45 Iowa 93 | Iowa | 1876
I. Upon the trial the defendant admitted the execution of the policy for the use and benefit of plaintiffs, and the delivery of the same to Jacob Butler in his lifetime, and due notice and proof of the death, and the payment of all premiums due the company up to the date of the death of said Butler, and took the affirmative of the issues joined between the parties.
It appears from'the record before us that Jacob Butler was admitted as an insane patient in the Iowa Hospital for the insane, at Mount Pleasant, a short time before his death. It was conceded on the trial, by plaintiff, that he was legally and formally admitted as an insane person.
We think the questions and answers referred to were properly excluded. Sec. 1100 of the Code provides that the physician “shall endeavor to obtain from the relations of the person in question, or from others who know the facts, correct answers so far as may be to the interrogatories * * *.”
The answers, then, are mere hearsay and not competent to show insanity at a previous date. Their introduction must have been sought for this purpose, for the plaintiff conceded that the deceased was insane at the date of his admission to the hospital at Mount Pleasant.
determine from the appellant’s abstract to what time these interrogatories referred or to what extent these witnesses were examined as to the facts upon which their opinions were based. There is an additional abstract in which it is claimed they were examined at length, showing a long and intimate acquaintance with deceased. Whether these witnesses narrated to the jury all the facts as to the conduct, appearance, health and conversation of the deceased, upon which they based their opinions, we cannot determine from the record. If they did, there was no error in permitting them to give an opinion founded on such facts. Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1; The State v. Stickley, 41 Id., 232; Redfield on Wills, vol. 1, p. 137, et seq.
Int. I will put this question. In view of the testimony as you have heard it, and in connection with your own knowledge of the state of Mr. Butler at the time he 'was in the asylum in 1847, in your opinion, was he or not,- at that time, insane?”
Ans. “ That opinion I have already expressed — that he was not insane- — based upon my own personal knowledge.”
The Court: — “He is giving you a hypothetical case.”
Int. To the same as before. “ I want the opinion now, with your own individual observation, from what has reached you in the testimony?”
Ans. “The testimony has not served to induce me to change my opinion already expressed.”
These questions and answers were properly objected to by defendant. Objections overruled," and this action of the court is now assigned as error. It is not disputed that the witness was a medical expert. His opinion, based on his personal observation and treatment, was given without objection. Indeed, as it appears to us, he was a most important witness in the case. His learning, age and experience, entitled his opinion to great weight. We have each examined the question arising upon this assignment of error with care, and are forced to the conclusion that the ruling of the court was prejudicial error. The interrogatories to be put to an expert are not as to what his opinion is of the testimony, but what is his opin- ’ ion, if thq facts are as stated to him by the questioner.
Of course the hypothetical question thus stated should be based on the testimony. We might hold the ruling correct if the questions had been put conceding the testimony to be true, or in some way indicating that the witness was not left to give his opinion of the testimony. As it is, we are unable to determine from Mr. Patterson’s testimony whether he believed that the witnesses as to Butler’s insanity were mis
As the judgment must be reversed for the error last above discussed, it is unnecessary that we should review the alleged errors based upon the instructions to the jury.
Reversed.