44 Wash. 630 | Wash. | 1906
This was a suit to enjoin the appellants from interfering with alleged rights of respondents as riparian owners and otherwise. The complaint is so long that space and time will permit presenting but a short summary of it. It alleged, that the plaintiffs were the owners of certain lands bordering upon the Humptulips river, in Chehalis county, Washington; that the river was about two hundred and fifty
The answer denies practically all the complaint, or that portion of it which alleged that damage was being done to the plaintiffs by reason of the operation of the booms; and further alleged that the defendants were corporations, duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the state of
The court found, in substance, that the Grays Harbor Boom Company and the Humptulips Driving Company, defendants, were both corporations, organized and existing under the laws of the state of Washington, each having its principal office and place of business at Aberdeen, Washington, and that C. D. Burrows and A. P. Stockwell were at all the dates mentioned in the complaint, and were at the time of the trial, the only stockholders and officers of each of said corporations [Under this finding, the correctness of which is not disputed, we will not find it necessary to enter into a discussion of the different responsibilities of these two alleged different corporations] ; found that the plaintiffs were the owners of certain land adjoining the Humptulips river at the place alleged in the complaint; that the Humptulips river was a government meandered fresli-water stream, emptying into the waters of Grays Harbor; that it was navigable in its natural condition for small craft, and was floatable for many miles inland, and through the plaintiffs’ lands; that the average width of the river from the mouth to the north line of plaintiffs’ lands was about two hundred and fifty feet; that the water therein for that distance was of a depth of from ten to. fifteen feet, mean high water, and from four to five feet, low water; that the water was suitable ior domestic and livestock purposes in front of plaintiffs’ premises, and was used by them for domestic and livestock purposes, from the date of their residence upon said premises until the acts of the defendants prevented them from so using them; that the water in said river in front of plaintiffs’ premises was suit
From these findings of fact, it is concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to a perpetual injunction against these defendants, and each of them, from obstructing the Humptulips river to navigation in front of the lands of these plaintiffs, and using the said river in front of plaintiffs’ premises for the purpose of storing logs, either in the water of said river or upon or against the banks above or below mean high water, from using any artificial means above the lands and premises of these plaintiffs, to increase the flow or volume .of
From these findings and conclusions, the court made the following decree:
“(a) That the Grays Harbor Boom Company and the Humptulips Driving Company, and the officers, agents, representatives and employees of each of said corporations, be, and they are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from obstructing the Humptulips river to navigation, from the mouth of said river, where it empties into Grays Harbor up to the north line of the lands and premises belonging to these plaintiffs and described in the complaint herein, and particularly from obstructing said river to navigation in front of the lands and premises of these plaintiffs, described as follows, to wit: Lot 1 in section 15, lots 3 and 4, in section 10, lots 1 and 3, the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the east one-half of the southeast quarter of section 9, all in township 18, north range 11 west of the Willamette Meridian, situate in Chehalis county, Washington, Where said lands abut upon said Humptulips river, of which lands and premises these plaintiffs were and are the owners in fee simple in possession of and entitled to the possession thereof, down to the line of mean high water on the banks of said river.
“(b) And from sorting, holding or rafting logs in the waters of said river in front of said lands of these plaintiffs, or upon or against the banks of said premises above or below the line of mean high water and from in any manner using the west bank of said river in front of plaintiffs5 premises above the line of mean high water.
“(c) From operating any boom within said Humptulips river in such manner as by the method of operation solely to cause sawlogs to jam or fill the river so as to prevent the navigation or use of the river by these plaintiffs, for navigation in the usual manner, or from maintaining a boom in said river or obstructing said river so as to raise the water, causing plaintiffs’ lands to overflow.
“(d) From operating or using any artificial means such as splash dams within said river or its tributaries above the lands and premises of these plaintiffs, to increase the volume
“(e) From in any manner occupying, using or damaging the premises of these plaintiffs, abutting upon the Hump-tulips river above the line of mean high water.
“(f) From exercising any of the powers or authority given to the defendants or either of them, by the statute of the state of Washington, or by reason of their plat or charter, in a manner that will directly cause any of plaintiffs’ lands to be overflowed or damaged.
“(h) That as to that portion of the plaintiffs’ premises located within the defendant, the Grays Harbor Boom Company’s boom, these defendants and each of them and each of their officers, agents, representatives and employees, are hereby perpetually enjoined from using the banks of these plaintiffs’ lands above the line of mean high water for one side or retention wall of the boom, and the said boom company is hereby ordered and required to keep open a waterway next to the said west bank of plaintiffs’ water front within said boom, which waterway shall be kept open to navigation and shall be of the width of at least fifty feet.
“(i) And it is further ordered and adjudged that these plaintiffs do have and recover of and from the defendants herein, their costs to be taxed at $19, and that execution issue therefor.”
The first Question discussed is, have the respondents as riparian owners the right, as an incident of their land, of unobstructed access to the navigable waters of the stream? In fact, the greater portion of the argument of respective counsel is devoted to this question. It is stoutly maintained by the appellants that this question has been answered in the negative by this court, in Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 L. R. A. 632, and in subsequent cases sustaining that decision; while the respondents contend that the questions at issue here are not involved in that case. An examination of the whole record in this case convinces us that it is not necessary to determine the scope of the Hatfield decision; for conceding, for the purposes of this case, that it was decided in that case — and properly decided — that a ri
“Any corporation heretofore or hereafter organized in the state of Washington for the purpose of catching, booming, sorting, rafting and holding logs, lumber or other timber products, shall have the power to acquire, hold, use and transfer all such real and personal property or estate, by lease or purchase, as shall be necessary for carrying on the business of said corporation.”
So far the statute seems to presuppose that the corporation will obtain all ground necessary for the operation of its business as other corporations do. It then proceeds:
“If such corporation shall not be able to agree with persons owning land, shore rights, or other property sought to be appropriated, as to the amount of compensation to be paid therefor, the compensation therefor may be assessed and determined and the appropriation made in the manner provided by law for the appropriation of private property by railways.”
Again, as indicating the intention of the legislature to prevent any infringement of the rights of others by these and kindred corporations, the legislature at the session of 1895 (Laws 1895, page 128), in an act relating to boom companies, entitled:
“An act to provide for the organization and incorporation of companies for clearing out and improving rivers and streams in this state, and for the purpose of driving, sorting, holding and delivering logs and other timber products thereon, fixing maximum tolls therefor”—
an act which was evidently intended simply to enlarge the
“Any such wing dams, sheer booms, dams with gates or otherwise shall not be so constructed or used as to in any manner injure or damage any lands adjacent to such stream by overflowing same or causing logs or other timber to accumulate on any land adjacent to such stream so dammed or used.”
That it was intended that the provisions of this act should apply to boom companies under prior acts, is manifest from the provisions of § 8, which is as follows:
“Duly organized boom companies at present operating upon any of the streams or rivers of this state may flic amended articles of incorporation to embrace the provisions of this act, and, for the purpose of time limitations mentioned in this act, the time of filing such amended articles of incorporation shall be deemed to be the time of organization thereof, but failure to comply with the provisions of this act shall work forfeiture of the rights of such corporations only so far as the same are subjoined under the provisions of this paragraph.”
Practically all the rights which are granted to boom companies under the act of 1889-90 are carried forward into the act of 1895, therebj7 simply enlarging the rights of boom companies; and it is not to be presumed that, within the contemplation of the legislative mind, one boom company organized under the act of 1890 would be permitted to interfere with the rights of navigation, and to commit depredation upon abutting lands, which rights were not accorded to boom companies organized under the act of 1895, although they might be incorporated under a different name.
This provision of the statute was construed by this court— if, indeed, such provision was susceptible of construction— in Carl v. West Aberdeen Land etc. Co., 13 Wash. 616, 43 Pac. 890, where it was held that boom companies organized
“The third objection is founded upon the claim of rights by the appellant boom company under the act above referred to, and a large number of authorities have been cited to show that it is competent for the legislature to provide that such boom companies may interfere with the navigation of navigable streams. But such authorities are not in point, for the reason that the legislature, in the act in question, has not attempted to confer upon the boom companies organized thereunder any such right. In § é of the act (Laws 1895, p. 180), after providing what such companies may do, it is provided: ‘Nothing shall be constructed that shall in any way interfere with the navigation of such river or stream, or the use of its waters for any purpose.’ From which it will be seen that the legislature not only did not intend to give to such companies the right to interfere with navigation, but took pains by express provision to provide that they should have no such right.”
From an examination of the statute, we conclude that, with the exception of the right of eminent domain and the right to charge and collect fees, the boom • company, stands upon no different footing from an individual. That the legislature did not intend to give any exclusive right of navigation to boom companies, although they may be dealing in business of great magnitude, but that they were restricted to a joint user of the waters of the stream, and that it was the plain intention to protect from their encroachments all other rights of navigation and rights of use in the waters of the river, is evident from the enactments on the subject. This being so, the boom company will be controlled by the same rule that is made applicable in the ordinary case of log driving in meandered streams.
“Another provision of the decree, with reference to the methods attending respondent’s navigation, also calls for examination. • It will be remembered that, by its terms, the decree prohibits appellant from interfering with respondent’s employees in the way of preventing them from going upon the banks of the stream upon appellant’s lands, for the purpose of breaking jams of shingle bolts, so long as the going upon the banks does no injury to appellant or his lands. We think this provision of the decree is also erroneous. We believe we went as far as we should go in the interest of public convenience, when we held, in Watkins v. Dorris, supra, that private land owners hold the beds of unmeandered streams subject to the easement of driving timber products over the land. But we tried to make it clear in that case that the timber driver must confine himself and his operations to the highwáy itself — the bed of the stream — until the land owner consents to the use of the banks, or until the right to their use has been acquired ;n a lawful way. If a more emphatic statement of that rule ,s necessary, we now wish to be understood as making it, with all needed emphasis. The fundamental principle of right in the land owner to control his own premises, outside of the bed of the stream, must not be violated. To leave parties under such terms as this decree provides would, in many instances, invite trouble and litigation. Each one would assume to be his own judge as to whether any injury is done to the land. What might appear to the land owner as injury might not so appear to the timber driver, and thus a controversy would at once arise, probably requiring repeated litigation to settle. The driver must know from the beginning that he must, in no event, go upon the banks of the stream in his operations without the owner’s permission, and thus controversies about damages accruing in that way will be avoided. Enough controversies will arise about the manner of operating in the bed of the stream to the possible damage of the adjacent land, without adding thereto those arising from semi-legalized trespass upon private premises, which would be the case if it were judicially held that one may operate upon private lands against the owner’s consent, and without compensation.”
It is claimed by the appellants, in conclusion, that this injunction cannot be sustained by reason of the rule announced by the court in Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., 43 Wash. 195, 88 Pac. 405, to the effect that no damages can be recovered for injuries which are merely the natural result of the use of a stream as a highway, where the operations have been conducted in a reasonably careful manner; and that, inasmuch as this decree is not based on negligence, it should not be allowed to stand. This announcement was not necessary to the decision of the case in Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., supra, inasmuch as it was determined that there was proof of negligence on the part of the drivers. But, whatever may be said of the soundness of the doctrine announced in that case, the question is not involved here, where there has not only been an invasion of the constitutional rights of the respondents, but an actual, permanent taking and permanent use made of respondents’ land, not only by using the west bank of their land as the west wall of the boom, but by using the land itself as a storage ground for logs that escape from the boom — an actual taking and damaging which, as we have seen, could not be indulged in without previous compensation. In addition to this, when it conclusively appears that the business in which the company is engaged cannot be carried on without damaging private interests, it would seem that the rule announced in the Lea Lumber Company case could not
But, outside of that question, in this case without doubt, the respondents have a l’ight to rely upon the protection guaranteed to them by the statute, the same statute which authorizes the organization of boom and driving companies ; (1) that they shall not have the right in any way to interfere with the navigation of the stream or the use of its waters for any purpose;' (2) that they shall not have the right to injure or damage any adjacent lands, etc. If they have no right to do this, it is plain that there is no room for the application of the rule of damnum, absque injuria, for in this kind of a case that rule is based upon the idea that a person is carrying on his business in a legal manner or under the sanction of the law; while, as we have seen, the law in this case expressly inhibits such a use.
The argument of appellants, based upon the difference between the importance and magnitude of the logging industry and the farming and other interests on the river, an argument which is largely the basis of their whole contention, is one that ought not to appeal to an American court, where justice is dealt out with an even hand to individual and corporation, to rich and poor, to strong and weak. Every citizen of this state must, not only in theory but in practice, be accorded by the law the prompt and efficient protection of his rights, regardless of the magnitude of his interests. It is the protection of the rights which is the object of the solicitude of the law, and not the ascertainment of the mercantile value of such right.
Construing the decree, then, Avith reference to the case before the court, Ave are inclined to the vievv that it is unob
Mount, C. J., Rudkin, Root, and Cnow, JJ., concur.