*1 BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD Atchison, Topeka &
COMPANY and the Railway Company, Petitioners, Fe
Santa Public INC. Southwestern Company, Respondents.
Service
No. 95-1317.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Argued Sept. 20, 1997.
Decided June
Rehearing Dee. Overruled Jr., IL,
Hаrry DeLung, Michael Chicago, Hatchell, George Whittenburg, Tyler, A Amarillo, White, Sipe, M. Charles G. Samuel Stein, DC, Jr., Washington, David A Petitioners. Hunt, Lubbock, Keely Cynthia M.
Donald Timms, Boydston, H. Col- Michael J. Michael Amarillo, lins, Watson, Jr., Dallas, R. Charles Respondents. Justice, PHILLIPS, Chief delivered Court, GONZALEZ, opinion CORNYN, BAKER, HECHT, OWEN and Justices, join. 171.014 of Civil
Under section the Texas Code, shall a court Practice and Remedies award if there has been vacate an arbitration *2 partiality by appointed “evident an agree proper not adjust- could on the rate aas neutral.” We ment. hold a neutral arbi- TUCO asserts that the in difference parties parties’ positions trator selected repre- or their amounted to more than contracts, sentatives exhibits million. Under the $150 under TUCO provision dispute this if submitted the to arbitration the arbitrator does not under dis- See Tex. close the Texas General Arbitration Act. might, objective facts which to an ob- server, § Civ. Prac. & seq. create a Rem.Code 171.001 et partiality. Applying arbitrator’s this stan- required contracts each side select us, in the dard case before we hold arbitrator, mutually turn would neutral arbitrator’s failure to disclose his ac- they pro- select the third arbitrator.1 While ceptance, during the course of the arbitration selecting hibit the their own proceedings, of a substantial referral from employees arbitrators, as the contracts do the law firm of a non-neutral co-arbitrator specify whether the two arbitrators that established evident as a matter of (the parties unilaterally “party law. Because the appeals court of deter- arbitrators”) rep- would be neutral or would mined that a fact issue existed about evident party resent the appointing interests of the partiality, 912 modify S.W.2d dispute, however, them. There is no that the judgmеnt of the court of and remand parties intended and understood that this cause to the trial court with instructions party with, aligned arbitrators would be act to vacate the arbitration award. for, ultimately as advocates side with the scenario, appointing party. Under this
I third arbitrator act would as the neutral decisionmaker.2 TUCO, Inc., company, an Amarillo-based purchases coal from in Wyoming mines arbitrators, appointed resale to Southwestern Public Service Com- Hardy, transportation Richard a retired at- pany to generating plants fuel its electric in torney, while the Carriers selected Emried the Texas Panhandle. In TUCO en- Cole, attorney with the Baltimore firm of 18-year tered into two contracts Bur- (“Venable-Ba- Venable, Baetjer and Howard lington Company Northern Railroad and the etjer”). parties exchanged When the lists of Atchison, Topeka Railway & Santа Fe Com- Beall, potential George “Carriers”) pany (collectively, the for trans- attorney, appeared Baltimore on both lists. porting coal from Wyoming to Texas. These When the arbitrators interviewed Beall contracts, generally contain the same any potential to determine whether he had terms, provide periodic adjustments rate conflicts, firm, Beall disclosed that Cole’s law changes based on “productiv- the Carriers’ Venable-Baetjer, previously had twice ity,” a operating measure which is tied to expert tained him witness. TUCO’s precisely costs but which is not defined investigation of these occurrences revealed During contracts. a 1990 contractual rate they relatively small involved amount review, parties disputed meaning longer ongo- of time and fees and were no scope “productivity,” ing.3 Hardy of the term and thus TUCO and thus concluded that Levine, (11th appointed by 1. If the arbitrators Co. v. 675 F.2d Cir. arbitrator, Stariha, 1982); agree on the third the contracts Ins. Co. N.W.2d Safeco apply Judge (Minn.Ct.App.1984). allowed either to the Chief While it is not expressly approved by of the United District States Court for the North- the Texas General Arbitra Act, appointment appears implicitly recognize ern District of Texas for of the third the Act procedure by referring "ap arbitrator. to an arbitrator 171.014(a)(2). pointed as a neutral” in section See, This is often-used arbitration format. affidavit, e.g., Coatings Corp. 3.Hardy’s summary judgment v. Continental which is Co., "[tjhese disputed, Cos. 393 U.S. 89 S.Ct. 21 L.Ed.2d states that matters were in Int’l, Co., (1968); i.e., Forsythe past, they completed, they S.A. v. Gibbs Oil been (5th Cir.1990); relatively 915 F.2d Merit Ins. involved a little effort and a small Co., Leatherby Sipe, Co. v. Ins. 714 F.2d amount of fees.” Samuel the Carriers’ lead Cir.1983); Co., counsel, Maryland deposition Cas. testified in his Lozano (11th Cir.1988); occasions, Venable-Baetjer Middlesex Mut. Ins. that on one of the matter not material to the impartiality.
they not affect Beall’s would Therefore, parties’ joint request, continued serv- response proceedings. to the Beall disclosing to serve the neutral arbitrator the refer- agreed ing panel without Hardy. October It ral to TUGO referral, not know about Cole also did conducting discovery, After TUCO and *3 pro- in its and had no involvement that he and sworn wit- submitted exhibits Carriers Similarly, Wright referred curement. when January to the arbitrators ness statements Beall, no knowl- he had the Mullan case February hearing then 1992. A live was and proceedings or that edge of the arbitration 23, 1992, solely for for the scheduled March panel serving on an Beall was cross-examining purpose of the witnesses Venable-Baetjer partner. with another testimony. based on written hearing The referral which lies at heart of At the conclusion the arbitration present dispute occurred about three weeks 27,1992, Beall ruled for the Carri- on March hearing. the March arbitration The Cole, before disposed Siding ers. he Corporation Resolution Trust had asserted favor, major including in their issues damage against substantial claim Thomas adjustments. productivity rate Mullan, Jr., a failed former director later, April on About a month savings Wright, loan James institution. met to decide several lesser is- Venable-Baetjer partner regularly During pending. still sues which were Mullan, could not handle meeting, Hardy this overheard course of claim because of a conflict of interest. RTC already “we’ve Beall remark to Cole that did, however, Stern, Wright meet with Gail were begun you on the matter folks so work family general counsel of Mullan’s busi- does kind to send over.” The record not ness, litigation to discuss who serve response, any, this if disclose Cole’s During meeting, Wright counsel. this either does previously, mark. noted TUCO suggested or Stern Beall.4 After two other knew the Mullan refer- contend that Cole case, lawyers Stem declined the prior ral to this time. Wright Wright contact Beall. she asked so, Stern, arranging meeting did its panel issued written decision on himself, Beall, son.5 and Mullan’s Based on 12,1992. dissent, May Hardy In his accused meeting, repre- Beall Mullan selected bias, contending up Beall that Beall made him, apparently sent on advice his son key hearing his issues before mind on Wright Although and Stern. attended the Hardy cit- reviewing relevant evidence. meeting participants and briefed the other regarding ed the he had overheard comment claim, background of the RTC’s he had referral, speculating the referral authority to no determine whether Beall alleged the source of the could have been be hired. should Hardy it is not whether bias. While clear prior issuing told about the referral TUCO piece The Mullan case was a substantial dissent, it his written litigation involving claims federal excess nothing until TUCO knew of the referral though Even his million. co-arbitrator’s $1 referral, panel remaining had directly firm in the after the decided the was involved April meeting.6 at the issues Beall testified that he concluded that discussed $3,000 paid affidavit not address the Beall about to review its file in a name. Stem’s issue, does testimony deliver rea- although matter and brief about the does that another attor- she state On Venable-Baetjer, sonableness of the firm’s fees. the second ney, not associated occasion, the which are not disclosed details of her. earlier recommended Beall to record, actually testify, Beall did not in- affidavit, only preparing stead he could eighties the time in his 5. Mullan at paid. not recall how much he had been family’s and reаl retired from his construction precise record also does not disclose date development estate business. prior of these associations between Beall either Venable-Baetjer. TUCO’s attor- 6. The stated that "shortly ney before became aware referral 4.Wright that he states his affidavit objec- presentations" no closing and "made first raised Beall’s recall whether or Stem filed this suit to the arbi- TUCO set aside under this standard. Id. The court thus award, contending summary judgment tration undis- the Car- reversed the for However, referral evidently closed rendered riers on this issue. Id. Beall TUCO, partial.7 judgment TUCO also ar- for contended that the did render instead authority by remanding bitrators had exceeded their the cause to the trial court trial . essentially reforming, on evident Id. The court did simply rather than in- terpreting, argument not address TUCO’s transportation contracts. alternative au- summary After both the arbitrators had exceeded their moved for thority. ap- and the judgment, granted summary the trial court TUCO Carriers both plied Court for writ of judgment upholding to this error. the Carriers the ar- bitration award. II appealed appeals, to the court of *4 that Beall arguing was under a to dis- A the referral close and that his failure do so parties’ provide contracts that dis- partiality” “evident section under putes pursuant “shall arbitrated the of the 171.014 Texas Civil Practice and Rem- provisions of the Texas General Arbitration edies as a matter That Code of law. section Act,” party disputes and neither that the in provides part: relevant controlling. argues Texas Act is TUCO (a) Upon application party, the court partiality” Beall “evident under exhibited vacate an shall award where: by accepting section 171.014 the Texas Act sj: % ^ during ease the Mullan the course (2) therе partiality by was evident proceedings disclosing without appointed or as a neutral cor- that fact TUCO. not While Court has ruption any in or miscon- arbitrators previously scope determined the of this stan- any duct wilful misbehavior of dard, jurisdictions courts in numerous other prejudicing rights arbitrators so, as partiality” have done “evident also a is vacating basis for awards under Federal Act, § see 9 Arbitration U.S.C. as well 171.014(a)(2) § PRAC. &
Tex. Civ. Rem.Code many statutes of sister states. added). (emphasis Alternatively, ar- TUCO gued that the arbitrators exceeded au- partiality” The seminal “evident case Thus, thority deciding dispute. in TUCO Coatings Corporation contended, granting the trial court erred in Casualty Company, Continental 393 U.S. summary judgment the Carriers’ motion for (1968). 21 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. granting in not TUCO’s. There, in a suit subcontractor’s appeals against prime surety
The court of
that an
concluded
contractor’s
submit-
partiality
par-
arbitrator exhibits еvident
under
ted the claims
arbitration under the
here,
agreement.
the statute when the arbitrator fails to dis-
ties’
each
select-
arbitrator,
any relationship
jointly
close
reason-
who then
ed
ably
appearance
create an
claim-
neutral arbitrator. Unknown to the
ant,
regular
at
Noting
prime
bias. 912 S.W.2d
318.
contractor had been a
past
engineer-
had been concerned about Beall’s
rela-
customer of the neutral arbitrator’s
tionship
Venable-Baetjer,
ing consulting
and that
business.
had
While there
dealings
essentially
Beall had
for the
been no
between them
thanked Cole
pro-
prime
pa-
in
preceding year,
referral
the midst of
contractor’s
the arbitration
repeated
ceedings,
tronage
significant.
the court of
been
concluded
claimant,
who learned of this relation-
a fact issue existed about evident
appeal.
рarticipation.”
Beall’s
TUCO in
trial court and on
In char-
tions to
continued
supported
parties’
S.W.2d at 314. This statement is
acterizing
arguments,
we refer
by the record.
Compa-
TUCO and Southwestern Public Service
collectively
ny
as TUCO.
Company
7. Southwestern Public Service
inter-
proceedings, aligning
vened in the
itself with
gruntled
pretext
ship only
receiving
can seize on it as
after
adverse decision
arbitrator,
invalidating the award.
challenged
the neutral
on the
of evident
Id.
award
basis
cautioning
Id. at
89 S.Ct. at
While
at
1344, 1358 (same); view Schmitz Health Ser broader reflected and the Management Corp. vices view of See Hughes, v. 975 F.2d narrower Morelite. Wheeler v. (7th Cir.1992) 345, Joseph Hosp., Cal.App.3d St. (holding that (1976) Cal.Rptr. (adopting “impres allеged “must be so ... conflict intimate possible holding sion bias” to cast on im standard serious doubt the arbitrator’s duty that arbitrator had to disclose business partiality,” further in holding that the firm); party’s direct, law San Luis terest or bias “must definite and Obispo Bay Properties remote, Gas & Elec. capable of demonstration rather than Pacific Co., Cal.App.3d 104 Cal.Rptr. speculative”). uncertain or (1972) (adopting “impression possible bias” contrast, courts, focusing other federal holding business that referrals the need for full disclosure to between neutral arbitrator and arbitra choosing own are tor did need be disclosed because the adopted example, a broader standard. For consideration); referrals were Zilveti, 1043, 1049 in Schmitz v. Haynes Constr. Cascella Co. v. & Son Cir.1994), the court held that an arbitrator Constr., 36 Conn.App. 647 A.2d to disclose that his firm had (1994) (holding must parent company arbi of an facts “that tеnd indicate trating party. “par The court reasoned concluding poten- partiality bias” but intelligently ties can choose their arbitrators arising attorney-client tial conflict rela showing potential when facts tionship between arbitrator and in-laws of Concluding are disclosed.” at 1047. Id. waived); party’s principal had Local been Coatings controlling AFSCME, City Council New precedent, the court decided that the “best Haven, Conn.App. 518 A.2d expression” Supreme holding Court’s (1986) (adopting Morelite standard and hold present is that evident when ing the fact that hearing labor *6 impres- “undisclosed facts show reasonable police grievance ap officer had been of partiality.” sion Id. at 1046. This stan pointed public mayor office did not dard, course, of much broader than partiality); constitute evident John E. Reid Morelite, in articulated can circumstances Assoc., v. & Assoc. Wicklander-Zulawski & convey impression partiality an of without 533, 232, 238, Ill.App.3d 255 194 Ill.Dec. 627 necessarily dictating a partiali conclusion of 348, (1993) (suggesting 354 “actual N.E.2d ty, as required under Morelite. See also holding that bias” standard and arbitrator’s Levine, Ins. 675 Middlesex Mutual Co. v. relationship parents long-term business with (11th Cir.1982) 1197, (adopting F.2d 1200 party’s require of witness did not vacation of possible impression “reasonable of bias” award); In re Arbitration Between U.S. standard, holding and that arbitrator had PSI, Inc., Exploration, and Turnkey Inc. duty in to disclose that he was involved 1131, (La.Ct.App.1991) 577 1135 So.2d ongoing legal dispute party); with an insurer and (adopting holding Morelite standard Pierce, Lynch, v. & Olson Merrill Fenner party regarding presen advice to arbitrator’s (8th Cir.1995) Smith, 157, 159-60 partiality); evidence tation of was not evident (recognizing that indirect disclosure “even Ass’n, Albion Public Schools v. Albion Educ. process, ties” will aid arbitration and (1983) 698, 55, Mich.App. 130 344 57 N.W.2d holding duty to that arbitrator was under a (holding that arbitrator must disclose facts relationship his disclose business may reasonably impression to an which lead Citibank, N.A., party); firm and Al-Harbi v. vacating appearance or of bias and award (D.C.Cir.1996) 680, (recognizing F.3d 683 85 failed to disclose that he because arbitrator which duty to disclose facts arbitrator’s previously served as consultant for a “might impression possible create an Stariha, v. party); 346 Ins. Co. Safeco bias”). (al (Minn.Ct.App.1984) 667 N.W.2d courts, refusing interpreting scope though State of “evi- to vacate the award where partiality” respective arbi- the neutral arbitrator had dent under statutes, party, prospectively also law firm of counsel for a tration are divided between
635
person challenging an
any
that a
requiring full
dents
hold
adopting rule
disclosure
reasonably
partiality
prove
create
“must
“might
award under
bias”);
Herrin
appearance
facts which would establish
the existence of
Inc.,
Stewart,
v.
M.
558 So.2d
par
Milton
arbitrator’s
impression
(Miss.1990)
that,
(holding
justify
vacat-
tiality
party.”
863 S.W.2d at
one
award,
ing
partiality “must
arbitration
substantially
language is
similar to
direct,
capable of demonstration
definite and
and
Ninth Circuit’s articulation
Schmitz
uncertain,
remote,
specula-
rather
than
language Middlesex
the Eleventh Circuit’s
concluding
tive”
that evident
and
Levine,
Company v.
Mutual Insurance
may
merely from
rul-
not be shown
adverse
1197, 1201
Cir.1982),
clearly
merits);
v.
ing
Bldg.
Ave.
Co.
National
approach of
parallel the
intended to
broad
Stewart,
(Mo.Ct.App.
910 S.W.2d
Schmitz, 20
Coatings. See
1995)
that,
par-
(holding
to constitute evident
Middlesex,
1047;
F.2d at 1201.
F.3d at
tiality, the interest or bias of the arbitrator
City Baytown,
simply quoted
“direct,
capable
of dem
must be
definite
the standard from Babcock. See
S.W.2d
remote, uncertain, or
onstration rather than
at 520.
speculative”
concluding
that arbitrator’s
Further,
at least
Texas
rеview
offer
for a
did
to serve
consultant
ing
awards under common
award);
vacating
Barcon
warrant
has
relied on Commonwealth
standards
N.J.
Tri-County Asphalt Corp.,
Assoc. v.
Coatings to hold that arbitrators must dis
(1981)
“ap
(adopting
A.2d
dealings
close
pearance
holding
partiality”
standard and
possible
create an
bias. See
arbitrator had
disclose business
Obst,
903, 907
659 S.W.2d
House Grain Co.
party); Kern
303 East
(Tex.App —CorpusChristi
writ ref'd
.
Corp., 204 A.D.2d
611 N.Y.S.2d
57th St.
n.r.e.).
(N.Y.App.Div.1994) (adopting
“appearance
and hold
standard
B
ing
duty to
that arbitrator had
noted
Common
Justice White
attorney
him
party’s
had referred business
Coatings,
capable
wealth
most
arbitra
Sup
proceedings);
Beck
persons with extensive
tors are often those
Reynolds,
pliers, Inc. v. Dean Witter
may
(1988) experience
industry,
natural
1187, 1193
App.3d
Ohio
558 N.E.2d
parties.
ly
past dealings
have had
“appearance
(rejecting
of bias”
*7
Thus,
per
should not be
se dis
arbitratоrs
evi
holding
arbitrator did not exhibit
qualified because of
business
merely
firm
partiality
dent
because his law
150,
393
89
at
represented corporate
party);
See
U.S. at
S.Ct.
affiliates of
with
Instead,
Shah,
(White, J.,
concurring).
v.
533 340
DeBaker
194 Wis.2d
(1995)
expertise
impartiality
competing
(holding
goals
that arbi
N.W.2d
may
parties have
must
all facts
trator
disclose
“which
must
balanced. Where
they
reasonably support
par
...
agreed
an inference of
to select their own
past
tiality,”
concluding
but
that arbitrator’s
this balance in the selection
should strike
receipt
campaign
of small
contributions from
their arbitrators intelli
process. To choose
lawyers
however,
parties
with arbitration counsel
ac
gently,
associated
must have
disclosure).
to require
trivial
might
too
reason
cess to all information which
partiality. This
ably affect the arbitrator’s
appear
Texas
There
to be
two оther
any potential
parties
allows the
evaluate
the stat
interpreting
cases
courts
outset,
shifting
than
bias at the
rather
See
utory
partiality”
“evident
standard.
when a
to the courts
do so
dissatis
burden
Ltd.,
PMAC,
863
Babcock & Wilcox Co.
party challenges an award.
Justice
fied
(Tex.App
[14th Dist.]
S.W.2d 225
. -Houston
Coatings:
White noted Commonwealth
denied); City Baytown v. C.L.
writ
its role in
judiciary
should minimize
Winter,
(Tex.App.
515
886 S.W.2d
denied).
judge
arbitrator’s im-
of the
arbitration
writ
[1st Dist.]
—Houston
Babcock,
consigned
role
best
prece-
partiality. That
the court relied on federal
parties,
who are the
agree
architects of their Because we
the policy arguments
own
process,
and are far better
advanced in
Coatings
prevailing
Schmitz,
informed of the
ethical stan-
prospective
we
hold that
reputations
dards and
within their busi-
by
parties
or their
ness.
representatives
partiality
exhibits evident
if
or
she does not
facts
might,
which
(White, J.,
393 U.S. at
at 340
S.Ct.
observer,
objective
to an
create a reasonable
concurring).
strong policy
favoring the
impression of
the arbitrator’s
We
up-front
potential
disclosure of
conflicts un-
emphasize
partiality
that this evident
is es
Supreme
“simple”
derscored the
Court’s
itself,
tablished from the nondisclosure
re
quirement
that arbitrators disclose
deal-
gardless of whether
ings
the nondiselosed infor
might
impression
“that
create
necessarily
partiality
mation
establishes
possible bias.” 393
at
U.S.
89 S.Ct. at
Coatings,
bias. See Commonwealth
393 U.S.
at
(finding
S.Ct. at 338-39
course,
Of
procedures
not all arbitration
partiality based on
arbitrator’s failure
dis
grant
power
particular
veto
over
conflict,
though
close
even
there was no evi
See,
Apperson,
arbitrators.
e.g.,
879 F.2d at
Schmitz,
bias);
dence of actual
(collective
bargaining agreement provid-
1047. Those
which
cоurts
have failed to
committees); Morelite,
ed
recognize
have,
comparable
(collective
F.2d at 81
bargaining agreement
believe, needlessly involved
themselves
provided
designation
of a single neutral
partiality
evaluations of
that are better left to
participation
par-
without
See,
parties.
e.g., Consolidation Coal Co.
ties); Toyota
Berkeley v. Automobile
(4th
Cir.1995);
Local
48 F.3d
Union,
Salesmen’s
Union,
Mining,
Hobet
Inc. v. International
Cir.1987) (same
Morelite).
The issue
America,
United Mine Workers
by
identified
these
courts
not whether
(S.D.W.Va.1994).
F.Supp. 1011
parties have access
all relevant
informa-
selection,
aid their
because there is no
This standard
II
accords
Canon
Rather,
selection to be made.
the issue be- Code of
Commer-
Ethics FORARBITRATORSin
comes whether the conflict is so severe as to
Disputes,
cial
provides:
wisely, adopted
nature of the
standard more akin to actual bias would
court in
indicate that
in the arbitrator’s decision.
applied
should be able to
courts
parties,
addressing
different standards
Schmitz,
standard for arbitrators chosen
partiality
arbitration.
a “reasonable
indicated
emphasizing
“evident
choose
or bias
For example,
depending
partiality”
played
Thus,
a narrower
on the
a role
some
ap
A. Persons who are
close:
arbitrators
*8
bias....
tionships
create
or professional, family ness, social rela-
(2) Any
Hs
any appearance
‡
existing or
which are
should,
or which
[*]
before
requested
past financial,
likely
‡
accepting,
to affect im-
‡
reasonably
to serve as
sfc
busi-
dis-
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
ply
other eases.
The Carriers
a Second Circuit decision
Morelite,
standing
complain
no
employed
similarly
have
about
refer-
court
a
accept
willingness
ral because
their
approaching actual bias.
strict standard
See
knowledge
(“There
prior
Beall with full
of his
work as
A flaw in reasoning the Court’s counsel. The Court no its cites requires that it one to assume is essen- case which Cole vacates an arbitration award due tially agent appointed for the to a business between arbitra- Although Significantly, him. Cole was chosen the carri- tors. the Court cites one case *12 “impression possible applied an Court’s, Texas, Relator, ARLINGTON, similar bias” standard CITY OF a neu- that business rеferrals between held need and a tral arbitrator Administrator, NADIG, Subse Claudia case, when, no be disclosed Injury Fund, quent Texas Workers’ Obispo Luis given. San consideration Commission, and Todd K. Compensation Co., 28 Bay Gas & Elec. Properties Pacific Director, Brown, Work Texas Executive Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. Respon Commission, Compensation ers’ Dist.1972). (2nd dents. on San questions my The reliance Court No. 97-0212. case Obispo, but the line drawn Luis by the the line drawn is far clearer than Supreme Court of Texas. purports to hold today. The Court Court June failure to relation- mere ship begins that arises after of law. 960 as matter hand, On the the Court at 637. other
S.W.2d holding by noting
limits own its
relationship must “substantial” in order requirement.
trigger the disclosure The de- Court neither
S.W.2d explains why nor
fines “substantial” substantial in this case. The
ferral was — in the Mullan $1 amount involved case — certainly appears “sub- million in claims relationship to Wright’s But
stantial.”
Beall “substantial?” The Court does of the case re-
specify whether the value
ferred or the manner which the neutral the rela-
arbitrator met the client renders
tionship “substantial.” “impression” not, hopes,
adopted today will the Court judicial interference in
decrease arbitration.
Instead, litigation will from the focus of shift
asking proceed- courts review arbitration the nu-
ings arguing for actual bias to over relationships arbitrators.
ances law, referral
As a matter of firm Beall no evident created
Cole’s I Accordingly, would reverse the and remand
judgment of to consider TUCO’s the case to Jr., Waite, Arlington, King, Don W. Frank remaining points error. for Relator. Joseph Brown, A. Nadig, K. Claudia
Todd Austin, Pitner, Respondents. PER CURIAM. Arlington sought judicial re- City of Compensation a Texas Workers’
view of
