19 Iowa 137 | Iowa | 1865
Lead Opinion
The counsel for the plaintiff, therefore, stated that it was the purpose of the pleader to so state, and that the conditions were not only performed by constructing the road through these lands, but the same had been properly certified to the plaintiff, after certificate of completion of the railroad through them, by the governor of Iowa, and duly recognized by the federal government through its proper department.
The counsel for the respective parties, then in open court, agreed that the only question arising upon the petition and the demurrer and motion to dissolve the injunction, as determined by the court below, and- the sole question presented for the adjudication of this court, was, whether the lands included in the grant are liable to taxation by the State after the railroad company became possessed of the unconditional title in fee, but before the same are alienated by it ?
The counsel for appellant, in his elaborate argument at bar, in support of his position that the lands were not liable' to taxation, cited and relied upon Weston et al. v The City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters, 449; Dobbins v.
After that full and deliberate consideration which the .importance of the question involved justly demands,’we are agreed in the opinion that the case at bar is not within the principle upon which the cases cited were based, and that the lands are liable to taxation by the State. That this liability to taxation is as complete after the railroad company has performed the requisite conditions and become possessed of the unconditional legal title, as it will be after such title shall become vested by voluntary alienation or otherwise, in private individuals.
In view of the purpose for which our decision is desired, and the course to be pursued, as announced by counsel in argument in case our opinion was adverse to plaintiff, we do not feel called upon to discuss at length the question made, but simply to announce that the judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I readily concur in the conclusion arrived at in the opinion just read, but prefer to state my reasons therefor a little more fully and specifically. It is evident that the right to tax the lands described in the petition, depends upon the question whether the plaintiff has a taxable interest therein not exempt by law.
This involves an inquiry into the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s right to and interest in said lands, so far as the same may be ascertained from the facts set out in the bill. This, in the first place, refers to the act of congress, which grants to the State of Iowa, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Burlington, on the Mississippi river, to a point on the Missouri, near the mouth of Platte river, * * * every alternate section of land,
This is not unlike a class of grants made by congress which have often received a judicial construction, and have been held to pass at once the title to and vest the seizin in the party named therein as grantee. Lessieur v. Price, 12 How. (U. S.), 59; Strong v. Lehmer, 10 Ohio, 93 ; Ward v. Bartholomew, 6 Pick., 409 ; Enfield v. Day, 11 N. H., 512; Hill v. Dyer, 3 Greenl., 341; Allison v. Halfacre, 11 Iowa, 450.
It follows that the legal title of these lands by said congressional act was vested in this State, but, as the act itself shows, in trust, for the benefit of any railroad companies that might be organized, to construct the line of railways designated therein. The plaintiff in this case, being one of said companies, becomes on that account the beneficiary of so much of said grant or trust lands as fell within the prescribed limits of its line of road. This trust was accompanied with certain conditions and restrictions, among which were the following:
1st. That the lands or the proceeds thereof should be applied exclusively to the construction of said lines of railways and for no other purpose.
2d. That the State, as trustee, should dispose of the lands only in a mode specified in the grant, that is to say, a quantity of land in the first instance, not exceeding one hundred and twenty sections for each of said roads might be sold, and then when the governor of the State shall certify to the secretary of the interior, that twenty continuous miles of any of said roads are completed, another similar quantity of lands might be sold, and so from time to time until said roads are completed, and if any of said roads should not be completed within ten years, no further sales should be made, and the lands unsold should revest in the United States. Regularly, under the conditions of the
The State, however, for greater convenience, or some other reason not entirely apparent, on the 14th duly, 1856 (as properly stated in plaintiff’s petition), passed an act accepting the grant, and at the same time, and in the same act, disposed of and granted all of said lands at once to the several railroad companies, subject, however, to the prescribed conditions and restrictions annexed to the original or congressional grant, as well as subject to certain conditions annexed to its own grant.
.While, therefore, by said legislative act, the legal title and seizin were.technically conferred upon said companies; yet it was given and received, expressly subject to the conditions and restrictions named in both acts. It follows, that such title is only formal, and does not become effectual, perfect or available to these companies until the conditions of the grant are fulfilled by them, in the manner prescribed. It is plain from the terms of the trust, and the nature and mode of its exactions, that the conditions which will entitle the companies to these lands must and will be performed by stages or given periods, and, hence, a complete title, and livery of seizin, will come to them by stages or given
Affirmed.
