43 Minn. 363 | Minn. | 1890
The premises upon which the alleged trespass was committed belong to plaintiff as one of the. heirs and grantee of the other heirs of James Burrell, unless defendant acquired title under a deed purporting to have been executed in 1871 by one Kinghorn as guardian of these heirs, then minors, pursuant to Gen. St. 1878, c. 57, § 36. The only evidence offered by defendant in support of its claim of title was (1) a certified copy of a’petition to the probate court by Kinghorn and the chief engineer of the Hastings & Dakota Railway Company, (to whose interests the defendant has succeeded,) in which Kinghorn styled himself guardian of these minor heirs, and stated that as such guardian he had, pursuant to the statute, agreed to sell and convey to the railway company the interest of the heirs in this land for $500, and prayed the court to approve the sale, and indorse the same on the deed; (2) a certified copy of the record in the office
This contention is based upon an erroneous assumption as to what was passed upon and adjudicated in confirming the sale and approving the deed. It merely adjudicated and determined that the sale was a proper one to be made, and that the price paid was an adequate one. The question of the appointment of a guardian, or the validity or fact of such an appointment, was not involved. A guardian’s sale presupposes the existence of a guardian; and, if there was no guardian, there was no guardian’s sale, and nothing for the order of confirmation to act upon. It was never heard, in the case of any judicial sale, that the action of the court in confirming the sale was an adjudication as to the existence or validity of a judgment or decree authorizing the sale, or that the person who made the sale was such officer as he assumed to be. The order of confirmation is merely an
The defendant attempted to establish an equitable defence by estoppel, and for that purpose introduced in evidence all the proceedings in the administration of the estate of James Burrell, deceased, which showed that Einghorn was administrator of that estate, and that as such he charged himself, and credited the estate, with the $500 which he received from the railway company for this deed, and also, perhaps, tended to show that he had used this money for the benefit of the estate, in paying debts and expenses of administration. It is claimed that, although these heirs never received.any of this money, yet they indirectly got the benefit of it, because, if it had not been used for the benefit of the estate, it would have been necessary, in order to pay debts, to sell some.of the land which descendedlo the heirs from the decedent, their father, and therefore they are now estopped from asserting the invalidity of this deed unless they refund the consideration which the railway company paid for it. With all due deference to the very able counsel, we hardly think the suggestion is entitled to- serious consideration. The land of these heirs was assumed to be sold by one who in no way represented them, and over whom they had no control, either in the disposition of the $500 or otherwise. They were not parties to the administration proceedings. The parties to the settlement' of the administrator’s accounts were the administrator and the estate which he represented, and the only questions involved in it were as to the receipts and disbursements of the former. We can conceive of no principle of law by which the heirs can be held estopped from claiming their own land by reason of an act to which they were not parties, and over which they had no control, merely because it may have resulted in some indirect benefit being thrust upon them which they had no power to reject.
Judgment reversed.
Vanderburgh, J., took no part in this case.