BURR ROAD OPERATING COMPANY II, LLC v. NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES UNION, DISTRICT 1199
AC 33954
Argued October 14, 2015—officially released January 26, 2016
DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Bear, Js.
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(Appeal
Jeffrey R. Babbin, with whom, on the brief, was Andrea C. Kramer, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael E. Passero, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
BEAR, J. This appeal comes to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 142 Conn. App. 213, 214–15, 70 A.3d 42 (2013), rev’d, 316 Conn. 618, 621, 114 A.3d 144 (2015), this court held that an arbitration award ‘‘reinstating the grievant, Leoni Spence, who is an employee of the plaintiff, Burr Road Operating Company II, LLC . . . and a member of the defendant, New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199,’’ violated public policy, and we reversed the trial court’s determination to the contrary. Our Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that the award did not violate public policy. Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 316 Conn. 618, 621, 114 A.3d 144 (2015) (Burr Road). Consequently, the court remanded the case to us with the direction to consider the plaintiff’s remaining claim.1 Id., 651. The sole remaining issue for our consideration is whether the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4)2 because the arbitrator exceeded his authority. We conclude it did not and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s remaining claim, as set forth by our Supreme Court, are as follows. ‘‘The plaintiff operates a 120 bed skilled nursing facility known as the Westport Health Care Center (Westport). . . . The grievant was employed there as a certified nursing assistant from 2002 until the termination of her employment in 2010, and is represented by the defendant. . . .
‘‘Between 2005 and 2009, the grievant was the subject
of three disciplinary actions that have remained part
of her personnel file. . . . In 2005, she received a suspension and final warning after she improperly
restrained a resident by using a bed sheet to tie him
into his wheelchair. . . . In April, 2009, she received
a written warning for speaking to a resident in an inappropriately rude, loud, and scolding manner, and for
being insubordinate and disrespectful to her shift supervisor, registered nurse Gay Muizulles. . . . Finally,
The particular incident giving rise to the plaintiff’s termination of the grievant’s employment began on Saturday, March 20, 2010. Id., 622. During a night shift beginning on the evening of March 20 and ending on the morning of March 21 in Westport’s Riverside unit
(Riverside), the grievant overheard a conversation between two coworkers, Dezra Leonard and Laurel Johnson. Id. ‘‘On the basis of the conversation she overheard, the grievant concluded that Muizulles had been involved in an incident [in Westport’s Woodside unit (Woodside)] in which a resident had been crying. . . . Although the grievant could not be certain, she also believed that the incident might have involved abuse. . . . Before her shift ended, the grievant went to Woodside to . . . investigate. . . . The residents were all asleep, however, and no one was crying.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 622–23. The grievant failed to report her suspicions immediately, because, as found by the arbitrator, ‘‘[she] didn’t know for sure that there had been abuse . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 623. Further, ‘‘[t]here . . . is no indication that she pursued the matter the following night shift, from Sunday, March 21, to Monday, March 22, when she again worked on Riverside with Muizulles.’’ Id.
‘‘The first shift that the grievant worked on Woodside after the suspected incident was the next night, from Monday, March 22, to Tuesday, March 23. . . . During that shift, she had occasion to speak with a resident of Woodside, who told the grievant that, on the previous Saturday night, Muizulles had been somewhat rough while helping her get her legs up onto her bed, had spoken gruffly, and had turned down the television without asking permission. . . . The resident’s roommate confirmed that these events had upset the resident, who had cried for some time afterward. . . .
‘‘The grievant realized that this was likely the incident she had overheard Johnson and Leonard discussing during the Saturday night shift. . . . The grievant comforted the resident, explained to her that she should not have been subjected to such treatment, and informed her that she should feel comfortable reporting it. . . . The grievant suggested that she could arrange for someone to come and speak to the resident about what had happened to her, and the resident agreed.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 623. Subsequently, ‘‘[a]fter her shift ended on Tuesday morning, the grievant went home and tried to call a social worker at Westport. . . . The social worker was not available, however, so the grievant left her three lengthy voice mail messages reporting what the resident had told her and urging the social worker to talk to the resident.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 624.
After ‘‘a thorough investigation of Muizulles’ treatment of the resident,’’ the plaintiff determined that, although insensitive, her treatment did not rise to the level of abuse or neglect and gave her a five day suspension and a final warning. Id., 624. During this investigation, ‘‘the plaintiff also concluded that three staff members . . . [one of whom was] the grievant . . . had failed to fulfill their obligations promptly to report
Muizulles’ possible abuse.’’ Id. Johnson received a suspension and a final warning,
‘‘By contrast, the plaintiff terminated the grievant’s employment on the ground that she had failed to make a timely report of an allegation of resident abuse. . . . It subjected her to more serious discipline than Muizulles, Johnson, and the [other staff member] because, unlike those employees, the grievant already had a final warning in her employee file. Prior to terminating the grievant’s employment, the plaintiff never informed her that she was under investigation, nor afforded her any opportunity to tell her side of the story or to explain or to clarify why she did not immediately report her suspicions after her shift had ended on Sunday morning. . . . ‘This most rudimentary due process,’ the arbitrator remarked, ‘was not afforded to the grievant.’
‘‘The grievant grieved her termination, and the defendant took the termination to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The parties asked the arbitrator to determine: (1) whether the grievant had been terminated for just cause; and (2) if not, what the remedy should be.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 624–25.
The arbitrator determined that ‘‘the grievant improperly had delayed reporting an incident of suspected resident abuse’’ and, thus, ‘‘was guilty of the offense of failing to timely report to a nursing supervisor (or higher authority) the information that had come into her possession . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 625–26. In evaluating whether just cause existed to terminate the grievant’s employment for her failure to timely report, the arbitrator considered a health care provider’s statutory duty to report suspected abuse3 and the potential harms that could arise if an employee delays reporting, ultimately ‘‘credit[ing] the plaintiff’s argument that a delay in reporting is almost as bad as not reporting at all.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 626. ‘‘The arbitrator also concluded, however, that it was ‘an important mitigating fact that the grievant was the one who actually came forward, although belatedly, and made [the plaintiff] aware of the problem. If the grievant had not come forward on March 23, it is quite likely that [the plaintiff] never would have learned of the insensitive treatment given by Muizulles, nor of the failure to report by multiple staff members. It is important to recognize that contribution which the grievant made, then, albeit belatedly, to help assure the well-being of the residents . . . .’ For that reason, the arbitrator recognized that ‘the grievant’s misconduct arguably was much less egregious than the misconduct of the others involved,’ who ‘apparently had no intention of making any report.’
‘‘Ultimately, the arbitrator found as follows: ‘The
grievant did fail to make a timely report of what she
had learned on March 20. She knew the rule that she
had to report, and to do so without delay. She failed
to fulfill that responsibility in a timely manner. And,
she had a poor disciplinary record, so that placed her
in a worse position than the other staff members
involved
The plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award on two grounds—specifically, that the award violated public policy and that ‘‘the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the collective bargaining agreement and refused to hear pertinent evidence’’—and the defendant filed an application to confirm the award. Id., 627– 28. The trial court, Hon. Robert F. Stengel, judge trial referee, rejected both of the plaintiff’s grounds in support of its application to vacate. In addressing whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, the court determined that the award answered the questions specifically before him. Considering the plaintiff’s arguments that the failure of the arbitrator to give credit to the final warnings and his consideration of the mitigating factor ‘‘create[d] a new category of disciplinary infraction that doesn’t exist in the collective bargaining agreement,’’ the court observed that ‘‘there was no express language which restricted the issues to be considered by the arbitrator in determining whether the grievant was terminated for just cause.’’ Noting that ‘‘the arbitrator [had] considered but rejected the grievant’s voluntary admission of her failure to report abuse and the argument that the final warning in the grievant’s file created just cause for termination,’’ had found that although she had a poor disciplinary history, her misconduct was less egregious than that of her coworkers, and had determined that ‘‘she reported the abuser when others did not was a mitigating factor,’’ the court held that it was bound by these legal and factual determinations by the arbitrator. ‘‘Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiff’s application to vacate and granting the defendant’s application to confirm the award.’’ Burr Road, supra, 316 Conn. 628.
‘‘The propriety of arbitration awards often turns on the unique standard of review and legal principles applied to decisions rendered in this forum. Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. . . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ agreement. . . . Parties to an arbitration may make a restricted or an unrestricted submission. . . .
‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the
arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal
questions and an award cannot be vacated on the
grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement
by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review
the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted,
‘‘The significance, therefore, of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrators’ decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 110, 779 A.2d 737 (2001).
Here, the parties agree that the submission was unrestricted, and our own review of the language of the submission and agreement finds no express language placing restrictions on the arbitrator’s authority. Nevertheless, the plaintiff asserts that, despite this unrestricted submission, the award must be vacated pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator exceeded his authority.
‘‘When addressing a claim that the arbitrators have exceeded their authority and violated § 52-418 (a) (4), the court’s inquiry generally is limited to a determination as to whether the parties have vested the arbitrators with the authority to decide the issue presented or to award the relief conferred. . . . Thus, the court’s review of [a] claim that the arbitrators exceeded their authority in rendering their award is limited to a comparison between the submission and the award to see whether, in accordance with the powers conferred upon the arbitrators, their award conforms to the submission. . . . During this limited inquiry, the court is required to provide [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment . . . in favor of the award and of the arbitrators’ acts and proceedings. Hence, the burden rests on the party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate it or avoid it. . . .
‘‘Furthermore, [a]rbitration awards . . . are not to
be invalidated merely because they rest on an allegedly
erroneous interpretation or application of the relevant
collective bargaining agreement. . . . Rather, in
determining whether the arbitration award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement, the
reviewing court is limited to considering whether the
collective bargaining agreement, rather than some outside source, is the foundation on which the arbitral
decision rests. . . . If that criterion is satisfied . . .
then [the court] cannot conclude that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority or imperfectly executed his
duty. . . . Ultimately, [n]either a misapplication of
principles of contractual interpretation nor an erroneous interpretation of the agreement in question constitutes grounds for vacatur. . . . It is not [the court’s]
role to determine whether the arbitrator’s interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement was correct. It
is enough to uphold the judgment of the court, denying
the . . . application to vacate
‘‘Indeed, [b]y including an arbitration clause in their contract, the parties bargain for a decision maker that is not constrained by formalistic rules governing courtroom proceedings and dictating judicial results. . . . Put simply, the parties bargain for the arbitrator’s independent judgment and sense of justice . . . . Thus, it is only [w]hen the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to [the obligation of rendering an award that draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement], [that] courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. . . . . Finally, even if we disagree with the arbitrators’ reasoning and the bases for their award, the award nevertheless controls unless the arbitrators’ memorandum patently shows an infidelity to [their] obligation . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303- 325 v. Westbrook, 309 Conn. 767, 779–81, 75 A.3d 1 (2013).
The plaintiff’s contentions that the arbitrator exceeded his authority can be summarized into three general arguments, the first two of which concern the arbitrator’s consideration of the final warnings that the grievant previously had been given. First, the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator’s failure to give dispositive weight to these final warnings shows that he ignored the language of the collective bargaining agreement concerning the special nature of the ‘‘patient care related disciplinary infractions.’’ Second, the plaintiff argues that, by determining that the grievant’s eventual report of her suspicions was a mitigating factor to her disciplinary record, the arbitrator implicitly added a term in violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting any such change by the arbitrator. This second argument overlaps substantially with the plaintiff’s third argument, specifically, that the arbitrator, by refusing to consider the grievant’s statements in her voice messages because the plaintiff failed to investigate these statements, impermissibly added a procedural requirement that the collective bargaining agreement does not mandate.
We first note that, despite certain language to the
contrary, none of the plaintiff’s arguments truly suggests that the arbitrator’s award failed to answer the
questions submitted or answered questions beyond
those submitted.4 Rather, each of its arguments concern
the manner in which the arbitrator arrived at his conclusions. We, therefore, review these claims
‘‘[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson Wire Co. v. Winsted Brass Workers Union, 150 Conn. 546, 553, 191 A.2d 557 (1963), quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). ‘‘If, for example, there was evidence that revealed that [the arbitrator] had reached his decision by consulting a ouija board, [it would] not suffice that the award conformed to the submission. . . . It must be emphasized, however, that merely claiming inconsistency between the agreement and the award will not trigger judicial
examination of the merits of the arbitration award. Rather, in the face of such a claimed inconsistency, this court will review the award only to determine whether it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. . . . We will not, however, employ a broader standard of review simply as an alternative means for determining whether the arbitrator correctly decided the issues that were submitted to arbitration.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Teamsters Local Union No. 677 v. Board of Education, 122 Conn. App. 617, 624–25, 998 A.2d 1239 (2010).
Finally, we previously have stated that ‘‘[m]erely because an arbitral decision is not based on the express terms of a collective bargaining agreement does not mean that it is not properly derived from the agreement. An arbitrator is entitled to take cognizance of contract principles and draw on them for guidance in construing an agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Local 391, Council 4, AFSCME v. Dept. of Correction, 76 Conn. App. 15, 19, 817 A.2d 1279 (2003).
Having set forth the principles governing our analysis, we turn to the portions of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at all times relevant to this dispute.5 Article 5 of the agreement defines generally the management rights retained by the plaintiff. It provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided herein, the management and operation of the nursing [c]enter, the control of the premises and the direction of the work force are vested exclusively with [the plaintiff] and the right to manage includes, but is not limited to the right to . . . discipline, enforce work rules, suspend, [or] discharge for just cause . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Article 25 of the collective bargaining agreement
defines both the plaintiff’s general right to discipline
and discharge, certain specific restrictions on that right,
and the applicable procedures to be followed if the
plaintiff wishes to exercise that right. Section A of article 25 restates the plaintiff’s ‘‘right to discharge, suspend or discipline
Finally, article 29 provides the general structure of
any arbitration taken pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement if a grievance is not resolved pursuant to the procedures outlined in article 28. Section B of article 29 provides in relevant part: ‘‘It is the function of the Arbitrator to make and issue decisions only regarding matters expressly submitted to him or her. The Arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction to add to, modify, vary, change, or remove any terms of this Agreement.’’ Section C provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the event of an arbitration of the discharge of an Employee, the [A]rbitrator may uphold the discharge or reinstate the discharge, with or without back pay, in whole or in part, as the circumstances in his or her opinion warrant.’’
The plaintiff’s first argument concerning the arbitrator’s failure to give dispositive weight to the two ‘‘final warnings’’ that the grievant had been given is without merit. As our Supreme Court noted, ‘‘[a]lthough the arbitrator suggests that these notations [concerning final warnings] had important significance under the collective bargaining agreement, that significance is not explained in the arbitration award.’’ Burr Road, supra, 316 Conn. 622 n.2. Further, there is also no language in the collective bargaining agreement defining the role of a ‘‘final warning’’ or, as our Supreme Court pointed out, strictly requiring discharge if an infraction occurs while there is a ‘‘final warning’’ on file. See id., 651. Consequently, despite the plaintiff’s contentions that the arbitrator failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that incidents related to patient care are never expunged from an employee’s personnel files, the determination of the role and weight to be accorded to these final warnings under the collective bargaining agreement was left solely within the province of the arbitrator.6 See AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 317 Conn. 255–56 (finding that arbitrator did not exceed authority in determining off duty conduct was just cause to terminate employee when, inter alia, ‘‘collective bargaining agreement did not . . . limit just cause for dismissal to conduct on the job’’).
The plaintiff’s second and third arguments concerning the allegedly impermissible addition of terms by the
arbitrator to the collective bargaining agreement are
also without merit. We begin by noting that the term
‘‘just cause,’’ despite being used several times in the
collective bargaining agreement,7
is nowhere therein
defined
As we previously have noted, in interpreting this agreement, the arbitrator is permitted to ‘‘look for guidance from many sources’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hudson Wire Co. v. Winsted Brass Workers
Union, supra, 150 Conn. 553; and ‘‘is entitled to take cognizance of contract principles and draw on them for guidance in construing an agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Local 391, Council 4, AFSCME v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 76 Conn. App. 19. ‘‘In interpreting and construing contracts . . . [l]anguage must be given its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perkins v. Eagle Lock Co., 118 Conn. 658, 663, 174 A. 77 (1934). ‘‘Technical words in a contract will be interpreted as they are usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate, and are taken in a technical sense, unless the context of the instrument, the applicable usage, or the surrounding circumstances clearly indicates that a different meaning was intended. Technical words, including legal terms, therefore ordinarily will be given a technical meaning.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) 17A C.J.S. 301, Contracts § 408 (2011).
The term ‘‘just cause,’’ despite its relative ubiquity in
collective bargaining agreements, does not lend itself
to a single universal characterization or test. See M.
Trotta, Arbitration of Labor-Management Disputes
(1974), pp. 231, 236 (almost all collective bargaining
agreements place limitations on management’s right to
discharge through language such as, inter alia, ‘‘for just
cause,’’ but ‘‘no standards exist for defining ‘just
cause’ ’’). A common understanding of what just cause
requires in this context involves not only a determination of whether the employee committed the infraction
in question, but whether ‘‘the proven conduct constitutes sufficient grounds to support the discipline or
discharge imposed.’’ R. Abrams, Inside Arbitration: How
an Arbitrator Decides Labor and Employment Cases
(2013), § 10.IV.3, pp. 208–209; accord The Common Law
of the Workplace: The Views of Arbitrators (T. St.
Antoine ed., 1998) § 6.7, comment (a), p. 172 (‘‘[t]he
concept of ‘just cause’ implies not only that the
employer have a ‘cause’ for disciplining the employee,
but also that the discipline be ‘just’ in relation to the
asserted cause’’). Pursuant to this understanding, several treatises on arbitration have noted that the concept
of just cause to impose a particular type of discipline
may involve both an evaluation of any mitigating circumstances8 and
As recognized by our Supreme Court, parties to a collective bargaining agreement may impose limitations as to what an arbitrator may consider in determining whether just cause exists. State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, 309 Conn. 519, 533 n.10, 69 A.3d 927 (2013).10 Absent such restrictions, however, it has refused to vacate an award where the arbitrator had determined that the party engaged in the alleged conduct, but found the punishment unjust. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Amalgamated Local 405, 140 Conn.
32, 38, 97 A.2d 898 (1953) (‘‘Even though [the employee] had been insubordinate, it did not necessarily follow that he should have been discharged. There was still the question whether his insubordination was of such a nature as to constitute ‘just cause’ for his discharge.’’); cf. Burr Road, supra, 316 Conn. 638 (courts must ‘‘defer . . . to the arbitrator’s ultimate determination whether termination was a just or appropriate punishment for the conduct at issue’’ in evaluating egregiousness factor of public policy review).11
Finally, we note that the courts of this state repeatedly have upheld awards as drawing their essence from the collective bargaining agreement, despite the presence of provisions that limit an arbitrator’s ability to add, delete, or modify the express terms of the agreement, when the arbitrator’s analysis shows that the award found its genesis in the provisions of the agreement rather than some outside source. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 173 Conn. 287, 292–94 and nn. 2 and 3, 377 A.2d 323 (1977); New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 106 Conn. App. 691, 699–700, 943 A.2d 494 (2008); Board of Education v. Civil Service Employees Affiliates, Local 760, 88 Conn. App. 559, 560–61, 570–71, 870 A.2d 473 (2005).
In support of its latter two arguments, the plaintiff
places great emphasis on Danbury v. Teamsters Local
677, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury,
Docket No. CV-98-0144861-S (May 7, 1998) (22 Conn.
L. Rptr. 249), and certain cases cited therein, to demonstrate that the arbitrator impermissibly
mitigating circumstances or refusing to consider certain alleged admissions by the grievant because they were not independently investigated. Neither the analysis in Danbury12 nor the appellate authority on which it relies, however, compels the result that the plaintiff seeks. Even assuming that the court’s decision in Danbury was correct, the situation here is distinguishable in that the arbitrator was both within his authority under the submission13 and arguably interpreting a term in the collective bargaining agreement rather than adding a wholly new term. See id., 251 (vacating award reinstating employee because no express requirement of warning prior to discharge for insubordination within agreement and arbitrators relied on general arbitral practice rather than pointing to any specific terms of agreement). Further, both of the cases discussed in Danbury are also distinguishable for similar reasons.14
Here, the parties sought a determination whether the
grievant had been terminated for just cause, and if not,
what the remedy should be. To answer this question,
the arbitrator was required to determine
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
sion. See, e.g., Brantley v. New Haven, 100 Conn. App. 853, 865–67, 920 A.2d 331 (2007) (upholding award made pursuant to similar submission that found employer lacked just cause to terminate employee, but had sufficient cause to impose eight month suspension); see also Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 584, 519 A.2d 1 (1986) (award finding that plaintiff city had violated collective bargaining agreement and ordering remedial payments ‘‘was dispositive of the dispute the parties had submitted to the [arbitrators]’’).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, 309 Conn. 533 n.10.
because their award included matters outside the submission, namely the arbitrators’ noncontractual reasons for denying the grievance’’ [emphasis in original]).