{¶ 3} After several motions for extension of time and leaves to file briefs in regard to the defendant's objections, on May 21, 2003, the trial court overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate's decision as the order of the court. Thе trial court reiterated verbatim all of the magistrate's orders, including order number 16, directing that "[c]ost to be assessed to Plaintiff after application of deposit."
{¶ 4} On June 5, 2003, appellant, purportedly pursuant to order number 16, filеd on defendant's behalf a motion to tax costs, seeking reimbursement from the plaintiff of costs associated with the trial transcript and a pretrial property appraisal. The plaintiff opposed defendant's motiоn to tax costs, but neither party requested a hearing on the motion. Nevertheless, the magistrate held a hearing on the motion on September 19, 2003, and issued a post decree chief magistrate's decision/tax costs on October 6, 2003.
{¶ 5} At the September 19, 2003 post decree hearing, the magistrate heard argument regarding both defendant's motion to tax costs and defendant's affidavit regarding attorney fees, relevant to an earlier order. In support of defendant's motion to tax costs, appellant argued that order number 16 of the trial court's May 21, 2003 order, adopting the magistrate's decision, assessed costs against the plaintiff up to that date, rather than up to the date of the divorce trial on June 21, 2002. The magistrate, on the record, denied the defendant's motion to tax costs, finding that appellant's representations for the defendant's claims in the motion were not before the court as of the dаte of the divorce trial. The magistrate further found that the defendant had not prevailed on his objections, so that he was not entitled to costs on that basis either.
{¶ 6} The tenor of the September 19, 2003 post decree hearing wаs contentious. At one point, the magistrate threatened appellant with contempt, if he failed to answer the magistrate's questions regarding appellant's argument. Appellant in fact answered the magistrate's questions, аnd the magistrate did not ultimately find appellant in direct contempt of court.
{¶ 7} Despite the magistrate's threat to hold appellant in contempt for failing to answer the court's questions, the magistrate never indicated any intеntion to sanction appellant for any other alleged transgression. Neither opposing counsel nor the court made a motion at the hearing to sanction appellant. Further, the magistrate made no finding on the record at the hearing that appellant's motion to tax costs constituted vexatious conduct and a frivolous filing.
{¶ 8} By the October 6, 2003 post decree chief magistrate's decision/tax costs, however, the magistrate made the express findings that appellant's motion, conduct and argument were not warranted under existing law and could not be supported by a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of any existing law. The magistrate further found that appellant filed the motion to tax costs merely to harass the plaintiff, so that appellant's conduct was vexatious, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 9} Appellant timely objected to the magistrate's decision ordering sanctions. More than five months later, the trial court overruled appellant's objection without analysis. The trial court adopted the magistrate's order to sanction appellant, directing him to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees and costs associated with the filing of the defendant's motion to tax costs. Appellant timely appealed, setting forth four assignments of error for review.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that the magistrate's imposition of finanсial sanctions against him, as affirmed by the trial court, constitutes an unconstitutional violation of his right to procedural due process.
{¶ 11} Appellant's first assignment of error presents a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law under the de novo standard of review. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co. (2004),
{¶ 12} Section 1,
{¶ 13} Due process protects against the arbitrary deprivation of property by requiring notice of the (potential) deprivation and an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin (1972),
{¶ 14} In this case, the trial court premised its imposition of sanctions on appellant pursuant to Loc.R. 31 upon its finding that appellant's conduct was vexatious, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 15} In the order imposing sanctions on appellant, the court directed plaintiff's counsel to submit an affidavit of fees relating to plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion to tax costs. The court further directed plaintiff's counsel to schedule a hearing date in regard to attorney fees. Thе purpose of the subsequent hearing was to determine the appropriateness of the amount of attorney fees to which plaintiff's counsel averred in affidavit, and not to determine whether the imposition of such sanсtion against appellant was appropriate.1
{¶ 16} Under these circumstances, appellant had no notice that he might be subjected to monetary sanctions by the court. In addition, appellant was accorded no opportunity to be heard in opposition to the imposition of monetary sanctions, either prior to the deprivation or postdeprivation. For these reasons, this Court finds that the domestic relations court's imposition of monetary sanctions against appellant did not comport with the mandates of procedural due process. Appellant's first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 17} Due to this Court's disposition of appellant's first assignment of error, this Court need not reach the merits of the second, third and fourth assignments of error, as they are now rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Thе Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified сopy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time thе period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to appellee.
Exceptions.
Batchelder, J., Boyle, J. Concur.