Appellant was indicted for murder. When tbe cause was called for trial be entered a plea of guilty. Tbe jury found him guilty of murder in tbe second degree, and assessed bis punishment at twenty-five, years in tbe penitentiary.
There are no bills of exception incorporated in tbe record. Attached to tbe motion for a new trial are found tbe affidavits of defendant’s counsel, to tbe effect that be (defendant) is of weak mind and scarcely responsible for his acts. These were supplemented by tbe affidavit of Dr. Stallcup, to tbe effect, that from-an examination of defendant, as well as from bis personal knowledge, be believed defendant to be of such weak mind as to render him irresponsible for bis acts. It was also alleged, that an agreement bad been entered into between tbe counsel in tbe case that tbe evidence of tbe sheriff alone should be used under tbe plea of guilty, and that this was violated by tbe court in asking defendant certain questions in relation to bis plea of guilty. Tbe affidavit of tbe judge is also found in tbe record, in which be certifies that be stated to counsel that be would not allow a plea of guilty' to murder in tbe second degree to be entered in favor of defendant, *141 but in the event be pleaded guilty, that it would be to murder, and tbe jury would find the degree. With this understanding the plea was entered. The defendant was then admonished by the court as to the consequences, and questioned in regard to the statutory requirements provided for in this character of case. The court further states, that defendant answered “all questions with as much intelligence as any man in Texas could have answered them.”
The court’s action was in accord with the statute, and there was no other evidence adduced before the jury except that of the sheriff. But if there had been, the court had the authority to have it introduced to satisfy himself and the jury in regard to the facts. Code Crim. Proc., arts. 517-519. “If the defendant plead guilty he shall be admonished by the court of the consequences, and no such plea shall be received unless it plainly appear that he is sane, and is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon prompting him to confess his guilt.” Id., art. 518; Willson’s Crim. Stats., secs. 2111, 2112. The action of the court was in conformity to the above cited statute.
In regard to the facts set up bearing upon the question of sanity, we may observe that the testimony mentioned in the affidavits was known to counsel at the time of the trial, and is in no sense newly discovered. His sanity was required to be shown before his conviction could occur under the plea of guilty, and was necessarily an issue for the court under such plea. If he was insane, the evidence should have been introduced at the time of the plea bearing upon that issue. Again, the affidavits set up no fact or circumstance tending to show insanity, nor do they set out any evidence whatever upon which the affiants predicate their belief or opinion as to defendant’s insanity.
As presented to us the record discloses no reason why the judgment should be reversed, and it is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.