34 S.W.2d 307 | Tex. App. | 1930
This action grows out of a collision of automobiles at a street crossing in the town of Quitaque.
Appellee Herring, the plaintiff below, alleges that the town of Quitaque is an incorporated town. That on the 28th day of November, 1929, while he was driving south upon and along Second street and approached the intersection of said street with Main street, which runs east and west, and while driving on the right-hand side, that defendant was also approaching the said intersection at a high rate of speed, and on the intersection drove his automobile into and upon the automobile of plaintiff. He alleges the damages to his automobile to be $630. The grounds of negligence upon which recovery is sought are: (1) Driving at an excessive rate of speed, alleged to be fifty or fifty-five miles per hour; (2) driving on the left-hand side of Main street; (3) failure to slow down or stop when he approached the intersection.
The defendant Butler answered by general demurrer, several special exceptions, general denial, and charged that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which constituted the proximate cause of his injuries. He charges that the plaintiff Herring approached the crossing from the north at the rate of about thirty-five or forty miles an hour and drove upon the intersection at said illegal speed, and that defendant failed to see plaintiff's automobile in time to stop and avoid a collision. That plaintiff failed to slow down before reaching said intersection and was therefore guilty of negligence. That plaintiff saw defendant's automobile some distance east of the intersection, and, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had theretofore caused his automobile, driven by him, to slow down just prior to reaching the intersection, the said plaintiff, realizing the danger of the situation, voluntarily accelerated the speed of his car and attempted to and did drive upon the intersection in an effort to cross ahead of defendant's automobile. That plaintiff was negligent in accelerating his car at the crossing after having slowed down prior to reaching the crossing and leading defendant to believe that he would give defendant the right of way. Defendant was driving west.
The court submitted the case to the jury upon special issues, as follows:
(1) "Was the defendant J. Butler guilty of negligence in the operation of his automobile at the time of the collision with the plaintiff's automobile?" Answer: "Yes."
(2) "Was defendant's negligence, if any, the proximate cause of the collision?" Answer: "Yes."
"In connection with this issue No. 2, you are instructed that a proximate cause is a cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the event and without which the event would not have occurred."
In response to other issues the jury found that plaintiff Herring was not guilty of contributory negligence and that his automobile was damaged to the extent of $291.80. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict.
The first proposition is, in effect, that, plaintiff having alleged several grounds of negligence on the part of appellant as a basis for recovery, it was error for the court, in submitting the case to the jury on special issues, to submit the issue of negligence generally instead of submitting each of the three grounds of negligence separately, and in this connection appellee insists that the effect of the general issue submitted was to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of negligence on any theory which might occur to them. Citing City of Ft. Worth v. Ware (Tex.Civ.App.)
On the other hand, the appellee, by counter propositions, insists that the ultimate fact to be determined was that of defendant's negligence. That no specific grounds of negligence were alleged, but that the petition charges negligence generally and that whether driving at an excessive rate of speed and on the left-hand side of the street and a failure to slow down or stop were merely evidentiary matters, and cites in support of the contention Campbell v. Johnson (Tex.Com.App.)
The pleadings do not support the appellee's assertion that plaintiff did not allege specific acts of negligence. If there had been a general allegation of negligence as in the Campbell v. Johnson Case, supra, where the charge is, "in substance, that the collision occurred on account of the negligence of the wife of appellant," the issue of negligence might have been submitted generally and would have been sufficient, although a general allegation of negligence without setting out the specific acts does not preclude the trial court from submitting such specific acts of negligence as the evidence may disclose. Texas Traction Co. v. Hanson (Tex.Civ.App.)
By the second proposition the appellant insists that the court erred in refusing to define the term "new, independent cause" used in the court's definition of proximate cause.
The failure of the charge to define "new, independent cause" was brought to the attention of the court by a timely and specific objection. The appellee insists that an objection is not sufficient to require consideration of the error by this court. That in order to properly present the error here, the appellant was required to submit a charge giving a proper definition of "new, independent cause." We think the objection was sufficient. Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley et ux.,
Under P. C. art. 801(E), plaintiff had the right of way at the intersection.
The appellant further insists that the court erred in defining proximate cause in omitting therefrom the element of foreseeableness. This contention is sustained. Foreseeableness is a necessary element of proximate cause in negligence cases whether the defendant is charged with negligence per se or under the common law. Proper objection was urged to the definition because of this omission, and the refusal of the court to correct the definition is reversible error. S. A. A P. Ry. Co. v. Behne (Tex.Com.App.)
For the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. *310
