{¶ 2} Butler Township sets forth four assignments of error claiming that the trial court erred in determining that the township was not a рarty to an expedited type II annexation, which had standing to bring a mandamus action; that the trial court erred in determining that the County Commissioners had no duty to make affirmative findings prior to granting the annexation; that the trial court erred in denying Butler Township a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo and denying its motion to amend the complaint on the grounds that it was moot.
{¶ 3} Because we determine that the trial court prоperly dismissed Butler Township's mandamus and declaratory judgment action on the ground of standing, and because the other issues are therefore moot, we affirm the judgment appealed from.
{¶ 4} On October 31, 2007, Waterwheel Farms, Inc., through its agent, Joseph P. Moore, filed a petition to annex 78.489 acres of property, located in Butler Township, to the City of Union. This petition was filed pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} This was the second attempt by Watеrwheel to annex this property to the City of Union. In 2004, Waterwheel filed a similar petition to annex this same property, but included in the petition a portion of Jackson Road (along with the berm, shoulder, *3
and other incidentals of the right of way) that does not abut Waterwheel's property. In that case, Butler Township filed objections to the proposed annexation on the basis that all of the property owners had not consented to the annexation. The property owners referred to in the objection were a number of landowners whose properties adjoin Jackson Road and who were the fee-simple owners (up to the centerline of the road) of the property over which the roadway passes, subject to an easement for the right of way. The County Commissioners granted the petition to annex, finding thаt all of the property owners had joined in the petition. A declaratory judgment action was then filed by the township and the property owners. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that "for purposes of R.C.
{¶ 6} The petition filed herein excluded the 1.351 acres of roadway, and was signed by the only owner of the real estate sought to be annexed. After the filing of the petition, Butler Township again filed a resolution with the Board of County Commissioners, objecting to the new petition on the basis that the annexation did not comply with the seventh condition of annexation, set forth in R.C.
{¶ 7} On December 11, 2007, the Board of County Commissioners approved thе annexation petition by Resolution Number 07-2156.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, Butler Township filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Union. The trial court, determining that Butler Township was not a party to the annexation under R.C.
{¶ 9} From this decision, Butler Township has appealed, setting forth four assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 11} "Standing is a threshold test that, if satisfied, permits the court to go on to decide whether the plaintiff has a good cause of action, and whether the relief sought can or should be granted to plaintiff." Tiemann v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1998),
{¶ 12} Butler Township points to R.C.
{¶ 13} The respondents argue that the General Assembly specifically determined that only the petitioners were to be parties for the purposes of mandamus under an expedited type II annexation. They point to the two other types of expedited annexation proceedings, type I (R.C.
{¶ 14} The trial court, applying the statutory interpretation principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the еxclusion of another), determined that the legislature's exclusion of R.C.
{¶ 15} In Lawrence Twp., Stark Cty., Ohio, Bd. of Twp. Trustees v.Canal Fulton, Stark App. No. 2007 CA 00010,
{¶ 16} In State ex rel. Overholser Builders, L.L.C. v. Clark Cty. Bd.of Commrs.,
{¶ 17} "Since 2001, R.C. Chapter
{¶ 18} The first, established by R.C.
{¶ 19} R.C.
{¶ 20} In an expedited type I annexation, R.C.
{¶ 21} As for expedited type III annexations, R.C.
{¶ 22} The owners who sign a petition for an expedited type II annexation also "expressly waive their right to appeal in law or equity from the board of county commissioners' entry of any resolution under this section." R.C.
{¶ 23} While R.C.
{¶ 24} Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. defines "party" in the following terms: "[a] party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance; it refers to those by or against whom a legal suit is brought, whether in law or in equity, the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one or more individuals and whether natural or legal persons; all others who may be affected by the suit, indirectly orconsequently, are persons interested but not parties." (emphasis supplied.) While an annexation proceeding is not, in strict legal terms, a legal suit, it is a legal proceeding brought by and in the name of the petitioners only, and before the board of county commissioners. And, while a board of township trustees or a municipal corporation may be interested persons, they are not, by general definition, "parties" to an annexation proceeding.
{¶ 25} What is significant in attempting to reconcile the appellate rights *10 apрlicable to all three of these expedited annexation proceedings, is that in all three, the statutory scheme sets forth specific requirements, and if those requirements are met, then the action by the board of county commissioners is merely ministerial and not discretionary.
{¶ 26} Furthermore, in all three proceedings, all of the owners of the land to be annexed must agree and participate in the petitiоn process. In all three proceedings, the municipal corporation to which the land is to be annexed must indicate their consent by the filing of a resolution or ordinance indicating what services it will provide to the annexed land. In a type I proceeding, the township must indicate their consent by approving an annexation agreement or a cooperative economic developmеnt agreement; in both type II and type III proceedings, the land annexed is not withdrawn from the township, and the township suffers no economic detriment by the approval of the annexation.
{¶ 27} Finally, in all three proceedings, it is contemplated that there is only very narrowly limited appeal, if any, from the board's action. In R.C.
{¶ 28} If we were to construe the Butler Township Trustees as a party to this expedited type II annexation, such as to give them standing to contest the granting of the application, we would be extending to them a greater right than they would have under either a type I or a type III expedited annexation, whеre the legislature has expressly chosen to define them as parties. And, if we were to find that the township has the right to file a declaratory judgment action, the township's rights would be greater than the affected property owners. In none of these expedited proceedings is it contemplated or provided that any person has the standing to contest the grant of an annexation petition that meets the statutory criteria.
{¶ 29} Finally, consistent herewith, we determine that the township lacks standing to file a declaratory judgment action herein as well. This very issue was litigated in Washington Twp. Bd. of Trustees v.Mansfield City Council, Richland App. Nos. 03 CA 85 and 03 CA 97,
{¶ 30} And, even assuming, arguendo, that Butler Township does meet the definition of a "party" for purposes of R.C.
{¶ 31} In Lawrence Twp., Stark Cty., Ohio, Bd. of Twp. Trustees v.Canal Fulton, supra, at ¶ 22, the Fifth District Court of Appeals determined that R.C.
{¶ 32} For these reasons, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 34} Based upon our resolution of the first assignment of error, this assignment of error is moot. Nonetheless, we will address it briefly. This is the issue raised in Butler Township's request for declaratory judgment.
{¶ 35} Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeals, addressing this identical question, determined that R.C.
{¶ 36} We agree with this conclusion as it is consistent with a clear reading of the statute. We agree with the Fifth District that it is consistent with the "longstanding common law that individual propеrty owners are entitled to the free alienation of their property if specific conditions are met." Id. at ¶ 19. We also find that it is consistent with our determination that only the property owner has any recourse from a decision of the board of county commissioners under R.C.
{¶ 37} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 39} Based upon our determination of the first and second assignments of error, the issues raised in this assignment of error are also moot. If, as we have found, the Butler Township Trustees do not have standing to seek mandamus, and if they are not entitled to the declaratory judgment that they seek, then they have no basis upon which to ask for a preliminary injunction. When a court determines that an action must fail for lack of standing, there is nothing left for the court to do, but to dismiss the action. The trial court has no further authority to grant any relief sought by any party. Brunswick Hills Twp.v. Cleveland, Medina App. No. 06CA0095-M,
{¶ 40} Additionally, in ruling on a motion for prеliminary injunction, a trial court must consider whether (1) the moving party has shown a substantial likelihood that he or she will prevail on the merits of the underlying substantive claim; (2) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) issuance of the injunction will not harm third parties; and, (4) the public interest would be served by issuing the preliminary injunction. Sinoff v. OhioPermanente Med. Group, Inc.,
{¶ 41} Therefore, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the pаrties pending a decision on the merits.Dunkelman v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,
{¶ 42} The decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief is within the trial court's sound discretion and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse thereof. Danis Clarkco LandfillCo. v. Clark Cty. Solid Waste Mgt. Dist.,
{¶ 43} Because the trial court had already determined that Butler Township could not prevail upon the merits, and because that decision is in accord with our determination as to the second assignment of error, the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 44} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 46} Finally, because the township's complaint was dismissed on other grounds, which we have sustained, the amendment of the complaint, even though it would have been otherwise proper, would have been a vain act, which the court will not require. It is well accepted that the law will not require a vain act. Gerhold v. Papathanasion (1936),
{¶ 47} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 48} Having overruled all of Appellant's assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BROGAN, J. and FAIN, J., concur *16 (Hon. Sumner E. Walters, retired from the Third District Court of Appeals sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio). *1