Butler v. StateButler v. State
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Norbert Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
PATTERSON, Presiding Judge.
The appellant, Nancy Butler, was indicted for the capital offense of murder done for a pecuniary or other valuable consideration.
The record shows that the victim was an elderly woman, of considerable means, who lived alone and also was in declining health, was suffering from diabetes, and was in need of constant nursing care. The appellant, who had some training as a nurse, was employed by the victim to provide her with such care. The appellant, with the assistance of others, persuaded the victim to change her will, so that, upon her death, all of her property would go to the appellant. One week after the victim executed the new will, the appellant and an accomplice intentionally killed the victim by giving her an overdose of insulin.
Shortly after the victim‘s death, the victim‘s heirs brought suit to set aside the will. The suit was settled before trial; however, the record before us does not disclose the details or circumstances surrounding the settlement. The record does show that the appellant received $13,000 from the victim‘s estate in the settlement. While the record is sparse, it is apparent that the will was set aside, and it is reasonable to assume that the settlement of the will contest occurred before the appellant‘s conviction.1 Subsequently, the victim‘s remaining estate was divided among eight heirs in accordance with the law of intestate succession. Each heir‘s share was diminished by the costs of the suit challenging the will and the expenses of administration of the victim‘s estate, in proportion to his or her interest in the estate.
The amount of restitution ordered by the trial court is based upon the economic loss suffered by the heirs because of the litigation over the will and the administration of the estate, including funeral expenses. The items for which restitution was ordered along with the share of the restitution each heir would receive are set out in the record. The trial court ordered restitution as follows:
$34,608.23 attorney‘s fees awarded to the attorneys representing the heirs in the will contest $ 5,527.00 administration costs for the estate of the victim $ 3,280.00 court costs attributable to the will contest $ 2,124.24 travel expenses $13,000.00 settlement paid to the appellant in the will contest $ 3,024.00 funeral expenses $ 769.10 other expenses __________ $62,332.57 total
The legislative purpose of the restitution act was to fully compensate victims for “any pecuniary loss, damage or injury” suffered as a direct or indirect result of a criminal act.
“Before a defendant can be held liable for damages, it must be established that his criminal act was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the victim.” Strough v. State, 501 So. 2d 488, 491 (Ala. Cr.App.1986). See also Day v. State, 557 So. 2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App.1989).
“The proximate cause of an injury is the primary moving cause without which it would not have occurred, but which, in the natural and probable sequence of events, produces the injury.” City of Mobile v. Havard, 289 Ala. 532, 538, 268 So. 2d 805 (Ala.1972); see also, Vines v. Plantation Motor Lodge, 336 So. 2d 1338 (Ala.1976). As our Supreme Court observed in Alabama Power Company v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484, 306 So. 2d 236 (1975), foreseeability is the cornerstone of proximate cause. This does not mean, however, that the defendant must have actually foreseen the particular injury which resulted from his action. Rather, the injury sustained by the victim must have been of such a nature that a reasonable person could have foreseen or anticipated that the injury might occur as a natural consequence of the action. Williams v. Woodman, 424 So. 2d 611 (Ala.1982); Prescott v. Martin, 331 So. 2d 240 (Ala.1976). Where an injury is caused by intentional conduct, the rules of proximate cause are more liberally applied. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
Strough v. State, 501 So. 2d at 491.
The restitution act by reference to pertinent Alabama civil law, permits a victim to recover all reasonable expenses that are incurred due to the defendant‘s wrongful conduct. Strough v. State. Whether an expense is reasonable is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and absent a clear abuse of that discretion, its ruling will not be reversed on appeal. Clare v. State, 456 So. 2d 355 (Ala. Cr.App.1983), aff‘d, 456 So. 2d 357 (Ala. 1984); Strough v. State.
We have reviewed the expenses listed above, which are encompassed in the trial court‘s restitution order, and find that they are causally related to the appellant‘s crime. The criminal act, i.e., the murder of the victim, under the circumstances of this case, was the proximate cause of the expenses, damages, or economic loss of the victims who were, in this case, the heirs of the victim. The restitution was to cover each heir‘s actual expenses and share of the economic loss that resulted from the murder. We believe that a reasonable person
It appears from the record that a civil suit against the appellant and her alleged accomplice was filed by the victim‘s heirs, and that a settlement for an undisclosed amount was made with the accomplice. The appellant contends that she is entitled to offset the amount of restitution ordered by the amount the heirs received from the accomplice in settlement of the civil suit. We find no merit in this contention. See Harris v. State; Patterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 809 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Varner v. State, 497 So. 2d 1135 (Ala.Cr. App.1986);
For the above reasons, we find that the trial court‘s order of restitution in the amount of $62,332.57 was proper, and due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TAYLOR and McMILLAN, JJ., concur.
BOWEN, J., dissents with opinion.
MONTIEL, J., recuses himself.
I dissent from the opinion of the majority upholding the trial court‘s order of restitution.
The majority interprets “victims” to constitute the “victim‘s legal heirs [who] brought suit to set aside the will.” In my opinion, the “victims” in this case are only those beneficiaries who were named in the victim‘s first will, which the appellant induced the victim to change. Unless the “heirs” were named as beneficiaries in the first will, they suffered no pecuniary loss from the appellant‘s actions because they would have inherited nothing under the first will.
From the record before this Court, we cannot determine the identity of the beneficiaries under the first will. I would remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to identify those beneficiaries and the specific pecuniary damages, as that term is defined by