Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company appeals from the judgment entered against it and in favor of appellees, David and Diane Burns, by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.
Appellee David Burns ingested glass particles contained in a bottle of Pepsi-Cola soft drink purchased from a lunch *574 truck at his place of work on June 22, 1981. Appellee was hospitalized on several occasions subsequent to this incident because of medical problems which developed from the passage оf the glass particles through his digestive system, including gastrointestinal pain and rectal bleeding. He was later treated by a psychologist for symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.
Appellees instituted the instant action seeking recovery for the physical and psychological injuries sustained by David arising from the glass ingestion incident and for Diane’s loss of consortium. The jury awarded damages to David Burns in the amount of $8,662.35 for medical expenses, $644.00 for lost wages, and $15,000.00 for pain and suffering. Diane Burns received $15,000.00 for loss of consortium.
Appellant timely filed this appeal to our court. It presents five issues 1 for appellate review. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties and the pertinent caselaw, we conclude that appellant’s issues threе,’ four, and five have been succinctly and accurately addressed by Judge Leonard B. Sokolove in his opinion dated *575 June 11, 1985, and require no further elaboration here. We therefore address only appellant’s remaining issues below.
Initially, we turn to appellant’s first issue. Appellant here argues that a new trial or remittitur is warranted because the trial court improperly excluded evidence of appellee Diane Burns’ heroin addiction and an alleged extramarital affair as not relevant to her loss of consortium claim. In the alternative, appellant contends that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to award a new trial or remittitur below, in light of an excessive jury award for Diane’s loss of consortium. We cannot, however, discern any merit in either argument.
First, with regard to appellant’s primary argument regarding the exclusion of evidence of Diane Burns’ drug use and alleged extra-marital affair, we must agree with the trial court that this evidence was irrelevant to disproving appellee’s loss of cоnsortium claim.
In this Commonwealth, loss of consortium has been recognized as a
right growing out of the marriage relationship which the husband and wife have respectively to the society, companionship and affection of each other in their life together. As thus defined and limited, any interference with this right of consortium by the negligent injury to one spouse, should afford the other spouse a legal cause of action to recover damages for that interference.
Leo v. Bottman,
It is clear from the above, that a сonsortium claim is grounded on the loss of a spouse’s services after injury. In calculating the extent of the deprivation to the spouse claiming loss of consortium and disruption to the family life caused by the loss of those services normally performed by the injurеd spouse, certainly the parties’ interpersonal relationships and the state of their marriage immediately before the injury is helpful in calculating any loss sustained after it, and is therefore relevant. In the instant case, however, Diane Burns’ earlier drug deрendency, which was no longer a source of tension in the marriage, was not relevant to the issue of what services she lost from David after his injury. As found by the trial judge, inferences that Diane Burns engaged in drug use would go only toward proving her character, which was not, a concern in determining what loss of consortium she suffered.
Similarly, Diane Burns’ alleged 1978 extra-marital affair was irrelevant as too remote in time to David’s injury to possibly prove that marital problems existed immediately before the glass ingestion incident. The alleged “affair” was based on David Burns’ statement contained in Eugenia Hospital records that he had found his wife in bed with another man on a single occasion fully three years before his injury. Since appellant could not show how this alleged incident, significantly removed in timе from the date of David Burns’ injury, would possibly diminish Diane’s loss of his services, we do not believe the trial judge improperly excluded that evidence. Nor do we accept appellant’s “back-door” argument that evidence of the alleged indiscretion shоuld have been admitted for the limited purpose of *577 impeachment. 2 We therefore find appellant’s primary argument in support of its first issue to be wholly without merit.
We are also compelled to dismiss its alternative argument that the jury’s verdict for loss of consortium was excessive. In evaluating an argument that a verdict is excessive, it is clear that each case is to be decided accordingly to its unique facts and circumstances.
Fretts v. Pavetti,
Being mindful of these guidelines, we can find no grounds for the grant of a new trial or remittitur based upon the verdict rendered in the instant case. Consortium is an element of damages which has no market value and the amount to be awarded for its loss is particularly for the common sense and sound judgment of the jury.
See Mueller v. Brandon,
In the instant case, appellee David Burns presented compelling testimony as to the severe negative effects the glass ingestion incident had upon his marriage. He testified to the changes which occurred in the couple’s previously happy marital relationship because of his mood swings, idiosyncratic eating habits, and refusal to have sexual relations with Diane for a year after the incident. N.T. 97-103, 9/22/83. He further testified to the significant disruption his condition caused with regard to his inability to assist Diane with co-parenting their young child. N.T. 99-100, 9/22/83.
Appellant argues that appellee Diane Burns’ recovery was nonetheless unsupported by the evidence since she did not testify at trial.
3
Appellant, however, does not cite any authority to support this assertion and our own research has not revealed any legal precedent to that effect in this jurisdiction. While it is true that in most cases the spouse seeking damages for loss of consortium has in fact testified, there is no language in any of those cases which we have reviewed which mandates that he or she do so.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Ensign,
*579
Furthermore, this court has permitted a verdict for loss of consortium to stand, absent the testimony of the wife-claimant in
Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., supra,
where the jury awarded $150,000 to the wife for loss of consortium, apparently based only on the testimony of her husband and their daughter.
Id.
We now turn to appellant’s second issue regarding the lower сourt’s failure to instruct the jury with the requested maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,” i.e., if a witness fully and corruptly swears falsely to any material fact in a case, the jury may disregard all of that witness’ testimony.
See Luckenbach v. Egan,
It may be said, once for all, thаt the maxim is in itself worthless; — first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what thеy may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also a practice pernicious, first because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1009 at 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
Commonwealth v. Levenson,
*580
The propriety and necessity of giving the instruction has been repeatedly questioned by our court in criminal cases.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maute,
The maxim has been limited, qualified, criticized, and, in a sense, rejected by both authors and courts, so that what remains might be stated thus: When a fact finding body concludes that a witness has deliberately falsified in his testimony on a material point this should be taken into cоnsideration, along with many other tests, in determining what credence should be given to the balance of his testimony.
See also Commonwealth v. Padgett,
In the instant case, the trial court cоuld properly find that the instruction was irrelevant,
see
Lower ct. op. at 15, because there was no indication of deliberate falsehood by any of appellees’ witnesses.
See Commonwealth v. Maute, supra.
Before the maxim is applicable, the falsehood must be “wilful and corrupt” rather than mere contradiction or self-contradiction.
See Commonwealth v. Parente, supra,
184 Pa.Super at 131,
Whether the jury should be instructed оn a given point of law depends upon the facts and the issues in the case,
Ferrick Excavating and Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co.,
Therefore, for the reasons еnumerated above, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. Those issues are as follows:
1. Is a new trial or remittitur mandated where the trial court erroneously held that evidence of a spouse’s heroin addiction and extra marital affair was not relevant to the parties’ loss of сonsortium claims?
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it failed to charge the jury concerning willful falsehood when the plaintiff-husband’s lack of veracity was demonstrated to the jury on more than one occasion?
3. Did the trial court commit reversible еrror when it refused defendant’s requested instructions that the jury be told they should not allow sympathy to enter into their deliberations?
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it limited the scope of the defendant’s cross-examination, made inconsistent evidentiаry rulings and refused to allow defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff’s expert concerning medical records he earlier testified that he relied on in forming his opinion?
5. Is a new trial mandated where the trial court erroneously charged the jury concerning damages for future pain and suffering when no evidence was presented to support such a charge?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
. David Burns’ statement that he had found his wife in bed with another man in an isolated incident did not actually conflict with his later statement at trial that he only "assumed" his wife was having a continuing extra-marital affair with “somebody else." N.T. 96, 9/22/83. Moreover, the truth or falsity of the former statement, as noted by the trial court, "would be extremely difficult to ascertain.” Lower ct. op. at 13.
. Diane Burns was apparently scheduled to testify as a fact witness, see N.T. 163, 9/27/83, but was not called.