Belinda Burog-Perez, a native of the Philippines, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to remand to permit her to file an asylum application. Ms. Burog argues that she faced persecution in the Philippines on account of her status as a lesbian and that she has a well-founded fear of such persecution should she be forced to return.
We are constrained by the immigration laws and our precedent to deny the petition. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we recount them only as necessary to explain our decision.
I.
A denial of a motion to remand is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Castillo-Perez v. INS,
II.
The BIA may, as it did here, deny a motion to remand or reopen because the alien has not established a prima facie case of eligibility for the underlying relief sought. See Ordonez v. INS,
A.
Past persecution is defined as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.” Singh v. INS,
The mistreatment described by Ms. Burog, while reprehensible, does not rise to the level of persecution as defined by the immigration laws. See Fisher v. INS,
Specifically, Ms. Burog’s allegation that her patients left her dentistry practice because of her sexual orientation does not meet the standard for economic persecution under our case law. When persecution based on purely economic harm is alleged, we have required a showing of “a probability of deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage.” Baballah v. Ashcroft,
We are unable to conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in determining that Ms. Burog did not made a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum based on past persecution.
B.
To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear of future persecution in the absence of past persecution, Ms. Burog must demonstrate that her fear of persecution is both “subjectively [genuine] and objectively reasonable.” Hoxha v. Ashcroft,
Ms. Burog asserts that should she return to the Philippines, she would not be able to find a job given her appearance as a lesbian. As discussed above, Ms. Burog alleges that her dental practice declined when her clients left for discriminatory reasons. The only other specific evidence advanced by Ms. Burog to support her fear of economic persecution consists of documentary evidence that homosexuals are not permitted to serve in the military and that homosexuals are sometimes steered toward professions such as hairdressing. These circumstances, while unjust, do not rise to the level of economic persecution nor support a reasonable fear of persecution on the part of Ms. Burog. See Nagoulko,
Ms. Burog has submitted a variety of other evidence documenting the mistreatment of homosexuals in the Philippines that she contends demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution based on a “pattern or practice” of persecution. In extreme cases where persecution is widespread, see Hoxha,
In addition to the evidence regarding military service and employment discussed above, Ms. Burog’s evidence includes reports that gay men employed by the city of Manila are prohibited from wearing female clothing and make-up and groups of gay men congregating in public places in Manila may be harassed by the police. Ms. Burog also offers reports from the Maguindanao province in the southern Philippines that Muslim and paramilitary leaders had banned homosexuals from certain towns and threatened them with physical harm in the mid-1990s.
This evidence, while disturbing, does not raise a reasonable likelihood that there is a widespread pattern or practice of persecution against individuals similarly situated to Ms. Burog. Enforcement of discriminatory dress and conduct rules does not rise to the level of persecution. See Fisher,
III.
Ms. Burog also argues that her motion to remand should have been granted because she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her former attorney faded to timely file an asylum application. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Burog’s motion on this basis, however, because she is unable to demonstrate prejudice from her attorney’s ineffectiveness. See Rodriguez-Lariz,
IV.
Finally, the parties agree that Ms. Burog’s voluntary departure period is stayed during the pendency of her petition for review. The stay wdl expire upon issuance of the mandate.
PETITION DENIED.
Notes
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.