1. Thе appellant’s first contention is that the judgment of the trial court overruling her challenge to the array *277 of the grand jury was error, and the second contention is that the overruling of a challenge to the array of the petit jury was error. These contentions will be dealt with together.
Pretermitting the question of the timeliness of the challenge to the array of the grand jury, the evidence adduced did not demand a finding, even if such a finding was authorized, that еither the grand or petit jury was unconstitutionally constituted. In this case, like the case of
Hardwick v. State,
2. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion for a change of venue.
While 28 prospective jurors were еxcused for cause, the 48 jurors put upon the defendant were not disqualified from serving and although, in varying degree, a number of them had been exposed to pre-trial publicity and some had formed some opinion, but no juror was put upon the defendant who indicated that he had formed any opinion which would not readily yield to evidence.
"The key rulings on such motions in this type of case, as gleaned from
Morgan v. State,
3. The trial court refused to excuse one prosрective juror for cause when she testified that she had a suspicion of the defendant’s guilt and that if she were being tried she would not want to be tried by someone who had her present state of mind as it related to the suspicions she had regarding the guilt of the defendant.
The individual examination of this prospective juror consists of approximately 60 pages. The examination by the defendant’s counsel was thorough and probing and the responses by the prospective juror were candid and frank.
She, like the defendant and the victim, was employed by the Internal Revenue Service; she had been under the supervision of the victim at one time for approximately six weeks and knew her as a supervisor, but not personally; she knew the defеndant by sight; she had signed a card sent to the victim’s family expressing sympathy and had contributed to the cost of such card along with numerous other employеes at the Internal Revenue Service; the "accident” had been discussed by other employees and she knew of it; she held no prejudice or bias against the defendant; she knew it was the responsibility of the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury would find the defendant guilty, and if the state did not prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the duty of the jury is to acquit; if she were chosen as a jurоr she could, after having listened to the law applicable to the case as given by the court and having heard the testimony as given from the stand or other testimony, decide whether the defendant was guilty and in so doing give her a fair trial; she had not formed an opinion because she did not know enough facts to form an opinion; and finally she answered the questions as shown above, which answers formed the basis of the objection.
The prospective juror had previously shown herself qualified to serve by her responses to the statutory questions set forth as questions 1 through 3 of Code § 59-806.
In Thacker v. State, supra, it was held thаt it was not error to refuse to strike for cause a prospective juror who had contributed to a fund raised for the family of the deceased. Certainly a contribution to express sympathy to such a family would not be cause to strike a prospective juror.
In
Thomas v. State,
The questions asked the prospective juror in that case are set forth beginning on page 299 and in many respects are similar to those asked in the case sub judice.
The prospective juror in this case was not disqualifiеd from serving and the judgment of the trial court refusing to strike such juror for cause was not error. Compare
Clemon v. State,
4. During the defendant’s trial a police officеr was called to testify as to certain admissions made by the defendant shortly after Betty Davis was shot. The jury left the courtroom and a separate hearing was held to determine voluntariness as prescribed by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno,
At this hearing evidence was adduced that police officers read to the defendant the "Miranda rights” from a printed form, that the defendant signed a form waiving such rights specifically before the admissions were made to which the witness testified, that prior to making such admissions the defendant made several telephonе calls and talked with an attorney who advised her not to make any further statements, that approximately two hours elapsed between the timе of the shooting and the time the in-custody statement was made, during which time the defendant was permitted to smoke and drink coffee. The initial finding of the trial court that the admissions were made voluntarily, thus permitting the jury to then pass upon such question, was not error.
Callahan v. State,
5. The remaining enumerations of error complain of the verdict being contrary to law and without evidence to support it basically because of the alleged errors heretofore dealt with and which have been held to be without merit.
The evidence adduced upon the trial of the case authorized the verdict of guilty and the sentence of the defendant to life imprisonment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.