30 App. D.C. 597 | D.C. Cir. | 1908
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is an action of ejectment brought in the supreme court of the District of Columbia to recover possession of an un
It is urged by counsel for defendant that it does not appear that either the plaintiff or any person under whom he claimed has ever been in possession of the land in controversy. Having failed to establish a common source of title, it was incumbent
It appears that on December 23, 1788, the assembly of Maryland offered to cede to Congress any territory within her limits, not exceeding 10 miles square, which might be selected for the seat of government. On December 3, 1789, Virginia made a similar offer, and Congress, on July 16, 1790, accepted the offer of Maryland in connection with that of Virginia. Burch’s Digest, 213, 225. The act of Congress of July 16, 1790 [1 Stat. at L. 130, chap. 28], providing for the establishment of a permanent seat of government, authorized the President to appoint three commissioners, who should; under his direction, survey and “by proper metes and bounds define and limit a district of territory, under the limitations above mentioned; and the district so defined, limited, and located shall be deemed the district accepted by this act for the permanent seat of the government of the United States.” Burch’s Digest, 225. The original territory embraced within the District of Columbia was accordingly selected, surveyed, and boundary lines established. As a part of the arrangement, and to carry into effect the cession act of Maryland, nineteen of the original proprietors of lands within the limits of the original city of Washington met and signed an agreement on March 30, 1791, which, among other things, provided that “we, the subscribers, in consideration of the great benefits we expect to derive from having the Federal city laid off upon our lands, do hereby agree and bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrators, to. convey, in trust to the President of the United States, or commissioners, or such other persons as he shall appoint, by good and sufficient deeds in fee simple, the whole of our respective lands which he may think proper to include within the lines of the Federal city for the purposes and on the conditions following: The President shall have the sole power of directing the Federal city to be laid off in what maimer he pleases. He may retain
Afterwards, pursuant to this agreement, on June 29, 1791,, these original proprietors conveyed for this purpose all their lands by deeds of trust to two trustees, Thomas Beall and John M. Gantt. These deeds are all in the same form and contain the same declarations of trust. They provide, among other things, that “in consideration of the uses and trusts hereinafter mentioned, to be performed by the said Beall and Gantt, and the survivor of them, and the heirs of such survivor, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, hath granted, bargained, sold, aliened, released, and confirmed, and by these presents, doth grant, bargain, sell, alien, release and confirm (describing the land), to have and to hold the hereby bargained and sold lands, with their appurtenances, to the said Beall and Gantt, and the survivor of them, and the heirs of such survivor, forever; to and for the special trusts following, and no other, that is. to say: That all the said lands hereby bargained and sold, or such part thereof as may be thought necessary or proper to be laid out, together with other lands, within the said limits for a Federal city, with such streets, squares, parcels, and lots, as the President of the United States for the time being shall approve; and that the said trustees shall convey to the commissioners for the time being, appointed by virtue of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of Government of the United States,’ and their successors, for the use of the United States forever, all the said streets and such of the said squares, parcels, and lots as the
The general assembly of Maryland ratified the cession on December 19, 1191. This act recognized that, under the previous agreement, certain proprietors of lands lying in the District of Columbia had deeded their lands to trustees in order that the lands so conveyed might be laid out into streets, alleys, lots, and blocks, which should constitute “a Federal city.” The act of ratification further provided a method' by which all the proprietors within the limits of the proposed city should convey their lands in trust under the same conditions as were contained'in the deeds already executed. The Maryland act of ratification further provided, in relation to the conveyance of
The grantors of the block in which the lot in question is located appear from the face of the certificate to have been George Walker and William Prout. The apportionment of this block is evidenced by what is called “a certificate of allotment,” which appears of record, and is as follows:
Sept’r 29, 1796.
The Commissioners and George Walker and William Prout, original proprietors of this Square numbered Eight hundred and thirty-four in the City of Washington have agreed on the division thereof in manner following to wit Lots numbered three, four, five, six and seven are to remain to the said William Prout. Lots numbered thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen are to remain to the said George Walker, and Lots numbered one, two, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, eighteen, nineteen and twenty are subject to be sold agreeable to the Deeds of Trust concerning Lands in the said City.
Witness our hands this twenty-ninth day of September in the Year one thousand and seven hundred and ninety-six.
Gusts. Scott,
William Thornton,
Alexr. White,
Geo. Walker,
Wm. Prout,
Commiss’rs.
Witness:
Wm. Brent.
T. Munroe.
Square No. 834.
Received to be recorded the 17th day of March 1797, and. same day-was recorded in Square Book No. 3 folio 834, one of the Square Records for that part of Columbia which lies within the State of Maryland.
Ex’d by Jno. M. Gantt, Cl’k
This certificate, plaintiff insists, establishes a common source-of title direct from the United States. The execution of it, he claims, was the exercise of sovereign power on the part of the United States. It will be observed that this is not a sealed instrument, asserts no interest or estate in the property therein described, alleges no consideration, and contains no clause of conveyance. It merely stipulates that the lot in question is to remain to the said William Prout. In an act of- the-Maryland assembly supplementing the ratification act it was. provided: “That the certificates granted, or which may be granted, by the said commissioners, or any two of them, to purchasers of lots in the said city, with acknowledgment off the payment of the whole purchase money, if any shall have arisen thereon, and recorded agreeably to the directions of the-act concerning the territory of Columbia, and city of Washington, shall be sufficient and effectual to visit the legal estate in-the purchasers, their heirs and assigns, according to the import of such certificates, without any deed or formal conveyance.”' •Burch’s Digest, 224. It will be observed that this act refers, to certificates granted to purchasers, and not to the grantors.
The crucial question for our consideration is, Did this certificate pass a legal title from the United States to Prout, and was its execution an act of sovereignty on the part of the United States ? If not, plaintiff’s case must fail. The rule in. ejectment proceedings is well settled, “that the plaintiff in ejectment must in all cases prove a legal title to the premises* in himself, at the time of the demise laid in the declaration,,
It is clear that, from the agreements herein referred to, the rights which the United States acquired, so far as the soil is ■concerned, are derived from the individuals who owned the land at the time of the cession, and were not granted by the State of Maryland. The foundation of the government’s title to so much of the real estate as was ultimately dedicated to streets, alleys, or public grounds rested upon contract with the individual proprietors. As to this portion of the ceded territory, title in the soil became vested in fee simple in the United States. The powers, however, which can be lawfully exercised over the realty are derived from the same source, and no rights can be created which the proprietors from whom title came did not possess. The agreement and deeds from which these rights are derived can only be interpreted and construed as if they were contracts between private individuals. The government in these transactions exercised no act of sovereignty, but placed itself upon a level with the individual citizen. If the United States acquired any sovereignty over the soil of the District of Columbia, it could only have been derived from the Maryland act of cession. The act of 1791, sec. 2, passed by the general assembly of Maryland, places a distinct limitation upon the powers of Congress by declaring in unambiguous terms that the cession shall confer no other right in the land than may be conveyed by the original proprietors. It
Even assuming that the title to the land in question passed to the government, it is impossible to derive a common source of title from the United States. That source must be found in a more remote period, and in a title direct from the original sovereign to the original proprietor. It seems to be well settled that when an officer or commissioner, as in this case, acting under authority of law and in accordance with its forms, conveys to an individual a tract of land owned by the government, the conveyance will pass only such title as the government has therein; and there is no greater presumption of law that the title is valid than if it had been derived from an individual proprietor. In Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 261, 31 L. ed. 430, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461, the court, considering the effect of a government title derived from an individual proprietor, said: “But in all these cases the question was whether the documents, with the recitals therein, and the presumptions of law and fact arising thereon, shown to have been executed by officers of the government, within the apparent scope of their authority, were sufficient in the first instance to show that the title of the government assumed by them to exist passed by the conveyance which undertook to transfer it. In no case, however, have they been held sufficient, where the fact in issue was whether the government at that time had any title to convey, to establish the fact in dispute, as against parties claiming a pre-existing adverse and paramount title in themselves. All that can be reasonably or lawfully claimed as the effect of such documents of title is that they pass such estate, and such estate only, as the government itself, in whose name and on whose behalf the official acts appear to have been done, had at the time, but not to conclude the fact that the estate conveyed
At this point it is proper to consider whether the legal title to the land here in controversy ever passed to the United States. The streets, alleys, and lands selected by the President for public purposes, for which the grantors were to be paid at the rate of twenty-five pounds per acre, by the terms of the deeds of trust and the agreement became vested in the United States in fee simple, as soon as the same were selected, set apart, and apportioned by the commissioners. As to the lands so embraced,
At the trial of this cause, plaintiff offered portions of the record of the proceedings in the circuit court of the District of Columbia for Washington county, in the matter of the estate of William Prout, deceased. It was sought by this to establish that the final decree entered therein vested title to the lot in -question in William Prout, one of the heirs of William Prout, deceased. This record is assailed “on the ground that the court liad no jurisdiction to pass any such decree; that there was no showing that William Prout owned the land in controversy; that he was dead; that he died intestate; that any proceeding was brought by any proper person; that any or all of the heirs were before the court; that any persons were appointed as commissioners; or that the decree was part of a chain of title
In the Matter of the Estate of William Prout.
To the Honorable the Judges of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for the County of Washington:
We the subscribers commissioners named in the commission hereto annexed, in virtue of the powers vested in us by the said commission do certify and return to your Honors, that in execution of the said commission, on the twentieth day of September one thousand eight hundred and thirty and having given reasonable notice to all the parties concerned of the matter of our proceeding in the execution of the said commission before any other proceeding was had as will appear by the notice herewith returned and which we pray may be taken as part of this our return, we in conformity with said notice met on the 12th day of September 1830 at the time and place in said notice mentioned and having made an accurate view and observation of the pieces or parcels of ground and premises in said commission mentioned, and then and there took into consideration every circumstance relative to the said pieces or parcels of ground and premises in the said commission mentioned were of opinion and did adjudge and determine that all the said pieces or parcels of ground and premises could be divided without loss-, or injury to all or any of the parties entitled. And we did therefore divide and make partition of the same fairly and
To Johnathan Prout (a large number of lots described).
To Robert Prout (a large number of lots described).
To William Prout as follows:
834 Lots three four five six & seven.
(And a large number of other squares and lots).
To Martha Hale Mc.Knight (a large number of lots described) .
To Mary Prout ( a large number of lots described).
In testimony whereof we have set our hands and seals this fifth day of November one thousand eight hundred and thirty.
Edw’d Simms (Seal.)
Geo. Adams (Seal.)
James Eriend (Seal.)
John Nowland (Seal)
The order of the court ratifying and confirming the report of the commissioners also appears as follows:
In the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for Washington County.
It appearing to the satisfaction of this court that the former order of this court made in this cause on the 23 day of March 1831 for the ratification and confirmation nisi of the report of the commissioners appointed to make a division of the estate of William Prout, deceased, amongst his heirs at law has been duly published in conformity with the said order and no cause having been shown against the ratification or confirmation of the said report or the partition or allotment made by the said commissioners it is therefore this II day of June 1831 by this court ordered that the said report partition and allotment be and the same are hereby finally ratified and confirmed.
By order of the Court, W. Brent, Cl’k.
The record of the division of the real property belonging to the estate of William Prout, deceased, in which the lot in
The sufficiency of these proceedings to convey title to William Prout is denied by defendant. We may inquire, first, whether it sufficiently appears upon the face of the record that the court had jurisdiction to enter the order appearing in the record. Counsel for appellant concedes “a presumption that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of partitions generally and of these persons mentioned in the proceedings as parties,” but insists that “there is no presumption as to who were the heirs of William Prout, deceased, nor that all or any of them, except these two (Jonathan and Mary Prout), were before the court.” With the general jurisdiction of the court conceded, the inquiry is narrowed to the sufficiency of this record to disclose a proper exercise of that jurisdiction. The order of the court ratifying and confirming the report of the commissioners certifies that “the commissioners were appointed to make division of the estate of William Prout, deceased, amongst his heirs at law.” The commissioners, proceeding under that order, made a division of the property between Jonathan Prout, Bobert Prout, William Prout, Martha Hale McKnight, and Mary Prout. These are the persons referred to in the decree as the heirs at law of William Prout. It is not necessary to go beyond the record before us to find that these are the legal heirs. No presumption on this subject arises. The court, in ratifying the report of the commissioners partitioning the estate, rendered a final decree in the proceedings, which had the effect, under the statute then in force, of vesting title to the property in the persons to whom it was respectively apportioned. The appointment of commissioners to partition the
We are of the opinion that there is sufficient disclosed in this record to support the presumption that the court not only
It is unnecessary to consider the other errors assigned, as the judgment of the court below must be reversed. The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for furthr proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Reversed.