16 Colo. 376 | Colo. | 1891
Mitchell instituted these proceedings in forcible entry and detainer against Burkhard, to recover possession of certain premises in Trinidad. The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of the owner for the possession, and
In June, 1884, Mitchell was the owner of the premises, and at that' time was evidently indebted to the firm of John & Gunter in a very considerable sum of money. To secure this indebtedness, and provide means for its payment, he assigned all rents and profits of the property for two years; and by due power authorized them, upon such terms as to price and parties as to them might seem proper, to lease the premises and collect the rents. By some stipulation, which does not appear, Mitchell continued this authority after June, 1886, the date named in the original power. He admits that they had such authority up to August 1, 1887, and concedes that they rented the premises, and collected the rent, by his consent, to that time. Whether there was, in the extension, any specific limitation of time which would, ex vi termini, terminate their power on that date, is not shown. Mitchell simply concedes the existence of the power during 1887, shows the liquidation of his debt August 1st, and insists that the power ceased on that date. July 24, 1886, while the authority of John & Gunter was in force, they leased the premises to Burkhard for two years, at a monthly rental of $40, payable at the end of each month. The tenant went into possession under the lease, and paid his rent to John & Gunter to July 1, 1887. During that time no question was made as to his tenancy, or as to the rental,, Whether Mitchell had actual notice of the existence of the lease which had been made by John & Gunter cannot be learned from the record. On the 1st of August, when the obligation to John & Gunter was paid off and the property came back under the owner’s control, he went for his rent
Manifestly, the judgment was entered without a correct conception of the relations and legal rights of the parties.
At the time John & Gunter leased the premises to Burk-hard they had ample authority to act. Possibly the authority is not to be found in the instrument which oi-iginally granted it, but the plaintiff concedes that it continued during the entire year following the date named in the letter of attorney. Whether it was continued by express letter of extension, or by tacit or verbal concession, can make no difference. If the power was conferred, as the plaintiff proved when establishing his own case, the lease made by John & Gunter was operative, and legally binding on the owner of the premises at the time of its execution. The estate was granted, and Burkhard thereby acquired the right to enjoy it for the term named, and at the rental specified. This cannot be disputed, except upon the hypothesis that, as the power was only extended for one year, the lease could not
The original lease of John & Gunter was admitted good
It was not possible for Mitchell to receive his rent, and continue the tenancy in the manner he did, without subjecting his premises to the burden of the lease for another year.
The plaintiff’s conduct was likewise, in legal effect, a ratification of the contract made by his agents. The premises were, for at least a year, in the occupation of the tenant, who was paying the stipulated rent from month to month. Whether this rent was turned over to the principal by the agents, or was applied by them in the discharge of the principal’s debt, in either event knowledge of the tenancy, and its terms, must presumably have come to his knowledge long before the 1st of August, 188Y. On that date he certainly knew of it, because it is in evidence that it was then shown to him. He continued to receive the rent for at least four months, according to the terms of the contract as made by his agents. The receipts which he gave are in the usual form, and are without restriction or exception of any sort. It does not appear that after'the 1st of August he made any objection whatever to the lease, or to the tenancy as asserted by the tenant. According to all reasonable rules, this must be held a ratification of the contract. A principal cannot acquiesce in the unauthorized contract of his agent, accept its benefits, and escape the responsibility of its obligations.
The judgment should he reversed and the cause remanded.
Richmond and Reed, CC., concur.
Por the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment is reversed.
Reversed.