Butterfield v. Usher
91 U.S. 246
SCOTUS
1876
Check Treatment
Me. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.

The'' decree here appealed from disposed finally of a motion made in the case, but not of the case itself. It simply set aside one sale that had been made, and ordered another. A decree confirming the sale would have been final. But this decree is ^analogous to a judgment vof reversal with directions for a new trial or a new hearing, which, as has been often held, is not final. Where the practice allows appeals from interlocutory ■' decrees, an appeal might lie from such a decree as this. " Such was the practice in*New York. 2 Rev. Stat. (N. Y.) 605, sects. 78, 79; id. 178, sects.'59,. 62. Consequently it was said, in Delaplaine v. Lawrence, 10 Paige, 604, “ In sales by masters, ■under decrees and orders of this court, the purchasers who have bid off the property and paid their deposits in good faith are considered as having inchoate rights, which entitle them to a hearing upon the question whether the -sales shall be set aside; . and, if the court errs by setting aside the sale improperly, they have-the right to carry the question by appeal to a higher tribunal.” But our jurisdiction upon appeal is statutory only. ■ If some act of Congress does not authorize a case to be brought here, we cannot -take jurisdiction. Appeals cannot be taken to this court from the Supreme Court of the District, except after a final decree in the case by that court. The decree in this' case not being final, we have no jurisdiction.

We do not "wish to be understood as holding that a purchaser at a sale under a decree in equity may not, at a proper stage of the case, appeal, from a decree affecting his interests. - All we do decide is, that there cannot be such an appeal to this court until the proceedings for the sale under the original decree are ended.

In Blossom v. R.R. Co., 1 Wall. 655, and 3 id. 196, we en *249 tertained such .an appeal; but the decree there appealed from was final. There was no order to resell, for the reason, that, between the time of Blossoni’s bid and the time of the order of the court appealed from, the decree for the satisfaction of which the sale had been ordered was paid. The decree against Blossom, therefore, was the last which the court could máké in the case. It ended the proceedings, and dismissed the parties from further attendance upon the court for any purpose connected with that action.

This appeal is, therefore, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.