5 Pa. 431 | Pa. | 1846
At the time the judgment was rendered against Sweigart, Bury was at least entitled to an equitable estate in the land in controversy. This we assume as proved, and therefore the only question is, on the instruction to the jury, that the sale on the judgment and the proceedings thereon vest a title by relation to the date of the deed, and that the defendant was entitled to a verdict. We see no substantial difference between this case and McCall v. Lenox, 9 Serg. & Rawle, 310, for the lien created by the deed, and the judgment on the bond on which suit is brought, arise out of the same transaction. They are in contemplation of law one instrument, form one security, and consequently the lien of the judgment, as is there decided, must relate to the date of the lien in the deed. That this would be so, if notice had been given to the terre-tenant, is very clear. The terre-tenant having an opportunity to make defence, if any he has, the judgment relates back to the date of the lien, which is prior to the purchase, and of which the purchaser, Sweigart, had full notice. It cannot be necessary to bring suit on the deed, as has been contended; as effect may be given to the lien created by the deed equally as well by a suit on the bond, with notice to the terre-tenant. The intervening title is avoided by the sheriff’s sale, because, although before the date of the judgment, it accrued after the creation of the lien. The sheriff’s vendee stands in the place of the judgment creditor, and succeeds to his rights. But is the title of the sheriff’s vendee bad because no notice was given to the terre-tenant of the
Judgment affirmed.