After 31 years of marriage, Glenn and Sheryl Burnett divorced on June 24, 1998. The circuit court’s judgment divided their property and ordered Glenn Burnett (husband) to pay a lump sum amount of $16,-000 in maintenance as follows: $600 per month for ten consecutive months, then $400 per month for ten consecutive months, and finally $300 per month for twenty consecutive months. The maintenance payments were ordered to commence thirty days after the sale of the marital residence. On appeal, Sheryl Burnett (wife) contends that the circuit court erred in limiting the duration of the maintenance, in designating a later starting date for the maintenance payments, and in delineating the maintenance as “nonmodifiable.” Husband cross-appeals, asserting that the circuit court erred in awarding wife any maintenance.
We reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions.
MAINTENANCE AWARD
An appellate court must affirm the circuit court’s award of maintenance unless there is no substantial evidence to support the award, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Buckner v. Buckner,
For a circuit court to award maintenance, it must first determine whether the spouse seeking it: (1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him or her, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and, (2) is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment. § 452.335.1, RSMo 1994.
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This threshold determination must be made before consideration of the commencement date and duration of maintenance under § 452.335.2. Relying on
Hosack v. Hosack,
Wife’s Reasonable Needs
The court received sufficient evidence to find that wife had reasonable needs of support. The marriage lasted thirty-one years, and wife quit college after only one year to marry husband. Wife’s Statement of Income and Expenses shows that she has no income and her average monthly expenses total $1,811 (not including an expense for housing). A review of the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found wife had reasonable needs for support.
Wife’s Property
Both parties submitted conflicting evidence concerning their income, expenses, property and debts. The trial court is in the best position to weigh all the evidence and render judgment based on the evidence.
Landry v. Miller,
Wife was awarded several items of personal property including late-model vehicles, a small amount of stock, one-half of husband’s pension plans and other various items. Most of this property wife received was not income-producing property. As to the parties’ real property, at the time of divorce, two parcels of land were jointly owned by the parties. Parcel one, valued at $125,000, consisted of their marital residence. Parcel two consisted of land valued at $47,000. The court ordered that both be sold and the proceeds distributed:
Parcel One: (1) $10,000 paid to wife before any other distribution;
Remaining balance shall be used to pay the marital debt [which the court found to be $24,739.32];
The balance, if any, shall be distributed to petitioner and respondent equally-
Parcel Two: (1) $5,000 paid to wife before any other distribution;
(2) Balance distributed to wife and husband equally.
In 1994, wife inherited $75,000. She testified she used the inheritance to pay the $15,000 mortgage debt on their marital home, to make $16,000 in improvements to abutting land, to make other improvements on their real estate, to pay other debts on their vehicles and credit cards, and to purchase various items of personal property. There was no evidence that any of the inheritance remained available for wife’s use.
Wife testified that her expense statement which reflected expenses of $1,811 did not include an anticipated expense for rent or a mortgage payment which she will have to make when the marital property is sold. Assuming wife will pay $500 per month in rent like husband does, her expenses would be over $2,300 per month. Applying a reasonable rate of return, this is in excess of the income she could receive
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from the property if invested. Once more, a spouse need not deplete his or her portion of marital assets for living expenses before an award of maintenance is justified.
Witt,
Wife’s Employment
Since the record indicates wife does not have sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs, we examine whether her needs can be met through appropriate employment.
Van Skike v. Van Skike,
After determining the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding maintenance, we now consider wife’s argument that the circuit court’s limitation on the amount and duration of the maintenance as well as its designated commencement date for maintenance payments amount to reversible error.
In determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the decree indicates the trial court “examin[ed] all relevant factors pursuant to § 452.335.... ” “These factors are neither all inclusive nor mandatory, so that the trial court is not required to specifically address each factor.” Mon
sees v. Monsees,
1) The financial resources of [wife], including marital property apportioned to [her], and [her] ability to meet her needs independently ...;
2) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable [wife] to find appropriate employment;
3) The comparative earning capacity of each spouse;
4) . The standard of living established during the marriage;
5) The obligations and assets, including the marital property apportioned to [wife] and the separate property of each party;
6) The duration of the marriage;
7) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of [wife];
8) The ability of [husband] to meet his needs while meeting those of [wife]; ... and
10) Any other relevant factors.
§ 452.335.2.
Commencement of Maintenance Obligation
To determine an appropriate maintenance award, courts balance the reasonable needs of the party seeking maintenance against the ability of the oth
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er spouse to pay.
Theilen v. Theilen,
Likewise, given our instructions to the trial court to determine the amount of maintenance in conformance with this opinion, we will not address the parties’ arguments concerning the amount of maintenance originally awarded by the trial court.
Duration of Maintenance Award
In regard to the duration of the trial court’s maintenance award, a maintenance award of limited duration “is justified only where substantial evidence exists of an impending change in the financial condition of the parties.”
Allen v. Allen,
The record does not establish a sufficient probability that wife will be able - within the forty-month period set by the trial court - to obtain the skills and find a job that ■will enable her to be self-supportive.
Polen v. Polen,
‘Nonmodifiable’ Maintenance
Section 452.335.3 gives the court discretion in including a termination date for maintenance and in designating it as nonmodifiable. However, the statute “ ‘does not bestow unfettered discretion on
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the trial court.... [A] maintenance order providing that it is “nonmodifiable” must be justified by the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ ”
Allen,
We found no evidence to support the existence of an impending change or to support a finding that wife’s financial situation will be markedly different at the end of forty months in order to support the trial court’s award of limited duration maintenance.
Test v. Test,
Conclusion
There was sufficient evidence before the trial court that wife had reasonable needs, lacked sufficient property to provide for those needs, and was unable to support herself through appropriate employment. Thus, its award of maintenance was supported by evidence. However, the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial court’s limiting of the duration of the maintenance or to support its designation of the maintenance as nonmodifiable. Nor was a lump sum maintenance award appropriate. As a result, we reverse and remand, with instructions as set forth above, the circuit court’s judgment as it relates to maintenance.
ULRICH, P.J., and EDWIN H. SMITH, J., concur.
Notes
. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory refer-enees are to RSMo 1994.
