Introduction
Plaintiff Busey Truck Equipment, Inc. (“Busey”) brought suit against American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (“Insurance Company”) for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay 1 and Insurance Company’s agent, Janey Foust (“Agent”), for negligent failure to procure insurance. Agent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted Agent’s motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
Busey alleged the following facts in its petition. Prior to July 27, 2006, Busey’s representatives met with Agent and requested an insurance policy to cover its facilities’ “contents,” which included tools, equipment, customer property, inventory, and supplies. Subsequent to this meeting, Busey purchased and received an insurance policy from Insurance Company. Agent represented to Busey that the policy covered Busey’s contents.
On July 27, 2006, there was a fire at Busey’s facility in Jackson, Missouri. Bu-sey suffered significant losses as a result of the fire, including the loss of tools, equipment, customer property, inventory, and supplies. When Busey reported the loss and demanded payment of “the full amount of lost Contents resulting from the fire,” Insurance Company refused to pay the full value of Busey’s claim.
Busey filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County alleging, among other claims, negligence against Agent. In its negligence claim, Busey alleged that Agent had a duty to ensure that Busey’s insurance policy would cover the contents of its facilities, that Agent breached that duty by negligently and carelessly advising Busey that the policy would cover its Contents, and that, as a result of Agent’s negligence, Busey suffered damages.
Agent filed a motion to dismiss Bu-sey’s negligence claim on the grounds that Busey’s petition failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Agent argued that her duty to Busey, if any, ended “upon the execution and delivery of the insurance policy to the insured which occurred prior to the fire causing the loss” and that Busey’s alleged failure to read its insurance policy was fatal to its cause of action. Agent also stated the legal principles that insurance agents have no duty to “explain the scope and effect of a written insurance policy to the insured” or to “advise insureds of optional insurance coverage.” The trial court dismissed Busey’s claim of negligence against Agent. 2 Busey appeals.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
Lynch v. Lynch,
Discussion
Missouri courts have long held that a broker or agent who undertakes to procure insurance for another for compensation owes a duty of reasonable skill, care, and diligence in obtaining the requested insurance.
Parshall v. Buetzer,
To prevail on a claim of negligent failure to procure insurance, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) the agent agreed to procure, for compensation, insurance from the insurance company, (2) the agent failed to procure the agreed upon insurance and, in so doing, failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence, and (3) as a result, the plaintiff suffered damages.
Haynes v. Edgerson,
In its petition, Busey claimed that its representatives met with Agent and specifically requested an insurance policy covering its facilities’ various contents. Busey stated that Agent advised it that the policy would cover Busey’s contents and, “[a]s a result of advice provided by [Agent], Busey procured the Policy believing its Contents would be covered.” Bu-sey further alleged that Agent failed to exercise care in ensuring that the policy covered all of Busey’s contents. Finally, Busey asserted that, as a result of Agent’s negligence and Insurance Company’s consequent denial of Busey’s claim, Busey sustained damages and losses. We therefore find Busey’s petition alleged sufficient facts to establish the elements of negligent failure to procure insurance.
In her brief, Agent characterizes Bu-sey’s claim as a cause of action for Agent’s failure to advise Busey of the types of coverage it needed for its business and the types of coverage available. Agent cites cases for the proposition that insurance agents do not have a general duty to advise customers about their particular insurance needs or the types and amounts of coverage that may be available.
Banes v. Martin,
Agent also claims that her duty to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence in obtaining the insurance requested terminated when Insurance Company executed and delivered the policy to Busey. The cases upon which Agent relies for this proposition are inapposite because the plaintiffs in those cases did not allege that the insurance agents with whom they dealt failed to provide the insurance coverage they requested.
See Hecker v. Missouri Prop. Ins. Placement Facility,
Agent further contends that Bu-se/s “failure to read its own insurance policy is fatal to its cause of action.” In support of this argument, Agent cites
Jenkad Enter., Inc. v. Trans. Ins., Co.,
Finally, Agent seems to argue that as a “captive” insurance agent, she had a lesser duty to Busey than an independent insurance broker might have. We find the distinction between a broker and an agent is not material to an insurance agent’s duty to either procure the insurance that her client requests or notify the client of her failure to do so.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Busey voluntarily dismissed its claims against Insurance Company.
. The trial court did not indicate its reasoning for dismissing Busey's petition. We will therefore "presume the decision was based on grounds stated in the motion to dismiss and will affirm if dismissal was appropriate on any grounds stated therein.” Phelps v. City of Kansas City, 272 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Mo.App. W.D.2009).
. The plaintiffs had also alleged in their petition that their brokers failed to obtain the insurance requested of them but chose to submit to the jury only the failure to advise claim.
Wilmering,
. Not only has Missouri abolished the defense of contributory negligence, but even when, as in
Kap-Pel Fabrics,
we recognized the defense, its application depended upon a court or jury considering evidence of the plaintiff's “maturity, experience and knowledge regarding the realm of human behavior in which his unwise or unreasonable acts or failure to act arise.”
