Buxton v. RudenBuxton v. Ruden
Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notices of appeal are treated as applications for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the application of the defendant in Action No. 2 to compel the plaintiffs deposition and substituting therefor a provision granting the application and directing that the deposition take place upon written notice of at least 10 days, to be given by the defendant Carol Germain to the plaintiff and the defendant Steven J. Ruden, or at such time and place as the parties may agree; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants in Action No. 1 and Action No. 2 payable by the plaintiff in Action Nos. 1 and 2.
The defendant in Action No. 2, Carol Germain (hereinafter the executrix), is the executrix of the estate of Wallace M.
The Supreme Court erred, however, in denying the executrix’s application to compel the plaintiffs deposition. Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the prohibition of CPLR 3130 (1) against the use of both depositions and interrogatories applies only to “[a]ction[s] to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death predicated solely on a cause or causes of action for negligence.” Since the plaintiff in Action No. 2 sought only to recover for pecuniary losses arising from the former attorney’s alleged negligence in failing to commence a timely action against a potential tortfeasor, that action is not for “personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death” and, therefore, does not fall within the limited scope of CPLR 3130 (1) (cf. Luckhardt v Jeffrey W. Waller, P.C.,