com- jury’s forth the succeeding cases that Herrera and the they have rea- produced if petent” evidence view. adopt, appear adopt, this amend- it is available. son to believe change. Part of real ment made no statu- dispose these issues on state We were jury reforms perceive a due tory grounds. We do not designed prevent prevelant they cause are abuses material to the issue of system by prosecutors, credibility of the some witnesses. This issue is statutory proviso by holdings opinion settled prosecut- that: “The elsewhere ing attorney regarding withholding shall conduct himself in a fair of evidence bear- impartial ing credibility on the and manner at all witnesses. times when assisting grand jury.” We affirm the decisions of the various lawyer oath as a and his duties as an officer trial courts as to all and issues defendants of this Court demand no less. and remand cases to the district courts for trial. do process

We not find a due viola tion here: if IT adopt even we did IS SO ORDERED. However* jurisdictions the rule of some other that an RIORDAN, JJ., and FEDERICI concur. indictment be overturned under the process due “flagrant prosecuto clause for SOSA, Justice, WOOD, Senior Senior misconduct”, rial the defendants would re Judge, Appeals, respectfully Court of dis- ceive no relief. prosecutors in our senting. simply following cases were the directions SOSA, Justice, WOOD, Senior Senior of the Legislature by withholding the evi Judge, dissenting. dence in question. per There was not the We holding dissent from the jury, deceit or overreaching malicious found present had no defend- essential before most courts would ants’ statements permit an attack on indictment. There jury. We specially concur with the remain- showing is no prosecutors’ that the conduct opinion. der of the majority’s infringed upon the independent judgment grand jurors. A determines whether there is accuse, probable cause to and also protects Furthermore, we applied if persons against unfounded accusations. tough Brady-Agurs test to the evidence 31-6-10, (Cum.Supp.1980). N.M.S.A.1978 § here, prevail. defendants would not In ex State, Baird v. See 568 P.2d amining that, the record we find as to each functions, In performing these defendant, the evidence withheld is not of presented by hears evidence sufficient materiality suggest direct- prosecutor. The has would, introduced, if changed have the vote ed the to conduct himself or of the grand jury on probable the issue of 31-6-7, fairly impartially, herself § cause. Considering eye-witness testi (Cum.Supp.1980), N.M.S.A.1978 mony information, to the murders and other negates evidence which the omitted evidence does not create a target prosecutor is when the aware *15 any reasonable doubt guilt. of defendant’s evidence, 11(B), that N.M.S.A.1978 § 31-6— There is no likelihood that the introduction with these (Cum.Supp.1980). Consistent of the changed evidence would have the requirements, jury “is legislative result. not, be, of the the tool should not The trial courts were not in error on this authority manipulate at prosecuting to issue. 500, Traub, 498, 565 v. 90 N.M. will.” Davis appeals 1015, (1977). These 1017 P.2d 4. PROMISES BY THE PROSECUTOR prose- present question of whether the the TO WITNESSES evidence from exculpatory cutor withheld (1) stan- prosecutor promised peni jury. The discuss: the each the We evi- exculpatory of tentiary presentation inmate who he testified that dard evidence; dence; (2) exculpatory not be returned to the Mexico is New State what determined; is (3) exculpatory evidence Penitentiary or of any its satellite facilities. how claims (4) exculpatory evidence agreements Defendants claim these should the presented have been to be- made.

708 is, negate exculpatory, guilt, that to Presenting Exculpa- For

1. Standard Jury tend “to establish defend- tory To A Grand must Evidence evidence charged.” crimes ant’s innocence of the exculpatory present is to Lochman, Pa.Super. 402 265 Com. v. known to evidence is when such evidence (1979). 518 A.2d 31-6-ll(B); v. see State prosecutor. § (N.M. 601 P.2d 75 Herrera, N.M. To Be Exculpatory Evidence Is 3. How Payne, Recently, in State App.1979). Determined (N.M.App.1981), N.M. 630 P.2d ex- determining evidence is In whether Appeals suggested “known” Court of not to be withheld evidence is culpatory, the have might “should known.” This include was in evidence that relation to evaluated suggestion appeals; is not involved in these evidence, See Maldona- undisputed it is that the withheld State, N.M. 604 P.2d exculpatory, was known do v. allegedly exculpatory allegedly evidence prosecutor. any without reference to is to be evaluated Herrera, supra In 601 P.2d at supra. Payne, Wheth- evidence. See other Appeals knowing the Court of held that “[a] not to exculpatory is is er withheld evidence withholding tending negate evidence prosecu- on the basis determined fundamentally guilt is unfair violates belief, Herrera, or on subjective supra, tor’s process.” 31-6-ll(B) requires due Section prosecutor’s belief that the basis presentation “directly of evidence that is State San- withheld evidence false. negates” guilt. light of our definition chez, (N.M.App. 618 P.2d evidence, exculpatory and how evi- 1980). determined, unnecessary to be it is is determine, cases, in whether there these exculpatory is is to be Whether in the two re- is material difference examining the objectively determined If evidence did quirements. the withheld determining wheth- withheld evidence and guilt, it did not “di- negate not “tend” er, itself, evidence indicates the withheld rectly” guilt. We to” negate use “tend crime guilty is not that a defendant hereinafter, is not phrase but use Herrera, Harge, supra; charged. State v. adoption phrase taken as as (N.M.App.1979). P.2d 1105 N.M. standard. Herrera, de- The withheld evidence in was not at the time fendant Exculpatory Is Evidence? What prior the time of acts child abuse or at 31-6-ll(B) abuse, Section refers indicated that defendant child guilt. ne negates abetting Evidence which child aiding or guilty not evidence; is, gates and, thus, exculpatory. The it was abuse Gonzales, evidence that indicates defendant withheld evidence Herrera, guilty charged. su crime (N.M.App.1981), pra. Webster’s Third New International vehicle forced defendant’s that the victim’s exculpate states that Dictionary street, indicate pickup off did not blame, fault, freeing “indicates a from or did not shoot whether defendant did comprehends guilt.” Exculpatory evidence and, thus, was not victim self-defense or, negate guilt evidence which tends exculpatory. affirmatively, supports the stated innocence *16 Germain,- Exculpatory of the defendant. v. St. Claims Made Com. The Mass.-, (1980). 408 N.E.2d 1363 n.6 by made defendants divide The claims parts: (A) exculpato- exculpatory “merely

Evidence is not be- into three defendants’ statements; (B) in- ry allegedly cause so it.” the defendant labels Evidence evidence to the exculpatory though may is even be consistent with evidence (C) promises wit- grand jury; to the if the made to favorable defendant evidence grand jury. merely impeaching.” “is collateral or To be who before the nesses testified directly negates Exculpatory target A. Defendants’ the Statements he where is aware of such evidence. statement, Colby, in his said that he nev- anyone during penitentia- er saw killed the 31-6-ll(B) second per- The sentence of § riot; ry he that never entered target, instances, Cellblock mits the in testify some to was Smith killed. before the The third sentence the prosecutor present directs to evidence Buzbee stated that he did not hit kill or negates guilt. According pros- to the anyone go he did not into Cellblock ecutor, requirement the 4 during riot. the presented applies be evidence when the Chapman stated that his the extent of present defendant is not to able his testimo- during activities the help riot was to out Thus, ny to the jury. prosecutor the some friends who had taken overdoses modify duty present exculpato- his to would drugs; then he overdosed himself and knew 1) ry given evidence as follows: when the nothing he up until woke in the hospital. opportunity testify to before the Chavez stated that he in his remained present jury, defendant could own ex- his unit during except helped the riot when he culpatory prosecutor statement and the outside; take some inmates that he no had so; 2) obligation would have no to do all weapon anyone did not get see mur- instances, other be prosecutor’s it would the dered, hit or stabbed. obligation present exculpatory to evidence. 31-6-ll(B) Bell Section is not so get that he worded. stated did not out of his cell until late the riot and did not hurt legislative The present direction to excul- anyone Tapia, than other someone named patory evidence not depend does on wheth- who had to tried hurt Bell. target er opportunity testify has an to grand jury; qualifica- prosecutor

The before does without not contend that tion, Buzbee, exculpato- stated Colby, statements Chapman, ry presented. be Chavez evidence “shall” This exculpatory. and Bell are not The mandatory direction, prosecutor statutory 12-2- see requirement, § contends that N.M.S.A.1978, Herrera, 2(1), present ambiguous stated in is not and is supra, to excul- patory to by legis- given evidence was be effect as written. Methola v. modified lative County Eddy, reforms enacted in 1979. 95 N.M. This con- tention is majority not answered

opinion. he prosecutor’s contention that has

As amended present exculpato- N.M.Laws ch. no to duty a defendant’s 31-6-ll(B) Section § reads: ry target given statement when is opportunity testify to

B. before duty It is the to weigh it, jury, procedural would also introduce a all the evidence submitted to complication Legislature’s unambigu- and when it has reason believe that complication other ous competent direction. The would be available may explain given opportu- away disprove target a whether the charge or nity testify, accusation or that would make answer re- an unjustified, then, quire indictment it should several factual determinations. See order the produced. target Rogers State, P.2d shall be target notified of his (Ct.App.1980), concerning status and opportunity given an opportunity testify, testify. if he If the defendant did not in fact so, desires do prosecutor testify, evidentiary unless determination would determines notification required result as to whether defendant had flight, endanger other persons, testify; obstruct given opportunity been justice, or the with unable determination would have to be made in diligence notify reasonable person. said decide order to whether had prosecuting attorney assisting present exculpa- a defendant’s shall tory evidence that A inter- statement. cannot *17 rights jury. grand defendant’s before the complication to avoid ject procedural this majority, opinion, in its utilizes this legislative with the re- The noncompliance his prosecutor’s provision justify same 31-6-ll(B). Prosecutors quirement of § exculpatory evi- clearly failure to spirit the letter and of the must abide grand jury allegedly to the which is Maldonado, supra. law. requires Basic fairness inadmissible. argued never in the dis- jury provisions grand of our statutes be that defendants’ statements trict court 31-6-7, applied evenhandedly. N.M. See § argument were inadmissible evidence. The (Cum.Supp.1980). S.A.1978 was not raised in the State’s briefs legislative in- We are not unmindful of interlocutory appeals. reaching In and de- requirement tent. Maldonado reduced the ciding question, majority of the this only presented admissible ap- long-established has broken the jury di- grand to the to an unenforced pellate arguments rule that not raised be- Legislature apparently agreed rective. The will fore the district court not be considered problem approach with Maldonado’s to the Parrillo, appeal. on 94 N.M. State grand of inadmissible evidence before the (Ct.App.1979). Maldonado, jury. Since 31-6-ll(A), (Cum. Section N.M.S.A.1978 (A) (1981 amended 31-6-11 Subsection § Supp.1980), requires that evidence “such as 1), excluding N.M. Laws ch. the re- § legally upon would be admissible trial” be quirement only evidence at admissible presented evi- grand jury to the and that grand jury. While presented trial be to a directly negates dence “that applicable the amended statute is not target” grand jury pur- presented to the case, legisla- this the amendment shows 31-6-ll(B). results reached suant to § tive intent rules of evidence not be exculpatory, as in when evidence which is grand prevent fully-enlightened used to case, inadmissible, depend upon a this is also jury- statutes, prior case pertinent review of the jury (2) grand The function of the is to disagree public policy. law and sound We probable whether there is cause determine majority’s rigid with the construction to accuse. statute, only making it the admis- rule obligated to If is not sible evidence be tending negate guilt, present evidence (1) jury. disagree We because of prose- hears what the Maldonado, supra, Court’s recent decision in hear, it with the result cutor wants (2) overriding public policy evident a tool of that the becomes that the statutes longer independently prosecutor and is no gives have the benefit evidence which determination making probable cause a full understanding of the facts of the 31-6-10, required by the statute. Section case, public policy established favor- knowing withholding A N.M.S.A.1978. ing judicial economy simplification tending negate guilt judicial procedures. due fundamentally unfair and violates (1) Maldonado, McGill, claimed process. the defendant [89 (Ct.App.1976)] supra. dis- P.2d 39 that his indictment should have been prosecutors presented missed because the Herrera, 601 P.2d at supra, 93 N.M. jury. inadmissible evidence to the of Justice Botts in the dissent See specifically Defendant relied on 31- Section Chance, supra. example An 6-11(A). Court, opin- This a unanimous jury becoming a tool of the ap- ion, accepted the fact that inadmissible evi- Sanchez, supra. opinion An of this pears in but, presented, re- dence was nonetheless prosecutors to shield Court which allows fused to followed which, reverse. Maldonado grand jury evidence if be- from the Chance, lieved, State v. 221 P. 183 leads to the conclusion that defend- 31-6-ll(A) given guilty charged has been Section ant is not crimes legislative upon protect contrary no effect when called to clear intent. *18 inconsistent, by majority, Prior and B are but decision the neither are ex- judges culpatory Lampman, faced with a motion to dismiss an of Jones. State of N.M. P.2d (N.M.App.1980), indictment because of the exclusion ex- culpatory relatively two contrary. evidence had sim- not to the The withheld state- ple questions (a) Lampman, to answer: does the evi- police ment attributed to the negate guilt accident, part dence on the of the investigating ac- officer was that cused, (b) was it from withheld the victim’s car came over into defendant’s grand jury? majority opinion The Although adds lane and hit defendant. the at- complicated third and far more issue. The tributed statement was inconsistent with district court must determine if the police testimony, with- officer’s reversal oc- exculpatory held evidence was admissible. curred because was and had been knowingly withheld. admissibility inadmissibility The of evi- apparent is rarely by reference to the The by withheld statements relied on de- item of evidence alone. A determination of fendants are not exculpatory because the admissibility requires statements, themselves, often that extensive negate do not requirements foundational met. This the defendants’ charged. crimes problem becomes clear when one considers This includes the statements examined person situation third makes an Judge Donnelly in example, camera. As an negates guilt out-of-court statement which Melvin signed Kenneth Thomas a statement part on the naming accused. The statement participants three killing may be admissible evidence if the Esquibel, founda- Madrid —Pete Jesus Antunuz and requirements tional one hear- Moisés Sandoval. Thomas stated he could say exceptions is met. But can only named, how a de- identify the three although termination the admissibility participated. evi- others had questioner, dence be grand jury stage made summarizing statement, substituted the the proceedings? Esquibel, name Casaus for and Thomas “Right. said: Paul Casaus shot him.” Un- We would exculpa- hold that defendants’ substituted, til the name Casaus was tory given statements investigators were Thomas’ statement did not any- contain wrongfully excluded from grand jury. indicating thing Casaus was not involved in We would reverse the district court’s order killing of Madrid. After the name sub- refused dismiss the indictments stitution, inculpatory the statement became against Chapman, Buzbee, defendants Col- as to Casaus. by, Chavez and Bell. considering argument Thomas’ B. Withheld Evidence Inconsistent With exculpating is that statement as Casaus Evidence Presented To The Grand Esquibel Thomas named both and Casaus as Jury victim, shooting and Thomas saw Esquibel may have shooting. All of the one That defendants claim with- shooting held witnessed Thomas statements are with done inconsistent presented to the does not indicate that Casaus did also statement, Thomas’ al- shoot Madrid. The fact that withheld evidence is incon- inconsistent, exculpatory. was not though sistent with evidence opinion goes raises no the with- to unwarrant- majority issue unless held evidence is exculpatory. ruling prosecutors “Inconsist- ed extremes in equate ent” evidence does not with “exculpa- had no tory” example: merely evidence. For In inconsistent with state- evidence which (withheld), A jury testimony. ment We reach the the witness stated that nothing being by relying plain he knew on the about the crime same conclusion investigated. meaning 31-6-ll(B). We look at the (presented statement B of § Methola, grand jury), supra; as the witness stated that words written. P.2d 1216 Ellenberger, Jones committed crime. A Statements (1981); Com’rs, Cty. City and Bd. of Etc. v. 634 P.2d 1264 Vegas, of Las ESPINDA, Petitioner-Appellant Samuel *19 (1980). Nothing language Cross-Appellee, supports statute the conclusion that intended that Ingrid ESPINDA, Respondent-Appellee present only directly direct evidence which Cross-Appellant. evidence, negates guilt. Circumstantial if believed, may lead to inferences which also No. 13334. Herrera,

directly negate guilt. supra, See Supreme Court of New Mexico. example for an of circumstantial evidence Sept. Gonzales, directly negated guilt, supra, Payne, supra, examples

cases where circumstantial evidence did not

negate guilt. By

C. Promises The Prosecutor

Each penitentiary inmate who testified

before the promised that he

would not be returned to the penitentiary any facility. satellite promises by These were not disclosed to the promises

These exculpatory are not evi-

dence, as we have defined exculpatory evi-

dence in this dissenting opinion. prom- might

ises bear on credibility of wit- trial,

nesses at promises but the do not tend negate defendant. position goes defendants’ beyond an evidence contention. They

urge that promises all must be disclosed.

Regardless, promises these

witnesses have been disclosed and defend-

ants make appropriate use of the

promises at trial. This disclosure is not

pertinent to the issue of withholding excul-

patory evidence.

The indictments Colby, Buzbee, Chap-

man, Chavez and Bell should be dismissed

because of prosecutors’ failure to dis-

close their exculpatory statements

grand jury. The refusals to dismiss the Casaus,

indictments of Flores and Sandoval

should be affirmed.

Case Details

Case Name: Buzbee v. Donnelly
Court Name: New Mexico Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 25, 1981
Citation: 634 P.2d 1244
Docket Number: 13783, 13789
Court Abbreviation: N.M.
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