128 Minn. 99 | Minn. | 1914
H. C. Butler, for many years a resident of Minneapolis, died in 1896, leaving a considerable property. He left surviving him plaintiff, his widow, and four grown children, one son and three daughters. The property involved in this action passed directly to the widow from decedent, and she has since owned and controlled the same
The assignments of error challenge the findings of fact insofar as plaintiff was found by the court to have been competent to enter into the trust agreement, and upon the subject of undue influence, and also certain rulings upon the admission and exclusion of evidence.
The assignments in reference to the admission and exclusion of evidence do not call for discussion. We have examined the same and discover no errors of a character to justify a new trial. Plaintiff was given considerable latitude in the introduction of her evidence, and that excluded, if not fully covered in a general way by other evidence, was not such as to require a retrial of the action.
We come then to the main question whether the evidence reasonably supports the findings.
At the time the deed was executed plaintiff was 78 years of age, and
The findings of the trial court set forth the facts in greater detail, but the statement here made is deemed sufficient to a full understanding of the transaction, the validity of which is questioned.
1. The rule guiding us in the determination of the question whether the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence is too well established to require restatement. Expressed in one form, it is that the findings will not be overturned unless the evidence is clearly and palpably against the conclusion of the trial court. In the light
2. We find no evidence of undue influence on the part of defendant Badger. While it is’ true that he had for some time prior to the transaction acted as the agent of plaintiff in the management of the property, in entering into the trust agreement plaintiff was represented in all the negotiations by members of her family, and by attorneys -employed by her, and whose interest in thematter was solely that of protecting plaintiff. The contract vests in Badger no proprietary interest in the property, there was no overreaching by Badger, and he acquired thereby no undue or other unconscionable advantage or benefit from the transaction. He was simply given the control of the property, with the right and duty of exercising supervision thereof, gnd this primarily for the purpose of relieving plaintiff from further responsibility in the premises and to avoid, also, further controversy between the daughters concerning the property and its disposition. The transaction accomplished what plaintiff and her advisers thought was for her best interests, and of all those interested in the estate. We are clear that no undue influence was shown. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 43 Minn. 73, 44 N. W. 885; Howard v. Farr, 115 Minn. 86, 131 N. W. 1071.
3. The evidence bearing upon the question of plaintiff’s mental capacity took a wide range, covered a period of years preceding the transaction, and brought to light numerous acts, conduct and lapses of memory on plaintiff’s part, and matters indicating in a measure a gradual weakening of her mental power. But taken as a whole the evidence did not require a finding that she was wholly incapacitated or incapable of understanding this or any other particular transaction. Her condition of mind did not arise from any organic ailment, but was naturally incident to her declining years. There was no showing of such a hopeless decay or loss of mental faculties as to require a finding of senile dementiaand we are not justified in
4. The fact that the trust deed contained no power of revocation is not fatal to its validity. 39 Cyc. 93; Brown v. Trust Co. 87 Md. 377, 40 Atl. 256. The absence of such a reservation is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the transaction was the deliberate act of the parties (Russell’s Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 269), but it is not an essential to a valid trust of this character. In the ease at bar the evidence makes it clear that the parties intended the trust to continue during the life of plaintiff, and this purpose would " have failed had the power of revocation been reserved. Nor does the clause jfound in the deed, by which Badger is relieved, from interfereneé by the courts in the management of the ordinary affairs of the trusty-render the transaction invalid. If this had been an attempt wholly to exclude the authority of the court to control the conduct of the trustee, and to vest in him arbitrary authority to sell and dispose of the estate in harmony with his own pleasure and without regard — to the best interests of the estate, no doubt the trust would, atMeast, to the extent of such grant of arbitrary power, be declared void. Trusts of this kind are subject to the supervisory control of ''tjje courts, even in cases where attempt is made by express stipulation between the parties to avoid, judicial interference. 39 Cyc. 315; " Keeler v. Lauer, 73 Kan. 388, 85 Pac. 541. To what extent this clause in the deed will authorize the trustee to proceed with the trust affairs, without application to the court, is not necessary to determine. That he cannot go beyond the detailed administration of the estate without the approval of the court, or the acquiescence of all interested parties, seems clear. But'what transactions or dealings
5. Subsequent to the execution of the deed, and after the decision of the court sustaining the trust, the trustee made application to the court for an order permitting him to mortgage a part of the property to obtain funds for the payment of taxes and other expenses of the estate, arising in part from the expense of the litigation and additional payments to plaintiff, required because of an injury suffered by her, necessitating the employment of physicians and nurses to treat and care for her. The application also prayed for the vacation of a Us pendens filed in the action by plaintiff at the time the suit was brought. After due hearing the court made an order granting the application and providing therein that the mortgage executed by the trustee should take precedence to rights protected by the Us pendens. From this order plaintiff appeals. Since the decision of the court in the main action is sustained, it is unnecessary to consider the questions here presented. That the court had the power to authorize the temporary loan is clear, and as the main action falls the Us pendens falls with it, and that puts an end to this appeal. The application justified the order.
Judgment and order affirmed.