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Burns v. Exxon Corporation
158 F.3d 336
5th Cir.
1998
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*3 (1) оn gas upon based of the 1/8 KING, PARKER, Before SMITH and wells; gas market value of the residue Judges. Circuit gas volumes used in manu- gasoline facture of plant products or other PARKER, M. Judge: ROBERT Circuit upon gas based of the market value of the 1/8 Plaintiffs-appellants plain- and intervenor processing. at the well before The McGills (“the McGills”) tiffs-appellants appeal from were not entitled to receive grant the district court’s of two sum- upon processed plant prod- mary judgments subsequent, and a final ucts. take-nothing judgment thereon in favor of royalty provisions The aрpellee, Corporation. Additionally, Exxon Processing Agreement supersede royalty the McGills contend that the district court provisions of the McGill leases to the extent refusing compel abused its discretion in that the two in are conflict. The produce Exxon to certain documents and also provides separate royalty terms for denying in supple- McGills leave to file a and residue In determining complaint. mental For following rea- royalty paid agree- on residue sons, we affirm. provides: Background I. History and Procedural price рer The Mcf at which the shall be valued in each instance shall be the The McGills are interest owners price per Mcf during applica- received under two oil and executed accounting period ble for sold at the Oil). (formerly Exxon Humble The oil and discharge plant. side In the event gas leases include a 1935 lease discharge is not sold at the side of 30,000 covering lease more than acres land but instead is taken into Hum- Brooks, in Hidalgo, Hogg, Jim and Starr ble’s transmission facilities for market- Counties, (hereinafter Texas “the McGill ing side, in an area removed from the leases”). Until un- McGill leases shall be valued at the fair questionably governed royalties paid (3)27 added). (emphasis value. 20, 1960, however, the McGills. On June royalty pro- McGills and Exxon amended the Fair market value is greater defined as the visions of require pay- the McGill leases to price of Exxon’s field specified royalties ment of on residue Exxon major purchasers, sells plant products pro- extracted from weighted average price paid and the in Texas gas processing plant cessed at a then under Railroad Commission District 4. construction, Gas Processing Agreement (hereinafter “the Processing royalty provisions amended of the McGill Agreement”). period twenty year leases for a of at least a royalty provisions of the two McGill gave term right leases are provide pertinent identical and receive based on of the value of part: processed plant products. The term of (b) royalties paid by the lessee are ... began on the date the

on gas, including casinghead gas placed operation or other Ranch Plant was against The McGills filed suit until termination thereafter continued underpayment royalties. 1985 for Termination could vided in court, but originally suit was filed state party the end of by any after triggered to federal court based diver- notice removed year by giving written the nineteenth December, 1986, sity citizenship. In intent to terminate. party of the the other compel production a motion to as to the McGills filed effective became The termination Granberry, a reviewed R.C. of documents year after notice. party one terminating preparation employee, former Exxоn Furthermore, right to “limit Exxon had the deposition. May In his curtail, entirely, its or recommence cease compel. motion to (or court denied the In any portion of operations interim, Granberry Mr. had died. operations).” such parties filed a Joint January processed until From 1960 *4 containing parties agree- Pretrial Order prod- liquid plant gas, fractionated ments, In stipulations. No- admissions and ucts, gas liquid the residue and sold vember, 1991, Exxon two motions for filed Plant. King Ranch Gas products at the plant summary judgment on the two main partial gas from years, five the residue For these urging the court to hold: issues in case higher was sold the McGill leases the market value clauses of that under market. intrastate unregulated priced leases, the market value the McGill however, 29, 1965, Exxon en- January On in- regulated residue was limited to contract an interstate sales tered into sold; in which the terstate market (“Trunkline”).1 Company Trunkline Gas with Processing King Ranch obligated Exxon Trunkline The contract applicable to and controlled j. from the McGill’s all induced to deliver plant prod- liquid payments In twenty years. period a property for produced on from the ucts manufactured commingling of sold prevent the order to Weakley and as to the McGillleases markets, and interstate in the intrastate January Enyart 1977 to December 1981 from gas produced all which would all plaintiffs for times and as to other all controls, pricing Plant to federal King Ranch 1992, September action. relevant to this separate gas processing a Exxon constructed summary for filed cross-motions McGills Plant, process gas from Kelsey facility, the issues.” judgment identical “on Kelsey Plant properties. The the McGill after the on the McGill lease was constructed ‍‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‍1994, 10, On March lease and granted Exxon a surface summary partial motion for granted Exxon’s pipeline. for right-of-way a Trunkline ruling that the “market value judgment, 1988, April 1966 until September From the McGill leases was limited the well” under Kelsey gas was sold at the residue McGill’s calculating royalties prices when commerce, in interstate Plant for distribution 11, 1995, April the dis- On on residue transported liquids were extracted and the second motion Exxon’s granted trict court Plant where by pipeline to ruling judgment, that the summary prod- into liquids fractionated Agreement, and Processing times, liquid relevant ucts. At all roy- payment of governed the McGill only at sold were fractionated and plant products. liquid on alties or were King Ranch tailgate 1995, sought 27, leave the McGills Kelsey June On Exxon. Since taken used complaint. The dis- 1988, supplemental to file a gas produced on the Plant closed 29, leave on December court denied transported to the trict been leases has no other issues finding that disposi- 1995. After Plant for King Ranch final remained, court rendered plant liquids. gas and tion of the residue both dedicated to rеmained Act. The Natural Gas and Trunk- the contract between Exxon 1. After Energy the Federal 1965, until interstate commerce from the McGill line in permanent granted Regulatory Commission dedicated to interstate commerce became 1, 1987. of December abandonment as under the subject to federal limitations 340 6,

judgment July (5th favor of on Pipeline 1997. Gas F.2d 789 1157 Cir.1986) appeal Stine, This (citing followed. Lone Star Gas v.Co. (Tex.

41 App.1931)). S.W.2d Comm’n Therefore, II. The March contends the Partial Processing Agreement controls the Summary Judgment calcula tion of liquid plant products. pоint appeal The McGills’ first is agree contentions, We with Exxon’s and thus that the in granting district court erred Exx hold that liquids the fractionation of is partial summary on’s first judg motion of “gas processing operations” within the holding ment and that the Ranch Pro meaning of cessing Agreement governed payment dispute simplified plant products. We re one of interpretation contract view a trial court’s granting order —does agreement permit the sale of judgment Landry de novo. See Kelsey Int’l, Plant and the fractionation of Air Line Pilots Ass’n F.2d (5th Cir.1990). products at Ranch Plant. Summary judgment is “Whethеr a written agreement ambiguous appropriate genuine where there is no issue clearly or whether it demonstrates the intent any as to material fact moving party and the parties question is a of law.” Shelton judgment is entitled to as a matter of law. Corp., v. Exxon Cir. 56(c). See Fed.R.Civ.P. *5 1991). agreement This unambiguous is —it argue The McGills royalty applies any gas produced from the McGill leases, of the McGill not provisions King and may leases which be processed King at the Processing Agreement, Ranch should have Ranch Plant. If a unambiguous, contract is royalties been used to calculate gas pro construction of the question contract is a of duced from McGill land. The King Ranch law for the court to Browning decide. See v. Agreement applicable it is any gas states “to Navarro, 1069, (5th Cir.1984); 743 F.2d 1080 produced may [from leases] McGill Payne, 102, Brown v. 142 Tex. 176 S.W.2d processed in [King plant.” Ranch] (Tex.1943). primary Our concern is during contend that the rele give effect to the true intentions of the period, gas vant from the McGill leaseholds parties expressed in the agree written being processed only Kelsey at the Plant ment. Corp. See Deauville v. Federated De liquids, and the fractionation of and not partment Stores, Inc., 1183, 756 F.2d processing occurring at the (5th Cir.1985); Lenape Corp. Resources v. King Ranch Plant. stopped Exxon Once Pipeline Tennessee Gas 925 S.W.2d shipping any of types the three listed (Tex.1996). ambiguity, Absent the writ King in Article III Processing of the Ranch ing alone will be express deemed to Agreement from the McGill leases parties, objective intention of the intent Plant, King Ranch argue the McGills that the subjective rather than intent controls. See King Ranch Processing Agreement ceased to (Del.) Sun Madeley, Oil Co. 626 S.W.2d payment thus, royalties, (Tex.1981). point The McGills ato royalty terms reverted those “smoking gun” so-called memorandum Exxon, however, McGill leases.2 argues that by O’Neal, written B.D. engineer, an Exxon “gas processing” continued at King Barton, to H.B. gas opera head Exxon Ranch Plant because fractionation tions, as evidence that Exxon knew King of the processing procedure, and Agreement Ranch was void. the memo law, “gas” under Texas randum, includes all constitu opines O’Neal that when Exxon elements, including liquid ‍‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‍hydrocarbons ent ceased at the Plant, recovered therefrom. Sowell v. See Natural Ranch agreement be- 2. Article Processing Agree- III of the plant of which will be into the taken without provides, pertinent ment part: (2) separation; non-associated or associat- separa- It is ed tion; understood that there will or taken into after lease be three types gas entering plant: casinghead gas gas produced non-associ- ated or associated the full well stream with oil. April 1995 Partial III. The may- the memorandum While came void. Judgment Summary part of understanding on the an evidence the status management of senior , point appeal Exxon is wheth- next The McGills’ the con- after Agreement Exx- granting court erred er the district Plant, Kelsey summary judgment the memo partial of the struction on’s motion royalties of the holding that the residue with construction the court assist market the fair should be determined The memorandum would interstate market. sold on agreement construing the helpful in only be of a district the order Again, we review the face of ambiguity on if there was judgment novo. de granting enforce We must therefore document. Landry, at 901-F.2d See as written. agreement Processing Agree- King Ranch Under express terms Because ment, gas processed royalties on residue that its state be “valued King Ranch Plant would earlier supersede visions will value,” by three determined the fair on all resi- royalties governs the agreement agreement.3 different formulas products processed liquid gas and due applies, that if the argue McGills II, the In Article Plant. King Ranch agree- have used the Exxon should then King Ranch that-the states their residue to calculate from the McGill gather gas was built royal- McGills рaid While Railroad Com- other leases leases products liquid ties on process and market and to Agreement, mission District Processing King Ranch liquefiable and the on residue paid II terms Article therefrom. “market value well” recovered under the “in its based on discretion provides that Exxon of the McGill further *6 that-if contend curtail, entirely, gas. recom- prices or may limit or cease the (or uniformly applied any Exxon had operations gas processing mence its liq- Processing Agreement to both Ranch agree- This operations).” such portion оf residue, would gas, then Exxon uids and Exxon the flexi- grants unambiguously the pay the McGills required to have been por- cease, any recommence limit or bility to gas. price for residue higher intrastate the operations at gas tion of its royalty provisions the counters that Exxon necessarily This would Plant. King Ranch payment of the McGill processing of ability to cease include on the gas based royalties on residue Plant. There- gas at the Ranch residue processed nor gas neither was fact that .the pro- to fore, made the decision when Plant. King sold аt Plant, Kelsey gas at the residue cess with at the rather than Process King Ranch Article V the merely taking was gas components, it other agreement that the provides ing Agreement express provision in advantage only of an ... supersede leases] the [McGill “shall Likewise, Exxon main- extent, provisions [the because that to the portion at least provisions at all times tained are in conflict leases] Plant, Therefore, not we King Ranch do matters agreement.” duction at royal- that to be will McGills’contention revert agree by with the covered to the by back McGill leases. governed terms had reverted ty payment ing ap expressly provisions Consequently, agreement’s McGill leases. processed judg- that are products by granting ply not err court did Plant. Because King Ranch sold at holding that ment and and sold processed gas was residue liquid plant McGill’s governed royalties entered even and never Kelsey Plant Plant. King Ranch processed price paid chasers, average weighted or the value provides fair market III 3. Article District greater of Exxon’s field as the Railroad Commission defined the Texas would be price pur- major price to gas, Exxon's sales Plant, (5th it fall Cir.1980). would outside F.2d As this court the terms of the would held in Phillips Bowers Petroleum governed by original instead McGill leas- market royalty purposes value for cannot es. exceed the maximum ceiling price imposed gas particular within that federally By gas royalty provisions virtue of the regulated category. 692 F.2d the governing McGill Cir.1982). Consequently, the “market value royalties will by be determined the market provision the well” in the McGill leases value at the well. The McGills contend that would be comparable determined inter if Exxon obligated pay royalties state sales because the that Exxon sold provision the market value of the McGill to Trunkline became dedicated to the feder leases, then the intrastate market value of ally regulated interstate market. should have been because an used intrastate market always was available in attempt to distinguish Weath- which to sell the it Because dedi- Middleton arguing that alter- erford market, cated to the interstate Exxon argues native markets were available at the time that the fair market cannot Exxon dedicated to the interstate federally exceed regulated its price. The market. Nothing in or Middle- Weatherford ton, held that court became any dedi- nor of the other suggest cases cated to interstate commerce and the results any would have been different federal ceilings because the had an alternative intrastate market been Exxon sold to Trunkline was sold in inter- producer available to the time the review, state commerce. In our we must was committed an interstate contract. address the McGills’ availability contention the fair The of an intrastate market intrastate, market value of and not inter- which plaintiffs’ to sell the gas relates to state, gas should be used an because intra- whether Exxon imprudently marketed the state market which to sell the residue and does not affect the McGills’claim of always available to Exxon. improper determination of market value.4 Therefore, because the existence of an alter- agree We with the district court’s native intrastate market change does not analysis of law, this issue. Under Texas result that interstate compara- sales are not determine the market value of ble to intrastate sales when determining should be valued as though it is free and value, we hold that trial available for sale. See Corp. v. Mid *7 was correct in granting par- Exxon’s second dleton, 240, (Tex.1981). 613 S.W.2d 246 Mar tial summary judgment. ket may be using calculated compara sales, ble which are those of which sales IV. Compel Motion to Plaintiffs comparable time, are in quantity, quality, The McGills next assert that the dis availability marketing of outlets. See id. trict court failing produc еrred to order Comparable quality physical includes both tion of documents that a former Exxon em legal characteristics. See id. To deter ployee used to refresh his recollection in legal mine quality, the court must consider preparation for deposition. his We review a whether the regulated is sold in a or district court’s overruling order a motion to market, unregulated or in particular one cat compel for abuse of discretion. See Scott v. egory regulated of a market. See id. “In Co., (5th 786, Monsanto 868 F.2d 793 Cir. trastate and interstate prices are not 1989). comparable [legal] quality.” 248; Id. at see also First Nat’l. Bank in v. The McGills contend that Granberry, R.C. Weatherford Corp., (Tex. 80, 622 S.W.2d 81-82 Exxon, a witness for used certain documents 1981); Kingery Co., v. Continental Oil 626 to refresh his recollection in preparation for 4. 595, (5th McGills have made Cir.1991); no that claim com- 602 Danciger v. Powell Oil & market, mitting to the Refining 493, (Tex.Civ. 134 S.W.2d 499 implied duty Worth, breached its ‍‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‍prudently rev’d, App. 1939), 137 Tex. —Fort Corp., See Shelton (Tex.1941). v. Exxon 921 F.2d 154 S.W.2d 632 that the documents had lit- determining plaintiffs requested deposition. his 1985 of to the matter tle or relation purpose questioning no dоcuments refused, Granberry’s testimony. claiming the witness, but Exxon attorney- protected documents Supplemental Complaint prod- attorney V. work privilege and client Plaintiffs McGills, however, contend uct doctrine. Next, the McGills claim the district discovery immunity from Exxon waived that denying to file a them leave court erred privilege and the attorney-client complaint. We review dis supplemental by making the product doctrine docu-. work supple a of leave to file trict court’s denial In December the witness. available to ments for abuse of discrеtion. complaint mental compel. filed a motion the McGills Sys., Lowrey A M v. Texas & Univ. See review, court camera After an Cir.1997). (5th F.3d compel pro- motion to plaintiffs’ denied the after the district court On June after “Granberry documents” duction of motions granted both Exxon’s had (1) the following conclusions: reaching the summary judgment, McGills filed bearing on absolutely no “have documents supplemental to file for leave a motion judgment] on [partial the court’s 15(d) Rule of the Federal complaint under issue”; a few the ‘market value’ district court Procedure. The Rules Civil аn “to have even appeared the documents com- for leave without motion denied the Agree- ‘Processing to the arguable relation ment. issue”; withholding of the doc- ment’ moot, was harmless uments 15(d), Rule Under plaintiffs already available to information plead supplemental permit a to file a party interpreta- the court’s open record occurrences transactions or ing setting forth Processing Agreement. tion of the happened have since or' events supple pleading sought to be date of the Federal Rulе Under 15(d). The See Fed.R.Civ.P. mented. Evidence, writ if witness a a uses Rules of show, in its either have failed testifying, memory before ing to refresh his district court compel filed motion compel the authorized to the trial court is court, any filed with this that in its briefs writing “if the court deter production tran or event has or occurrence transaction jus necessary in the interests of mines it is they filed their years ten since spired in the in most As discov Fed.R.Evid. tice.” cite to sev complaint. The McGills original matters, court has broad ery holding that leave to amend should cases eral in an only be reversed and should discretion 15(a).5 under Rule While freely granted O’Malley exceptional case. See unusual and 15(a) provides leave text Rule Co., Fidelity & Guar. States United of Rule freely granted, text should be Cir.1985). 15(d) 15(d) Rule similarly provide. they a have ‍‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‍substan failed to show have may permit supple the court is clear that produc or that for the documents tial need *8 changed cir setting forth pleading mental justice. necessary in the interests of tion was Here, changed nothing has cumstances. contain that the documents party If a claims motions granting of Exxоn’s except for the matter to matters not related was summary judgment, the court partial for court 612 authorizes the testimony, Rule supple deny its discretion leave within inspection refuse to make an in camera ment. re so production of documents not to order Consequent R. Evid. lated. See Fed. Judgment Final VI. its well within discretion ly, was argue that the district Finally, the McGills docu production refuse to order judgment by rendering final camera inspection court erred making an in ments after freely give when party; shall 15(a) and leave be pertinent part: verse provides "[A] in 5. Rule 15(a). only by party’s pleading requires.” Fed. R. P. may justice party so Civ. amend by the ad- written consent of of court or leave the entire ease when alleg- additional issues holding that King Ranch Processing edly remained (the unresolved. Agreement “Agreement”), rather than leases, governed liq- The McGills contend that the two motions plant products. uid partial summary judgment did not re- case, solve all therefore, the issues in the original McGill leases provided more should not have served as a basis for final favorable treatment judgment. The argue McGills fol- than did Agreement. lowing (1) three claims remain unresolved: argue McGills that those and not the that after when the McGill’s was no Agreement, should liquids longer legally required to be dedicated to the separated are from the residue at.the markets, pay Exxon failed to roy- Kelsey plant but fractionated at King alties the best available plant. Ranch I agree. (2) gas; that even if the King Ranch Agreement applies by its terms to - Processing Agreement applies, “any produced [from the McGill leases] duty breached its may which processed be [King Ranch] liquids proсessed King prudent- plant.” The (1) argument is twofold: McGills’ ly faith; (3) and in good None of “gas” processed Ranch Processing Agreement terminated plant; all processed that was when the McGills filed this lawsuit. After (2) liquids; what was supplemental filed a brief done Ranch was not “processing,” describing court the issues which but “fractionating.” I compelling find a vari- they unresolved, believe remain the court ant on “gas” argument: An examination ruled that the first two “unresolved issues” Agreement shows that it did not Í0, foreclosed the March or vide for the liquids treatment of sent to the April 1995 orders granting partial sum- plant only for fractionation. mary judgment, and third “unresolved issue” was not raised until after the district The McGills point language granted Exxon’s second motion stating that “there orwill for summary judgment. types of gas (1) three entering the plant:” full well stream gas that has been run agree. We The first two claims are indeed through separator lease, foreclosed the orders granting summary casing head footnote, In a the majority judgment. The third issue —the termination quotes this passage but not deal with it of the King Ranch Processing Agreement in any way. contrary, To the I believe the upon filing of this suit was never raised passage dispositive issue, is for, on this obvi- by the either McGills in the Consolidated ously, liquids from the McGill leases that Appeal, joint Amended pretrial order, entered the were not any of the three response to Exxon’s motions for summary types contemplated lease. judgment. The first time the plead- this theory ed was in their Motion for Leave Exxon, turn, points to caselaw that to File Supplemental Complaint. -Because “gas” holds to include all component the district court did abuse its discretion parts of that which comes оut of the well. in denying leave to file supplemental See Sowell v. Pipeline Co., Natural Gas complaint, it was therefore not error for the 1986). Cir. Neither court to decline to address the merits Sowell nor upon based, the case it argument. Stine, Lone Star Gas Co. 41 S.W.2d (Tex. Comm’n App. judgment adopted), Therefore, for reasons, the foregoing we *9 provides unmitigated the support that Exxon AFFIRM. to assign

seems to it. SMITH, JERRY E. Judge, Circuit The leases at issue in specifically Sowell concurring part dissenting and part: provided royalties on “sulfur-free I respectfully part dissent from II produced of the Sowell, its'natural state." See majority opinion. That added). the affirms at (emphasis There- gas, of sorts different treating the system for roy- claim not could fore, royalty owners the prod not address system that does liquid of value separate upon the based alties scheme upon overall the Finally, uct. downstream that condensed hydrocarbons treat better gives Agreement of lease. Under located meters from —which liquid contain more that products trig- that production “it is agreement, that say that this difficult hydrocarbons аs Id. royalty obligation.” gers —it hy liquid of purely which consists product, state” —included its “natural produced —in unfavorably in form, drocarbons, be treated should so gaseous hydrocarbons those only on done. way has- compensated royalty owners form. Sowell gaseous of basis of the treatment ‍‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‍to shoehorn tries always includes “gas” hold that not did that agreement into an hydrocarbons liquid by the limited it was rather products; all not, by its structure by its terms that stating at issue the lease of provisions Agree- cannot, substances. those cover natu- “in its on be based would fractionаtion ment cannot ral state.” major- While hydrocarbons. these specifically contem- Here, Agreement ease for logical fair and a ity has fashioned hydro- manifestations insuffi- has, given the various has plated I it it believe ruling as levels compensation set provisions I molecules carbon contract cient attention plant royalties on provided that, It on this accordingly. Concluding have discussed. value- otherwise, other propane, issue, products butane, should the result specific — were ex- Those but con- products. issue addеd that respectfully dissent I state in plicitly opinion. based' of the in the remainder cur Thus, plant. arrived gas deliv- from are “extracted products that separation prior plant without ered on 100% be based shall from

liquids products plant of the plant of the hand, other On the gas.” to such allocated arrived that has been' delivery to the “prior to that lease,” the separator1 through a run America, STATES UNITED a upon only third be based royalty would Plaintiff-Appellee, actually produced of the less gas. that from CORPORA AMERICAN CHROMALLOY specifically contem- Thus, Agreement as Wool formerly doing business TION, stream, containing all well the full that plated Sequa Manufacturing ley & Tool than more valuable much liquids, Defendants-Appellants. Corporation, liquids some plant with arrived Sowell, missing. Unlike No. 97-50818. “gas” treat here did Appeals, Court States United full component parts including all Circuit. Fifth stream. well impor more Furthermore, perhaps 4, 1998. Nov. unambiguous specific and is the tantly, there must we to which Agreement language to cov purports Agreement

give effect. types do types specific three

er More here. at issue product

not include two-tier establishes

over, completely re- plant that fide,processing a bona liquids from some separator removes A1. all that so liquids from moved incompletely. The does so but head stream well was residue was left a'separator, merely but Kelsey plant was not

Case Details

Case Name: Burns v. Exxon Corporation
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 10, 1998
Citation: 158 F.3d 336
Docket Number: 97-41023
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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