The bill of complaint is filed in this case to reform a certain deed of real estate described as “the entire of lot two, block two, Snell’s addition to the village of Lowell, as of record,” so that the same shall read, “all of village lot number two of block two, according to Caroline Snell’s recorded addition to the village of Lowell, excepting that portion heretofore sold by the first party hereto unto one Ann Loughlin by deed bearing date the tenth day of August, 1877;” and also to restrain the defendants from prosecuting a suit, or any suit, against the complainant for breach of covenant of warranty of seisin on account of that portion of lot two conveyed to Ann Loughlin prior to the deed from said Susan A. Bush to them.
The bill of complaint sets up that prior to the 10th day of August, 1877, complainant was the owner of lot 2, block 2, above mentioned, and on that day sold a. portion thereof, and conveyed the same, to one Ann Loughlin; that on the 20th day of February, 1888, she sold said lot 2, block 2, except the portion previously sold to Ann Loughlin, to the defendant David P. Merri
Complainant further alleges that, shortly' after the delivery of the deed, the defendants took actual possession of the premises, and have ever since been in possession thereof, and occupied the same as a home; and that, prior to the execution and delivery of the deed, the actual location and extent of the premises intended to be conveyed were ascertained by view and inspection thereof, and were understood correctly and alike by the' parties to said deed to be all of lot 2 of block 2 in the village of Lowell, Kent county, State of Michigan, according to Caroline Snell’s addition to said village, except that portion of said lot 2 that had been deeded to Ann .Loughlin, and which portion was then fenced in as aforesaid with her other land, and was then, and is now, and has ever since been, in her possession. She then charges that by mistake of said parties the description in said deed is so drawn that it includes not only the premises intended to be conveyed to the defendants by the complainant, but also the piece of land sold and conveyed to Ann Loughlin as aforesaid; that the defend
Complainant further charges that the claim set up on the part of the defendants, after having obtained possession of the premises, is untrue, wicked, and fraudulent, and by means whereof they are trying to obtain an undue advantage of her by obtaining from her pay for that which they never purchased and paid for; that they now have and enjoy all that they purchased, and all that they paid for, and are seeking to take an undue advantage of the language usecl in the deed to extort a large sum of money from her; that on or about the 1st day of June, 1888, .they commenced a suit against her before a justice of the peace, based upon the covenants in her deed; that
The defendants, David P. Merriman and Emily M. Merriman, interposed a plea to the bill of complaint in
The plea interposed by the defendants was brought on for argument, and was held by the court to be sufficient to bar the complainant of any relief in this suit; and, the complainant declining to take issue upon the plea, the court entered a decree dismissing complainant’s bill of complaint; and the question presented to us is whether or not the trial of the suit at law is a bar to a proceeding in a court of equity, by the complainant to reform the deed.
In this State the distinction between law and equity, as applied to remedies, has been kept up. The courts of law have no jurisdiction to reform written agreements. This jurisdiction is exclusively vested in courts of equity, and it has long been settled that if, by reason of fraud, mistake, accident, or surprise, an instrument does not express the true intent and meaning of the parties, equity will upon satisfactory evidence reform it. It was said by Chancellor Kent in Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, that—
“The written instrument, in contemplation of law, contains the true agreement of the parties, and the writing furnishes better evidence 'of the sense of the parties than any that can be supplied by parol; but equity has a broader jurisdiction, and will open the written contract to let in an equity arising from facts perfectly distinct from the sense and construction of the instrument itself.”
The rules of evidence at law and equity are the same, but when the question is not what the terms of the written contract are, but whether the contract as written
It appears from the bill that the mistake did not consist in including the description of the whole lot in the deed, for that fact was known and understood when complainant executed it; but it consists in what the scrivener told her as to its legal effect, and her liability or responsibility thereunder. If the draughtsman was honest in his statements, and there was no collusion or fraudulent design in so procuring the deed to be executed with such description on the part of the grantees, then he made a mistake of law in so advising Mrs. Bush; but Mrs. Bush relied upon the fact, as it was stated to her, that she would incur no liability in executing the deed as presented, and was induced by that fact to execute it. In either view, it was such a mistake as equity would relieve against. If the advice given by the draughtsman was intended to mislead Mrs. Bush, then it is clear that the execution of the instrument was induced
The bill in this case, however, shows a stronger ground for relief. It is stated that soon after the deed was executed the defendants procured a surveyor to run the lines of their lot, claiming the whole of lot 2; that they attempted to tear down the line fence which separated the land intended to be conveyed to them from that of Mrs. Loughlin; and upon her exhibiting to them her deed, with the certificate of. the register showing that it had been recorded a long time before they purchased, they desisted, and immediately commenced suit against their grantor upon the 'covenant of seisin contained in the deed. These facts, taken in connection with what occurred upon the execution of the deed in Mr. Hicks* office, wherein he told complainant that, if she had conveyed the premises to Mrs. Loughlin, it did not appear upon the abstract, lead us most strongly to the inference that Merriman was attempting in that transaction to obtain undue and unconscionable advantage, and to lay claim to the whole of the lot as an innocent purchaser, basing it upon the idea that Mrs. Loughlin*s deed was not on record. But equity will interfere to protect the rights of parties to control the legal effect and operation of covenants obtained as this one was, when they are sought to be enforced by the party who has obtained them unde,r the representation that they would be of no binding force or effect. And such action upon the part
The claim set up in the plea that this‘case has been tried before a court of law, and found adversely to the complainant, does not meet the case made by the bill. The court in that case at law charged the jury that they must find a verdict for the plaintiffs in the suit at all events, "and, if they were satisfied that the defendant's testimony with reference to the transaction was correct, then they must assess damages at the merely nominal sum of one dollar, but, if otherwise, they should assess" the damages in proportion as the value of the part which had been previously sold to Mrs. Loughlin bore to the whole lot, valued at $300, the purchase price agreed to be paid by Merriman.
We think that the plea tendered was insufficient, and
Tlie defendant Bad tendered the sum of one dollar, and kept the tender good by paying the money into court, as payment in full of all the damages plaintiffs had sustained by reason of the alleged breach of covenant, which facts the jury were instructed were undisputed in the case.