Andrea N. BUTLER, Emmalea Butler and Ted Butler, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. H. Dean EVANS, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Indiana Department of Education, Indiana Department of Education, Jerry Thaden, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Mental Health, Dina Haugh, in her capacity as Superintendent of LaRue D. Carter Memorial Hospital, and Paul Ash, individually and in his capacity as Director of the Indiana Division of Special Education, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-3135
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Argued May 9, 2000. Decided Aug. 31, 2000.
225 F.3d 887
Jon B. Laramore (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant-appellee.
Before MANION, KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge.
As a child, Andrea “Niki” Butler experienced severe emotional and psychological troubles that made it difficult for her to be educated in a regular school. Her local school recommended that she be placed in a residential educational facility that could provide a structured setting designed to accommodate her condition. Before her local school and the Indiana Department of Education could process this placement, Niki Butler‘s condition forced her parents, Emmalea and Ted Butler, to have her committed to a psychiatric hospital for several months. After Niki was released from the hospital, the state of Indiana placed her in a residential educational facility. Nevertheless, her parents sought reimbursement from the state for the costs of Niki‘s hospitalization. We affirm the district court‘s denial of the Butlers’ reimbursement claim because Niki‘s hospitalization did not result from delays by the state of Indiana in processing Niki‘s placement, nor did the hospital care constitute “related services” reimbursable under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA“),
I. History
The IDEA represents “an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children.” Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (discussing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, later amended and renamed the IDEA). Its purpose is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.”
For each child in need of special education assistance, the state of Indiana convenes an IDEA case conference between parents and local officials to tailor an individualized education plan (“IEP“) for the disabled student. See
Niki Butler endured a series of emotional disturbances during her childhood and was diagnosed with severe schizophrenia. By her sixteenth birthday, she had suffered auditory and visual hallucinations, attempted suicide and struggled with paranoia and psychotic episodes. She eventually was hospitalized for six weeks at Alexian Brothers Medical Center in August 1990. After evaluating Niki‘s case on November 16, 1990, her local school preliminarily recommended application for a S-5 residential placement. On February 12, 1991, the local coordinating committee agreed that Niki‘s condition warranted a residential placement and approved the proposed S-5 application to the Indiana Department of Education. On April 18, 1991, the local school authorities held an IEP case conference and agreed that Niki‘s condition required a residential placement for educational purposes. They devised an IEP that targeted basic academic skills and social behavior as key areas for instruction and suggested a number of placement options, including special classes in a private or public residential education facility. The IEP assumed that Niki would not be hospitalized and was ready for an educational placement.
However, during this prolonged administrative process, Niki‘s condition demanded immediate medical intervention. Following a request from Niki‘s school that she be examined by a psychiatrist, Niki‘s parents admitted her voluntarily to Valle Vista Hospital on March 15, 1991. Then, on April 23, 1991, before Niki‘s local school had filed its S-5 application with the Indiana Department of Education, Niki‘s parents transferred her to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital in Dyer, Indiana, where she would stay for the next six months. During her hospital stay, Niki received medical treatment for her psychiatric needs at a cost of $121,021.13. This care included daily psychiatric counseling, strong doses of Lithium and Stelazine and daily group and recreational therapy. The hospital retained two teachers and a teacher‘s aide on staff for patients from 9 to 11 a.m., and Niki received assignments from school while she was hospitalized. However, Our Lady of Mercy Hospital was not approved by the state as her IDEA residential educational placement, nor were these educational activities at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital conducted pursuant to Niki‘s IEP.
On April 24, the day after Niki was admitted to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, Niki‘s local school corporation filed the long-anticipated S-5 application. Yet the next day, April 25, 1991, on their own
Niki remained at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital for another five months awaiting a transfer. Our Lady of Mercy Hospital reported that Niki “worked toward a goal ultimately of residential treatment. . . . She showed significant gains. She ceased to be delusional and hallucinating. She slowly began to explore the relationship to family and to become more appropriate. Certainly the underlying pathology was still present throughout. As of the time of discharge she appeared to be stabilizing and preparing for transfer to residential care.” She eventually transferred to LaRue Carter Hospital on November 6, and then pursuant to her IEP, moved to a residential special education program at the Maryhurst School in Louisville, Kentucky, on December 2, 1991. It was not until December 3 that LaRue Carter Hospital notified the court that Niki was no longer a danger to herself or others and that her civil commitment could be terminated.
Meanwhile, a class of disabled children and their parents filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Indiana Department of Education. The class alleged, among other things, that the long delays between the development of IEPs requiring residential placement and the actual residential placements violated the IDEA. Niki‘s parents added Niki and themselves as plaintiffs to the lawsuit in August. On April 8, 1993, Judge Rudy Lozano granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, explaining that “[a]n IEP must be implemented as soon as possible following the development of that IEP.” Evans v. Evans, 818 F.Supp. 1215, 1222 (N.D.Ind.1993).
After some negotiation, the parties submitted an agreed order settling the suit on June 20, 1994. The order provides that the plaintiffs were eligible to petition through administrative adjudication for “educational and related services reimbursement for each member of the class who incurred costs for education and related services between the date of the IEP . . . and the date of actual placement.” In addition, the agreed order concluded that the state of Indiana should place eligible disabled children in a residential facility no later than thirty days from their IEPs, “except where special circumstances require otherwise.” The order explains, “Among the events that shall constitute special circumstances for purposes of this paragraph are IDOE‘s lack of receipt of notice [of the IEP].” The state of Indiana also agreed to waive all the charges that Niki accrued at LaRue Carter Hospital.
Pursuant to the administrative procedure described in the agreed order, the Butlers filed a reimbursement claim for Niki‘s bills from Our Lady of Mercy Hospital because the hospitalization occurred during the delay between completion of Niki‘s IEP on April 18, 1991, and her placement at the Maryhurst School on December 2, 1991. The Indiana Department
II. Analysis
The Butlers appeal the district court‘s affirmance of the denial of their IDEA reimbursement claim by the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals. Under the IDEA, parties may appeal the results of a state administrative proceeding to a district court. The district court “basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”
The agreed order in Evans declared that the Indiana Department of Education was obligated by federal law to place disabled children in residential facilities within thirty days of the IEP, except when “special circumstances require otherwise.” In addition, the agreed order stipulated that the state of Indiana would reimburse the plaintiffs, after administrative adjudication of their claims, for qualified “educational and related services” incurred as a result of unreasonable delays between IEP development and residential placement. The Butlers contend that Niki‘s hospitalization expenses at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital are reimbursable costs under the agreed order.
The state of Indiana is not liable for Niki‘s hospitalization charges because those expenses resulted from “special circumstances.” Local school officials approved Niki‘s IEP on April 18, 1991, but the IEP was designed only for a homebound placement and contemplated Niki‘s release from Valle Vista Hospital on April 23, 1991. The IEP recommended placement at a residential educational facility to serve Niki‘s particular educational needs, not placement at a hospital for further medical treatment. However, Niki‘s psychological condition demanded emergency action. On April 23, instead of bringing her home from Valle Vista Hospital, Niki‘s parents transferred Niki to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital and two days later commenced involuntary commitment proceedings. Niki‘s unstable psychological condition necessitated her hospitalization and rendered her unable to handle the residential placement recommended by the IEP. In fact, it was only after several months of care at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital that “she appeared to be stabilizing and preparing for transfer to residential care.” By December, when Niki‘s commitment ended upon a declaration that she no longer posed a risk to herself or others, the state of Indiana had already moved her to the Maryhurst School for her residential placement. The district court and the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals found that Niki‘s transfer to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital and subsequent commitment were special circumstances that delayed
Moreover, Niki‘s hospital charges are not recoverable because only payments for “education or related services” are reimbursable under the agreed order. The IDEA defines related services as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.”
Niki‘s IEP did not authorize psychiatric hospitalization as a related service. The IEP determines the IDEA services that the state will provide subject to state approval and oversight. Federal regulations require that the educational placement of the disabled child be “based on his or her IEP,”
By the Butlers’ admission, Our Lady of Mercy Hospital is a medical hospital, not a residential education facility, and does not conform to the recommendations in Niki‘s IEP. There is scant evidence that the hospital provided or was equipped to provide anything more than meager educational services, and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital was not approved by the state to serve as Niki‘s IDEA residential educational placement under Indiana law. See
The Butlers do not argue that Niki‘s IEP was erroneous and should have recommended psychiatric hospitalization at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that reimbursement may be available when parents place their child in an educational placement which the IEP should have authorized in the first place). In Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit ordered state reimbursement for a disabled child‘s residential placement only after the court found that the child‘s IEP originally should have recommended that placement as the parents had insisted. Likewise in Seattle School District, No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1502 (9th Cir.1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the school district was liable for the costs of a residential placement at an accredited educational institution approved by the state for IDEA placements. The Butlers, however, did not challenge Niki‘s IEP and never requested a new case conference to design a new IEP. In any case, a revised IEP would not have authorized residential educational placement at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital because, as the Butlers’ counsel admitted at oral argument, the facility “was not in the business of providing residential placement for educational purposes.”
It is true that the IDEA requires the provision of certain medical accommodations within a regular school environment for disabled students. See Irving Independent Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d 1493. For example, in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the IDEA required a school to provide a ventilator-dependent student with a full-time nurse during the school day. The Court reasoned that the
In contrast, Niki‘s hospitalization was not an attempt to give her meaningful access to public education or to address her special educational needs within her regular school environment. This is not a case in which the disabled student needed medical assistance to remain in a regular school; Niki was committed to a psychiatric hospital. Niki might have continued to receive school assignments and some tutoring while hospitalized, but education was not the purpose of her hospitalization. Unlike in-school nursing in Cedar Rapids, Niki‘s inpatient medical care was necessary in itself and was not a special accom-
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court denying the Butlers’ IDEA reimbursement claim under the Evans agreed order.