135 Ark. 269 | Ark. | 1918
(after stating the facts). The chief reliance of counsel for appellant for a reversal of the judgment is, that the court erred in refusing to allow him to prove by witnesses that the universal custom between land owners and real estate brokers in Mississippi county, is, that when a tract of land is listed with a broker for a designated price per acre net to the owner, the broker gets as his commission all that he sells the land for in excess of the list price. Counsel for appellant admit that generally it is the duty of the court to construe a written contract and declare its terms and meaning to the jury. But they invoke the rule that where commercial terms are used which by custom are used in a sense other than the ordinary meaning of the words, oral testimony is admissible to explain the meaning of the words used and that it should be submitted to the jury to determine in what sense they were used. They rely upon the principles of law decided in Paepcke-Leicht Lbr. Co. v. Talley, 106 Ark. 400. In that case the parties entered into a written contract for the sale and delivery of lumber at a designated price per thousand feet “board measure.” The court held that it was competent to show by parol evidence that the phrase “board measure” was a commercial term, and that it was the well-nigh universal custom in the lumber trade for sales to be made in accordance with its commercial meaning. There is no difficulty of this kind in the contract here. The .words have a settled and definite legal meaning. In Boysen v. Robertson, 70 Ark. 56, the court in construing a similar contract held that the words used were only a limitation upon the power of the agent to sell and that it was still his duty to sell the land for the highest price obtainable, and to account to his principal for the proceeds, less a compensation not greater than the excess of the purchase money over the designated price per acre net, and at the same time not exceeding a reasonable compensation. This rule was reaffirmed in the later case of Bennett v. Thompson, 126 Ark. 61. It was there said that the duty rests upon a real estate broker, the same as upon any other agent, to make disclosure to his principal of the terms of a negotiation so that the principal may act advisedly in determining whether or not the proposal is satisfactory. The court held that the broker may make a contract whereby he will be entitled to the difference between the price the seller agrees to accept and the amount the purchaser agrees to pay, regardless of what that amount is; but that such a contract must be plainly expressed in order to relieve the broker of the duty he owes to his principal to make a full disclosure concerning the terms of the negotiation. In the case above cited the words under consideration had a meaning peculiar to the lumber trade and that meaning was understood by all lumber men. Here the words used in the contract had a well defined legal meaning, and, in the absence of any showing in the contract that the parties intended them to have a different meaning, they must be presumed to have used them in their legal meaning. In all cases where evidence of custom or usage is received the rule must be taken with the qualification that the evidence be not repugnant to or inconsistent with the contract. No usage or custom can be incorporated into a contract which is inconsistent with its terms. It is clear that local usages or customs can not defeat the express terms of a contract; nor can they contravene settled principles of law. This principle is clearly recognized in the case above cited as well as by other opinions of this court. Although usage may be resorted to to explain the meaning of a commercial term, it can never be received to contradict the express terms of a contract, nor to give words a meaning different from their settled legal interpretation. Hence the court did not err in refusing the offered testimony.
The contract under consideration does- not fix what compensation appellant was to receive for selling the land. It was agreed by the parties that, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, 5 per cent, is a reasonable commission for the sale of the land. The jury found for appellant and fixed his compensation at $960. This finding eliminates from our consideration the other assignments of error, for the reason that the finding of the jury being in favor of appellant, he could not be prejudiced by the instructions given to the jury;
It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
