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1:25-cv-03008
E.D. Wash.
Aug 29, 2025
Case Information

*0 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON SEAN F. M C Aug 29, 2025 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON GREGORY B., No. 1:25-CV-03008-SAB

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER REVERSING THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DECISION OF COMMISSIONER

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying hIS application for social security benefits.

Plaintiff is represented by Matthew McGarry. The Commissioner is represented by

John Drenning and Brian M. Donovan. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s

Opening Brief, ECF No. 10, the Commissioner’s Brief, ECF No. 12, and Plaintiff’s

Reply Brief, ECF No. 13.

After reviewing the administrative record, briefs filed by the parties, and applicable case law, the Court is fully informed. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands for an immediate

award of benefits.

I. Jurisdiction

On December 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed application for Title II disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application supplemental security income with

the onset date of December 1, 2013. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and

on reconsideration. Plaintiff timely requested a hearing. A hearing was held on

May 1, 2019, and ALJ Kennedy found Plaintiff was not disabled.

Plaintiff appealed that decision and this Court remanded the case on September 8, 2020. Another hearing was held on September 28, 2021. The ALJ

found Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council vacated and remanded the

decision. [1]

Another hearing was held by telephone on July 16, 2024. Plaintiff participated and was represented by Timothy Anderson. Sharon Welter, vocational

expert also participated. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the ALJ that he was no

longer disabled as of September 6, 2022, which is when he started a new job. The

ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled from December 1, 2013 to November 12,

2024.

Plaintiff filed a timely appeal on January 20, 2025. ECF No. 1. The matter is before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to be under

a disability only if their impairments are of such severity that the claimant is not

only unable to do their previous work, but cannot, considering claimant’s age,

education, and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work that

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The

Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to

determine whether a person is disabled in the statute. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v).

Step One : Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activities? Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). Substantial gainful activity is work done for

pay and requires compensation above the statutory minimum. Keyes v. Sullivan ,

894 F.2d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 1990). If the claimant is engaged in substantial

activity, benefits are denied. Id. § 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not,

the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two : Does the claimant have a medically-severe impairment or combination of impairments? Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A severe

impairment is one that lasted or must be expected to last for at least 12 months and

must be proven through objective medical evidence. Id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. If

the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the

disability claim is denied. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the

impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step.

Step Three : Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude

substantial gainful activity? Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the

impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is

conclusively presumed to be disabled. Id. § 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the

impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation

proceeds to the fourth step.

Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ must first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). An individual’s residual functional

capacity is their ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained

basis despite limitations from their impairments. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1),

416.945(a)(1). The RFC is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.

Step Four : Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing work they have performed in the past? Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the

claimant is able to perform their previous work, they are not disabled. Id.

§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) . If the claimant cannot perform this work, the evaluation

proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step Five : Is the claimant able to perform other work in the national economy in view of their age, education, and work experience? Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The initial burden of proof rests upon the

claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett

v. Apfel , 108 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). This burden is met once a claimant

establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in her

previous occupation. Id . At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity. Id.

III. Standard of Review

The Commissioner’s determination will be set aside only when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the

record as a whole. Matney v. Sullivan , 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), but “less than a preponderance,”

Sorenson v. Weinberger , 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). Substantial

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Richardson , 402 U.S. at 401.

A decision supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision.

Brawner v. Secr’y of Health & Human Servs. , 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988).

An ALJ is allowed “inconsequential” errors as long as they are immaterial to the

ultimate nondisability determination. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. , 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). The court must uphold the ALJ’s denial of benefits if

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which

supports the decision of the administrative law judge. Batson v. Barnhart , 359 F.3d

1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). It “must consider the entire record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the

Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific

quantum of supporting evidence.” Revels v. Berryhill , 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir.

2017) (quotation omitted). “If the evidence can support either outcome, the court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney , 981 F.2d at 1019.

IV. Statement of Facts

The facts have been presented in the administrative record, the ALJ’s decision, and the briefs to this Court. Only the most relevant facts are summarized

here.

Plaintiff was 28 years old on the alleged onset date. He graduated from high school and worked as a cashier, cook, customer service representative, and pizza

delivery cashier/driver. Plaintiff suffers from hemochromatosis. He must have

three or four phlebotomies a year to manage the iron levels in his blood. He

describes having joint pain and memory loss. He has difficulty doing anything for

more than twenty minutes, including playing video games, typing on the computer,

or washing dishes. In January 2018, he was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. He also

testified he has irritable bowel syndrome that flares up a couple time a week or

more and he experiences tremors and panic attacks a couple of times a week. He

takes medication for his panic attacks as needed.

Plaintiff worked for Door Dash and was able to work about 10 hours a week.

It became too demanding physically.

At the hearing, Plaintiff explained he had secured competitive employment that is sedentary and involves simple tasks such as answering phones and typing

orders on a computer. His sister’s employer was willing to accommodate him, so he moved to Georgia and is living with her. He is able to take extra breaks if

needed, and he can come in late and leave early, or take time off, if needed. [2]

V. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ issued an opinion affirming denial of benefits. AR 714-730. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the SSA

through March 31, 2024, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from

December 1, 2013 to September 5, 2022. AR 717.

At step two, the ALJ identified the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia and hemochromatosis. AR 717.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of

the listed impairments. AR 719.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has an RFC to perform: y to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can sit for one hour at a time, after which he must be able to stand or move around for few minutes while sitting; he must be able to continue working in the changed position. He can sit in this manner for a total of six hours in an 8-hour day. He can stand and/or walk for a total of two hours in an 8-hour day. He can frequently reach, push, and pull. He can frequently perform fine fingering and gross handling. He can frequently push and/or pull with the lower extremities. He can perform all postural activities occasionally, except he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, pulmonary irritants, and hazards. He can work in a job with a moderate noise intensity level as the term moderate is defined by the SCO. He can perform simple tasks.

AR 720.

At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. AR 728. The ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including collator

operator, storage facility rental clerk, routing clerk, telephone quotation clerk, call

out operator, addresser, and document preparer. Consequently, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff was not disabled from December 1, 2013 to November 12, 2024. AR 728-

29.

VI. Issues

1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence.

VII. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Olden.

A. Evaluation of the Medical Opinions Plaintiff filed his disability application before March 27, 2017, so the rules

in 20 C.F.R. § 416.9271 apply to his claim.

To reject the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, the ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial

evidence . Revels v. Berryhill , 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation

omitted). If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another

doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id . (quotation omitted). The

opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician

or a treating physician. Id. (citation omitted).

Id.

Dr. Carl Olden Plaintiff’s treating provider, Carl Olden, M.D., drafted an opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations on December 11, 2020. AR 1701. Dr. Olden noted

diagnoses including hemochromatosis, essential tremors, gastrointestinal reflux, irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia, and cubital tunnel syndrome. AR1700. Dr.

Olden described spells of reactive hypoglycemia, with syncope, chronic tremors,

abdominal pains, joint pain, and pain and numbness in the hands. AR1700. Dr.

Olden noted that genetic testing and nerve conduction studies supported these

diagnoses. AR 1700. Dr. Olden opined that Plaintiff would need to lie down during

the day, for one to two hours at a time if he became severely fatigued. AR 1700.

Dr. Olden also noted Plaintiff’s treatments could take two to four hours per

session. AR 1700. Dr. Olden opined Plaintiff’s conditions would reasonably cause

pain, citing Plaintiff’s diffuse fibromyalgia pain, cubital tunnel syndrome, and

ulnar nerve pain. AR 1700. Dr. Olden further opined that, if Plaintiff worked, he

would deteriorate. AR 1700. Dr. Olden explained fibromyalgia flares would

present themselves with heavy activity, such that being able to take breaks is

critical. AR1700. Dr. Olden further opined Plaintiff would likely miss work if

trying to complete a 40-hour workweek and he would likely be absent four or more

days per month. AR 1701. Dr. Olden explained Plaintiff’s phlebotomy

appointments required two to three days of monitoring and observed his

fibromyalgia or IBS would flare at times. AR 1701. Dr. Olden opined Plaintiff’s

conditions were present since at least 2014, and further opined Plaintiff was

capable of intermittent sedentary work, but it must be “extraordinarily flexible.”

AR 1701.

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Olden’s opinion. AR 727. The ALJ believed Dr. Olden’s limitations were not consistent with both the longitudinal

record and his own treatment notes. AR 727As an example, Dr. Olden’s notes

reflect concerns of reactive hypoglycemia only briefing beginning around

December 2020 and the symptoms were treated with a diet change, yet he listed

reactive hypoglycemia as a diagnoses. AR 727. Dr. Olden also noted Defendant’s

hand pain and numbness, but the record did not reflect hand atrophy and most

examinations showed no significant abnormalities in strength sensation, grip, or range of motion in the hands or arms. AR 728. Also, the ALJ noted the record

rarely mentions tremors.

The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Olden’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ fails to account that Plaintiff needs to lie down

throughout the day due to severe fatigue and that his fibromyalgia flares with

heavy activity. On the contrary, Dr. Olden’s notes support his conclusion that

Plaintiff would likely miss more than four days a month dur to the required

phlebotomy procedures and subsequent monitoring, as well as flare from

fibromyalgia. The ALJ’s rationale for rejecting Dr. Olden’s opinion focuses on two

symptoms, but ignores all the others that are well-documented in the record. In an

attempt to discredit Dr. Odom, the ALJ relied on these two instances having very

little bearing on the limitations set forth in his opinion. As such, the ALJ failed to

provide legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Olden’s opinion.

On the contrary, Dr. Olden’s opinion is deserving of great weight as it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case

record.” It goes without saying that Dr. Olden has the benefit of firsthand treatment

and his opinion is supported by his own medical findings and explanations.

The only contradictory evidence is from non-treating, non-examining State agency consultants who did nothing more than review select medical records and

formulate opinions. The opinions of these non-examining doctors are entitled to

less weight than doctors who treated Plaintiff. Benecke v. Barnhart , 379 F.3d 587,

592 (9th Cir. 2004).

VIII. Conclusion

The ALJ failed to provide specific or legitimate reasons to discount the opinion of Dr. Olden. Because the record is developed and if the ALJ would have

given Dr. Olden’s opinion proper weight, it would have been required to find that

Plaintiff was disable. As such, a remand for an immediate award of benefits is *10 Case 1:25-cv-03008-SAB ECF No. 14 filed 08/29/25 PageID.2050 Page 10

of 10

appropriate.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. For docket purposes, Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, ECF No. 10 is GRANTED .

2. For docket purposes, the Commissioner’s Response Brief, ECF No.

12, is DENIED .

3. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and remanded for an immediate award of benefits.

4. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. IT IS SO ORDERED . The District Court Executive is hereby directe d to file this Order, provide copies to counsel, and close the file.

DATED this 29th day of August 202 5 .

Notes

[1] Plaintiff sought congressional help due to the extraordinary delay at the Appeals Council.

[2] In his brief, Plaintiff states that he was no longer able to work his job in Georgia and has moved back to Yakima.

Case Details

Case Name: Burnes v. Bisignano
Court Name: District Court, E.D. Washington
Date Published: Aug 29, 2025
Citation: 1:25-cv-03008
Docket Number: 1:25-cv-03008
Court Abbreviation: E.D. Wash.
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