*1 and hold trial court’s order modify we sequently, for 1971 plaintiff-wife amount due the $18,003.83. as modified.
Affirmed Burroughs Corporation, corporation, appellee, a Co., E. Simon corporation, James Construction appellant. 220 N. W. 2d 225 July 11, Filed 1974. No.
Kelley & for Wallace, appellant. Pederson
Murphy, & Piccolo and LeRoy Anderson, appellee.
Heard before J., White, C. Spencer, Boslaugh, and Brodkey, McCown, Newton, JJ. Clinton, White, C. J. an action brought
This is to recover a money judgment arising an insurance clause in an equipment sale (cid:127) contract between parties. The plaintiff, Burroughs Simon Corporation, defendant James E. Con- purchase of into a contract for entered struction computer system defendant made a down- which purchaser payment. In the contract the defendant as “* * * equipment agreed the benefit insure the to: *2 damage against any shall be abso- kind, loss or Seller lutely responsible equipment the of de- the time for paid building livery and thereafter until Purchaser’s at * * equipment the delivered for in Certain was full designate parties treat the delivered and defendant. The Subsequent property “hardware” and as “software.” as damaged by equipment delivery, a fire. was “application any that software” The defendant denied destroyed damaged by It denied fire. further or was plaintiff any result of due the as a amount was that interrogatories and other After insurance clause. above hearing the motion in the were introduced evidence granted judgment, a summary Court the District for.a partial plaintiff summary judgment based on for the equipment agreement to insure the the defendant judg- summary plaintiff. partial benefit equip- only portion to the “hardware” ment related for trial the issues reserved ment. The court “application any, damage, regarding soft- if to the concerning goods al- action and a cause of ware” second in- legedly not listed in the aforementioned delivered but light herein, of our decision contract. In the surance summary partial wording precise nature of the the judgment important. It is: order is plaintiff’s mo- “IT THEREFORE ORDERED IS summary judgment respect hardware to the with tion for Burroughs consisting Computer, Billing Electronic of a tape punch tape features hardware reader, other a Equipment ‘Ex- marked Contract Sale in the described pe- plaintiff’s amended second A’ and attached to hibit hereby the same is be and other documents tition and plaintiff regard, re- have and and in that sustained $12,545.45. cover from defendant the sum 274 plaintiff’s
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motion summary judgment respect application with to the $3,000.00 software the amount of ‘Ex- referred to in plaintiff’s hibit A’ and the issue raised in second cause of plaintiff’s petition action of second amended be and hereby same is overruled.” appeals partially
The defendant
from this order
sus-
taining
summary judgment.
the motion for
We dismiss
appeal
being premature.
plaintiff
appeal
premature
asserts that the
is
partial summary judg
should be
dismissed because
being
ment,
in the nature
an
order,
is
appealable.
not a final
or
order
which is
It is
jurisdiction
appeals
fundamental
that our
over
is based
judgments
on final
or orders. Grantham v. General Tel
ephone
(1972);
647,
2d
Hart
§
Neb.
Ronspies,
(1966);
181 Neb.
We par- entering order, this sustained The District Court only summary tially the motion for equip- liability “hardware” for certain the defendant’s *4 equipment sale ment under insurance clause further trial retained for contract. It liability “appli- regarding for the issues the defendant’s of action based cation under the first cause software” upon plaintiff’s clause, the insurance and all the second By petition. cause of action in amended its its second terms, statute, section R. author- 25-1333, R. S. izes the court to eliminate issues on which there is no genuine by interlocutory issue fact, orders, of and the squarely language District Court’s order comes within commanding specifying it to make an order the facts controversy, including without substantial extent which the amount or other re- controversy, directing is pro- not in such further lief ceedings just. in the action as are also statute con- templates, by proceed terms, its that the whole case shall disposition by entry to trial and of a final adjudicating all in conclusion, issues the case. In partial summary judgment clearly entered herein was interlocutory appealable nature, not final or or- purpose der. To hold otherwise would emasculate the Summary Judgment destroy purpose Act and its expediting unnecessary trials the elimination of is- by permitting piecemeal sues, appeals, delaying the final disposition of the whole court, case the trial and the acquisition complete jurisdiction of the whole cause appeal to this court. pre-
Consequently, appeal the contention that this is appeal mature is sustained and the should be is hereby dismissed.
Appeal dismissed. Boslaugh, J., concurring, opinion ap- dismissing
I concur in the of the court peal premature. finality
The test of substance of the decision ra- ther Appeal than its form. 4 See Jur. 2d, Am. and Error, p. § 51, it is However, sometimes difficult deter- mine whether a decision is or Some final. difficulty might partial summary be judg- avoided in phraseology clearly ments if expressed were used which *5 decision and avoided nature subject had to execution implication that a entered. been doing Co., Supply Soo business
So corporation, Feed & Morgan Soo Max So appellant, Supply, Feed & appellees. al., et 2d 25 July 11, 1974. No. Filed Boyd, appellant. Smith, & Smith appellees Morgan. Roy Anderson, I. J., Spencer,
Heard before White, Boslaugh, C. JJ. Newton, Clinton, Brodkey, McCown, J. Clinton, plaintiff action as an commenced This cause arising and materialman’s lien a contractor foreclose grain drying of a erection bin. the sale and out of Morgan, alleging, purchaser, Max answered defendant implied things, warranty among breach of fit- other cross-petition, cause of of a the first action and, ness quantity $2,500 in the sum of to a claimed dryer alleged: bin. The defendant stored milo causing drying was defective unit fire in “k.
