BUTZ, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL. v. GLOVER LIVESTOCK COMMISSION CO., INC.
No. 71-1545
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 27, 1973—Decided March 28, 1973
411 U.S. 182
Keith A. Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Morton Hollander, and William Kanter.
R. A. Eilbott, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward I. Staten.
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159,
Respondent operatеs a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered “market agency” under § 303 of the Act,
Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department of Agriculture hearing examiner fоund that respondent had “intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights.”2 The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease-and-desist оrder and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day suspension of respondent‘s registration under the Act.
The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer. After hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and order accepting the hearing examiner‘s findings and adopting his rеcommendations of a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed but was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated:
“It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions but in view of the previous warnings given resрondent we conclude that we should not only issue a cease and desist order but also a suspension of respondent
as a registrant under the act but for a lesser period than recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner.” 30 Agri. Dec. 179, 186 (1971).
The Court of Appeals agreed that
The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases required review of the Secretary‘s order according to the “fundamental principle . . . that where Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy ‘the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.’ ” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112 (1946). Thus, the Secretary‘s сhoice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it “unwarranted
We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to suggest that the sanction was “unwarranted in law” because “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations” is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute.4 The Secretary may suspend
Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting on the premise that the Seсretary‘s practice was to impose suspensions only in cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct.”6 The Secretary‘s practice, rather, ap-parently is to employ that sanction as in his judgment
Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a сonclusion that the suspension of respondent was so “without justification in fact” “as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary‘s] discretion.” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 115; Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S., at 414; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 455 (1954). The Judicial Officer rested the suspension on his view of its necessity in light of respondent‘s disregard of previous warnings. The facts found concerning the previous warnings and rеspondent‘s disregard of these warnings were sustained by the Court of Appeals as based on ample evidence. In that circumstance, the overturning of the suspension authorized by the statute was an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain.
Similarly, insofar as the Court of Appeals rested its action on its view that, in light of damaging publicity about the charges, the cease-and-desist order sufficiently redressed respondent‘s violations, the court clearly exceeded its function of judicial review. The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.
The only remarkable thing about this case is its presence in this Court. For the case involves no more than the application of well-settled principles to a familiar situation, and has little significance except for the respondent. Why certiorari was granted is a mystery to me—particularly at a time when the Court is thought by many to be burdened by too heavy a caseload. See Rule 19, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court of Appeals did nothing more than review a penalty imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture that was alleged by the respondent to be discriminatory and arbitrary. In approaching its task, the appellate court displayed an impeccable understanding of the permissible scope of review:
“The scope of our review is limited to the correction of errors of law and to an examination of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factual conclusions. The findings and order of the Judicial Officer must be sustained if not contrary to law and if supported by substantial еvidence. Also, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Judicial Officer‘s as to which of the various inferences may be drawn from the evidence.” 454 F. 2d 109, 110–111.
“Ordinarily it is not for the courts to modify ancillary features of agency orders which are supported by substantial evidence. The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within thе special competence of the regulatory agency vested by Congress with authority to deal with these matters, and so long as the remedy selected does not exceed the agency‘s statutory power to impose and it bears a reasonable relation to the practicе sought to be eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere.” Id., at 114.
Had the Court of Appeals used the talismanic language of the Administrative Procedure Act, and found the penalty to be either “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”
Today the Court holds that the penalty was not “unwarranted in law,” because it was within permissible statutоry limits. But this ignores the valid principle of law that motivated the Court of Appeals—the principle that like cases are to be treated alike. As Professor Jaffe has put the matter:
“The scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and determined by the major proposition that the constitutional courts of this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal system. . . . An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the prеmise that each agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the ‘common law,’ and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.”2
The reversal today of a wholly defensible Court of Appeals judgment accomplishes two unfortunate results. First, the Court moves administrative decisionmaking one step closer to unreviewability, an odd result at a time when serious concern is being expressed about the fairness of agency justice.3 Second, the Court serves notice upоn the federal judiciary to be wary indeed of venturing to correct administrative arbitrariness.
Because I think the Court of Appeals followed the correct principles of judicial review of administrative conduct, I would affirm its judgment.