106 Kan. 461 | Kan. | 1920
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The action was one 'against an employer for damages sustained by an employee as the result of personal injury negligently inflicted. The sole ground of negligence pleaded was that the defendant failed to furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work. The plaintiff recovered, and the defendant appeals.
The plaintiff was a tool dresser at the defendant’s oi'l-drilling rig. The engine house was south of the derrick, and the two structures were connected by a board walk about four feet wide. The belt house was on the west side of the walk. North of the engine house and adjoining the walk on the east was the tool rack. North of the tool rack, but not adjoining it, was the casing rack. There was casing on the rack and lying about it. Drilling operations had been in progress for some time, and as casing was used the rings which
The plaintiff had had several years’ experience working about oil derricks. When he first went to work he learned to dress tools, and he had been acting as a tool dresser for some months previous to his injury. He had worked in the capacity of tool dresser about the rig at which he was injured for 15 or 20 days before the accident, and he was familiar with all the conditions, including the location of the casing rings,
The argument in support of the judgment departs from the case made by the petition and the evidence. It is said the plaintiff was not engaged in the performance of his ordinary duties, but was called on to render an unusual and extraordinary service. The petition pleaded that assisting in handling the stem was part of the work to be done in the course of the plaintiff’s employment. At the close of the evidence the petition was amended to conform to the proof in certain respects, but not in regard to the character of the work. In describing the work of a> tool dresser the plaintiff specified certain things, and added that it was his duty to “help all he can around the rig that the driller needs him to do.” The plaintiff helped the driller attach the cable to the stem preparatory to raising it.
It is said that the plaintiff was injured while working under the immediate direction and supervision of the master himself. This subject was not in mind when the petition was drawn, or when it was amended, or when the jury was instructed. The well had caved, causing loss of some tools. Operations waited on arrival of a stem. The defendant brought the stem, and after it had been unloaded said, “Here’s your stem, boys; hook onto it.” The driller and the plaintiff had just finished preparing the rope socket to be attached to the stem, and they simply passed to the next thing to be done in regular progress of the work. All orders to a servant are given by the master. In this instance they were usually voiced by the driller, who was the plaintiff’s immediate superior. The driller’s orders, however, were master’s orders, and it was not material that the defendant himself happened to be present on this occasion, and spoke instead of the driller.
It is said the stem was moved suddenly and without warning to the plaintiff, so that he could not loosen the tongs and get away. No such claim was made in either the petition or the testimony. The engine was started and stopped from inside the derrick. On this occasion the engine was started by Sillín.
It is said the rings were not a part of the tools or equipment necessary to drilling the well. Casing was necessary to drill - ing the well, and the rings were essential portions of the casing up to the time the casing was put into the hole.
The result is, the judgment cannot be upheld by any of the supports proposed by the plaintiff.
It is difficult to discover a fair basis on which to rest a finding that the defendant was negligent. Drilling an oil well is a somewhat rough-and-ready kind of business. The premises are not supposed to be kept swept and garnished. Tools, material and supplies, by-products, worn-out and cast-off articles, and rubbish of all kinds are disposed of according to convenience. As the work progresses things accumulate, and a condition gradually grows up with which experienced workmen are perfectly familiar, and which they recognize as incidental to prosecution of that kind of an enterprise. The defendant’s premises appear to have been safe enough for any one not a novice at the business; but whether or not his method of conducting drilling operations was one which a jury might pronounce reasonably safe for his workmen, it was his method. Casing rings were dropped by the casing crew where they were removed, and were left in the vicinity of the casing rack. The plaintiff met this condition when he went to work there. The condition continued unchanged, and he knew all about it. The rings were obvious impediments, if in anybody’s way. It was scarcely necessary that the plaintiff should be instructed concerning running against, falling over, stepping on, or jumping on a casing ring or collection of casing rings. .He knew just as much about the risk attending such action as the defendant, and he accepted the situation. He assisted in removing casing lying beside the rings, from the anticipated path of the stem. When he went out to the stem, he could foresee just as well as the defendant that if he should be obliged to retreat before the moving stem, the rings would confront him, and whatever risk there was in the work he assumed.
The principles which have just been applied are all elementary in the law of negligence, and need neither fortification nor illustration by citation of decided cases. t
At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence a demurrer was interposed and overruled. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court with direction to sustain the demurrer.