16 Wash. App. 73 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1976
Floyd Burris, guardian ad litem of Mark Burris, appeals a summary judgment dismissing his declaratory-judgment action to determine whether an injury to Mark came within the purview of a “Standard Workmen’s Compensation and Employer’s Liability Policy”
The affidavits and deposition before the superior court support the following factual statement: Pacific hired high school students as weeders to work in its field when necessary. The students reported each day to a staging area for Pacific’s work crew, known as the plant, during weeding season. Depending upon where weeding was needed, the students were assigned either to the Cold Creek property which is approximately 25 miles from the plant or to a parcel of land in the plant’s immediate vicinity. Pacific provided transportation to the Cold Creek site for 20 to 25 weeders; however, on many occasions, more than that number reported for work.
On June 16, 1971, Mark worked in the fields near the
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no issue of fact; that there was no employer-employee relationship at the time of the accident and dismissed the suit.
Both parties recognize the general rule that an employee traveling to and from work is not within the course of his employment as that phrase is used in the area of workmen’s compensation.
The sole issue is whether there exists an issue of material fact as to whether Mark was acting within the scope of his employment. We answer in the affirmative.
Summary judgment is designed to do away with useless trials on formal issues which cannot be factually supported, or, if factually supported, could not as a matter of law lead to a result favorable to the nonmoving party.
The importance of the weeders reporting to the main office and being dispatched from there to different sites at the discretion of Pacific, coupled with (1) the fact Pacific transported 20 to 25 people to the Cold Creek property, (2) the fact more than 20 to 25 weeders would often times report at the main office, and (3) an admission by Pacific’s manager that it was in Pacific’s best interests to have as many weeders working in the different fields as possible, creates (albeit by inference) a question of fact as to whether Mark was employed when he reported to the plant at approximately 7 a.m., and was, therefore, traveling between the plant and the Cold Creek property within the purview of the exception.
The judgment of the superior court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial.
Green and Munson, JJ., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied September 22,1976.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 21,1976.
“Coverage C—Voluntary Compensation. To pay on behalf of the insured, if any employee within a group of employees hereinafter described shall sustain injury, including death resulting therefrom, while employed by the insured in operations in a state specified opposite the description of such group of employees, under circumstances which would have rendered the insured hable for compensation if the injured employee and the insured had been subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Law hereinafter designated with respect to such employment, an amount equal to the compensation and other benefits which would have been payable under such law had the injured employee and the insured been subject to such law with respect to such employment.”
Venho v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138, 52 P.2d 1267 (1936). See also 8 W. Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation § 1710 (3d ed. 1951).
Burchfield v. Department of Labor & Indus., 165 Wash. 106, 4 P.2d 858 (1931).
Palmer v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 52 Wn.2d 604, 328 P.2d 169 (1958).
Mitchell v. McCarty, 239 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1957).
Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
See Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
See Wood v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 469, 473, 358 P.2d 140 (1960).