32 Gratt. 472 | Va. | 1879
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action of assumpsit by the plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, against Rush Burgess, collector of internal revenue, in which there was judgment by default for the amount of his account, with interest, as claimed by the plaintiff. The judgment was not upon a writ of inquiry, but for the amount of the account without proof, under § 44 of chap. 167 of the Code of 1873, which dispenses with such inquiry, “ provided the plaintiff shall serve the defendant, at the same time and in the same manner that the process or summons to commence the suit or action is served, with a copy (certified by the clerk of the court in which the suit or action is brought) of the account on which the suit or action is brought, stating distinctly the several items of his claim, and the aggregate amount thereof, and the time from which he claims interest thereon, and the credits, if any, to which the defendant may be entitled thereon.” The following is a copy of the account upon ■ which the suit was brought, which is certified by the clerk, and which was served upon the defendant, as required by said section of the statute:
Rush Burgess, Col. of 3d Dist. of Int. Rev. of Va.,
To Blair Burwell, Jr., Dr.
1870— No. of pack’es; 468, at 25 cts. each, - $117 00
1871— No. of pack’es, 1,219, at 25 c. each, - 309 75
1872— No. of pack’es, 32, at - - 8 00
$429 75
1871— With int. from Jan’y 1st, - $117 00
1872— With int. from Jan’y 1st, - 309 75
“ “ 6th, 8 00
Whether the special count in the declaration sets out a cause of action for the plaintiff depends upon the question whether it was unlawful for the defendant to require each package of the plaintiff’s tobacco intended for export to be stamped, and to collect from the plaintiff 25 cents for each stamp so affixed to each package? The plaintiff contends that the act of congress requiring and authorizing it is in conflict with the constitution of the United States, which ordains by the 5th clause of § 9, article 1, that “ no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state” ; and he contends that this is a tax on the exportation. If it is a tax or duty, it is clearly unconstitutional.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued with ability, and cited numerous authorities and several decisions of the supreme court, to show that the charges to which the plaintiff was subjected for export stamps were taxes on exportation. He argued with much force to show that the stamps in this case were not necessary to segregate the tobacco which was for exportation from that which was
These are certainly heavy burdens upon the article of tobacco exported from a state, in addition to the enormous revenue collected from this article, when intended for domestic consumption ; a burden of taxation upon the producer, which acts unequally in different sections of the Union, and it is believed with great harshness on the producer. And the inquiry has been suggested, whether the levying of such a tax by congress is an assumption of power warranted by the constitution ? But this is not the tribunal whose authority is effectual to remove the burden, in either case, if it be an unconstitutional imposition.
We do not mean to deny the jurisdiction.of the state court to construe and pass upon the constitutionality of a revenue act of congress, when it becomes necessary in the decisión of a cause which is rightfully before it, just as the supreme federal court may construe a state law and decide whether it is consistent with the constitution of the state, when it has not been judicially determined by the supreme court of the state; but if it has been judicially construed and determined by the supreme tribunal of the state, will be governed by its adjudication. So, we think, whilst the supreme court of the state has jurisdiction to construe and
The precise question involved in this case was decided
It is essential to every government that it should have the power to enforce its own revenue laws; and that the decisions of its court of last resort, and of highest judicial authority, as to their constitutionality, should be final and conclusive. It is important that the administration of the revenue laws should be uniform in every part of the United States, which would be impracticable if the state courts were clothed with co-ordinate powers to pass upon the constitutionality of such laws. It is not likely that there would be uniformity of decision by the several state courts, and consequently a revenue law of the United States would be in force in one state and disregarded in another. We are of opinion that the final and conclusive adjudication of the constitutionality of a revenue law of congress, and its construction, belongs to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the United States, just as the adjudication of a state law—its construction, and whether it is consistent with the constitution of the state—belongs to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the state, and is final and conclusive; and an encroachment by the state court upon the jurisdiction of the federal court would be as unwarrantable as an encroachment by the latter on the former. It is important to the states, as well as to the United States, that the jurisdiction of both courts should be well defined and sacredly observed. With these views, we must regard
But the learned counsel for the plaintiff contend, admitting that to be so, that the general counts show good cause of action. Suppose they do; did the account filed, and a copy of which was served on the defendant, warrant the entering of a judgment, without a writ of inquiry, under §44 of ch. 167 of the Code above cited? We have seen that said account was unintelligible except as explained by the special count of the declaration, unless by the defendant who was cognizant of and an actor in the transaction to which it refers; and it would be understood by him just as the claim is set out in the special count, which, as we have seen, does not set out any cause of action, under the decision of the federal court. And if the service of a copy of that account on the defendant is relied upon to give notice of the character of the plaintiff’s claim on the common counts, it would be notice to him of just such a claim as is set out in the special count, which we have seen, under the decision in Pace v. the same defendant, gives no cause of action.
To warrant the judgment by default without a writ of inquiry upon the common counts under § 44, supra, it was just as necessary that the defendant should be served with a copy of the account distinctly stating the several items of the plaintiff’s claim, in those counts, as it was to warrant a judgment by default on the first count; and the only notice lie had of the character of the plaintiff’s claim in the common counts was the service of a copy of the account, which it has been held gave him no cause of action! Consequently the judgment by default, whether on the special count, or the common counts, was illegal, and the court below did not err in reversing it and setting it aside.
Judgment affirmed.