There is no provision in tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act for a rehearing of a proceeding in which tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission has made an award in accordance with tbe provisiоns of tbe act, on tbe ground of newly discovered еvidence. It is provided in tbe act, however, that tbe Industrial Commission, on its own motion, or on tbe application of a party to tbe proceeding, mаy review an award made by tbe Commission, on tbe ground оf a change of conditions since tbe award wаs made. Upon such review, tbe Commission may vacate and set aside an award previously made by it, оr may diminish or increase tbe amount of compensation awarded, within tbe limits provided in tbe act. N. 0. Codе of 1931, sec. 8081 (bbb). Tbe Commission also has tbe power to make rules not inconsistent with tbe act, for carrying оut its provisions. N. C. Code of 1931, sec. 8081 (jjj). All tbe provisions of tbе act show that it was tbe purpose of tbe General Assembly that tbe Industrial Commission should have a continuing jurisdiction of all proceedings begun before tbe Commission for compensation in accordance with its terms. Tbe Superior Court has jurisdiction only when a рarty to a proceeding has appeаled to said court on matters of law involved therein. Findings of fact made by tbe Commission are conclusive and when supported by evidence, cannot be reviewed by tbe Superior Court. We think it clear that tbе Commission has tbe power, in a proper cаse, and in accordance with its rules and regulations, to grant a rehearing of a proceeding рending before it, and in which it has made an award, on tbe ground of newly discovered evidence. See
Byrd v. Lumber Co.,
Pursuant to tbe order of Judge Erizzelle, at June Term, 1933, of tbe Superior Court of Wayne County, tbis proceeding was pending before tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission at tbе time tbe order for a rehearing on tbe ground of newly discovered evidence was made by tbe Commissiоn. Tbe order of Judge Erizzelle was in compliancе with tbe order of tbis Court on tbe former appeаl. When tbe proceeding was remanded from tbe Superior Court, where it was pending on appeal, to tbe Industrial Commission, although for a specific purpose, as stated in
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tbe order, the Superior Court surrendered its jurisdiction, and the Industrial Commission acquired jurisdiсtion for all purposes. See
Finlayson v. Kirby,
There was error in the judgment reversing the order of the Industrial Commission for а rehearing- of the proceeding on the ground оf newly discovered evidence, and in affirming the award made by the Commission on 6 October, 1931. The appeal from the order of the Commission to the Superior Court should have been dismissed. The judgment is
Reversed.