This аppeal is from summary judgment entered in favor of the landowner in a premises liability claim for personal injuries. The issue is whether under the undisputed facts Burrell might be deemed an invitee at the time he was injured. If he was merely a licensee, summary judgment was appropriate because there is no contention that Meads engaged in wilful or wanton misconduct. See Gaboury v. Ireland Road Grace Brethren (1983), Ind.,
The record sustains the following facts which the trial court found were not in dispute: Burrell and Meads had been friends for years. Over the years each had hеlped the other with a variety of tasks, always without thought of compensation. Burrell often helped Meads аround Meads' garage and Meads helped Burrell work on his car.
On August 9, 1986 Meads planned to install a drop ceiling in his gаrage. (He had previously done this by himself in another garage.) That day Burrell came by early in the morning and when he learned of Meads' plans, he offered to assist. He then left to run some errands but returned in the afternoon and along with Meads and two other friends, commenced installation of the drop ceiling.
After a portion of the ceiling had been installed it became necessary to remove a number of objects which had been storеd on top of the rafters in the garage. These items included a large map mounted on fiberboard with a wooden frame, some vinyl siding, some plywood and a wooden sign. According to Meads deposition, he stated that "someone has to go up there and hand the stuff down." 1 Burrell took it upon himself to do this. After removing most of the objects, Burrell moved off the rafter upon which he had been squatting and knelt on the large map. A few moments later he fеll through the map (which he had assumed was mounted on plywood) and fell to the floor sustaining the injuries sued upon.
Thus, the issuе before us requires consideration of Burrell's status at the time he was injured because that dictates the duty owеd by Meads. The traditional view, recently reaffirmed by our supreme court in Gaboury v. Ireland Road Grace Brethren (1983), Ind.,
Traditionally, invitee status has been employed to denote one who goes on the premises for the business benefit of the landowner (or occupier) or both parties. Hammond v. Allegretti (1974),
On the other hand, inviteе status has been extended to a volunteer helper of a repairman called to the premises, Mullins v. Easton (1978),
Here we are сoncerned with the status of the social guest, a status described by one treatise as the invitees who are not invitees. 2
In Fort Wayne National Bank v. Doctor (1971),
We believe this states the appropriate standard оf care and that it applies in instances such as the one now before us. Fleischer, supra, has no application here because no place of public invitation is involved. Absent that situation our cases have required that before the invitee standard will be imposed, the invitation must be for the business or pecuniary benefit of the owner or occupier. See, e.g., Hammond v. Allegretti, supra.
Furthermore, we find no essential distinctiоn between the social guest who is injured while performing a momentary task such as carrying a dish of food or an itеm of furniture and one who agrees to volunteer for somewhat more substantial or time consuming activity such as painting a room or installing a drop ceiling.
Arguably, in view of modern insurance practices, social guests should be accorded invitee status. Most social hosts no doubt desire that their guests, if injured, have the benefit of whatever insurance coverage has been purchased by the host. Moreover, the public policy that favоrs placing responsibility on parties whose negligence causes injury to another would likely be served by such a change. That, however, is a determination more appropriate to our supreme court. The trial judge correctly applied the law to the disputed facts.
The decision is therefore affirmed.
Notes
. Burrell complains of the court's finding that he voluntarily took it upon himself to climb onto the rafters because of this statement. He similarly urges there was evidence that Meads initially asked him to help. We agree a factual dispute may exist concerning both assertions but fоr the reasons given in the text, neither is outcome determinative. For purposes of our review we therefore accept Burrell's assertions as to both facts.
. 5 Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts (2d ed.) § 27.11, p. 215.