Burkett v. SchwendimanBurkett v. Schwendiman
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff William M. Burkett appeals from a trial court decision revoking his driver’s license pursuant to Utah’s implied consent statute.
We need only summarize the facts. On November 25, 1983, Uintah County Deputy Sheriff Ted Freestone and three back-up officers arrested Burkett for driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of section 41-6-44 of the Code.
I certify and swear that I am a sworn Utah peace officer and that I have prepared the above report form and that the information on the report form and the attached documents are true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that the report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation ofsection 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time and place specified in this report.
Burkett requested a revocation hearing before the Department of Public Safety (“the Department”) as authorized by
On appeal, Burkett repeats claims made below, to wit: that even though Freestone signed the bottom of the DUI form and attested to its correctness before a notary public, the form was not the “sworn statement” required by the Code and case law for the Department to revoke a party’s driving privileges.
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He notes that Freestone was not the peace officer who attempted to administer the blood alcohol test and who noted, on the form, Burkett’s refusal to submit to that test. In making this claim, he argues that the “sworn statement” required by the Code must be the legal equivalent of an affidavit and that it was not in this case. Therefore, Burkett reasons, the DUI report form failed to meet the strict truthfulness standards applicable to the “sworn report[s]” as required by decisions such as
Colman v. Schwendiman,
We refrain from adjudicating issues when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.
See Jones v. Schwendiman,
The record on appeal indicates that Burkett’s driving privileges were revoked for one year, beginning in approximately March of 1984. On this appeal, Burkett only requests that we reverse the trial court’s decision to revoke his license. Because there is nothing in the record to indicate a stay of the revocation order, the one-year revocation period has presumably expired by its own terms so that the requested judicial relief cannot affect Burk-ett’s rights and the case is moot. This is not a case where it is appropriate to invoke an exception to the mootness doctrine. The issue raised in Burkett’s appeal is not likely to recur because the legislature amended the implied consent statute in 1987 to delete the requirement of a “sworn statement” and to require only that the officer submit “a signed report” indicating that an arrested driver failed to submit to a blood alcohol test.
The appeal is dismissed.
Notes
. At the time of Burkett’s arrest, Utah’s implied consent statute provided that if a person refused to submit to a blood alcohol test after being arrested for violating