75 Pa. Commw. 1 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1983
Opinion by
Beatrice M. Burke (claimant) appeals to this Court for relief from the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review’s (Board) decision that she was unavailable for v/ork, and thus ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant'to Section 401(d)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).
The claimant was employed as a pressor by Charles Rabin & Company until the employer’s plant was closed on December 3, 1980. On January 11, 1981
On March 12, 1981 the claimant was referred to College Casuals for a position as a pressing machine operator at an hourly rate of $4.00. The claimant is a resident of Frackville, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, which is approximately seventeen miles from the prospective employer’is plant located in Sheppton, Pennsylvania. Anticipating a problem 'of getting to and from work, the claimant telephoned College Casuals on two separate occasions to inquire if any of its employees lived near her. The claimant does not own a car and does not have a driver’s license. The area in which -she lives is not serviced by public transportation. Consequently, she has access to neither private nor public transportation to get to College Casuals in Sheppton, Pennsylvania. When College Casuals informed the claimant that it had no employees from her hometown or the immediate vicinity the claimant refused the referral.
On appeal from the OES’ determination, it was decided by the referee that the OES’ determination should be affirmed. However, on a further appeal to the Board, it was decided that the claimant was not ineligible under Section 402(a), but was disqualified pursuant to Section 401(d) (1) of the Law. Section 401(d)(1) of the Law provides that to be eligible for compensation benefits a claimant must be, at all times,
In this case, the Board made several inferential findings of fact which led to its conclusion that the claimant was ineligible for compensation benefits. The Board found that the claimant limited he.r availability to work within walking distance of her home or to places of employment where transportation is available with friends, co-workers or neighbors.
The claimant argues that she became unemployed through no fault of her own, and made every realistic effort possible to find a means of transportation to Sheppton, Pennsylvania. She contends that her inability to find transportation to the employment referral in Sheppton is not sufficient to warrant the finding of fact that she effectively removed herself from the local labor market. Further, the claimant asserts that the Board could not properly conclude that she was unavailable for work in the local labor market where there was no evidence adduced at the hearing relative to the claimant’s ability to reach other work in the local labor market of Fraekville, Pennsylvania.
Our scope of review is limited to determining questions of law, and absent fraud, a determination of whether the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Myers v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 281, 330 A.2d 886 (1975). While it has been held that one may render oneself unavailable for work by attaching conditions and limitations to employment,
After a careful review of the record we find only a brief inquiry made of the OES representative as to the condition of the local labor market. However, that discussion did not establish that the claimant’s transportation situation eliminated her availability for work within her local labor market. It appears that the Board concluded that the claimant was unavailable for work because of her isolated refusal of the College Casuals job referral. There is no evidence establishing the fact that the claimant’s particular transportation situation prevented her from accepting other employment referrals. It is possible that friends, neighbors or others could provide the claimant with transportation to and from work. And the. Board made no finding on that issue. Thus, it remains an unanswered question of fact, in this case, whether the claimant’s limitation on her availability actually and effectively removed her from the local labor market.
Therefore, we must vacate the Board’s order and remand this case for additional findings of fact relative to the issue raised in the foregoing paragraph.
Order
And Now, the 8th day of June, 1983, the decision and order of the Unemployment Compensation Board
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §801 (d). •
43 P.S. §802(a). In pertinent part this section provides that an employee is ineligible for compensation for any week in which his unemployment is due to failure, without good cause, to accept suitable work.
The claimant’s refusal of the position at College Casuals because of a lack of a means of transportation led 'bo the Board’s finding that the claimant imposed limitations on her availability far employment.
The pertinent portion of the OES representative’s testimony follow®:
“QR: She could receive employment .or referral.
AO : You are a machine presser aren’t you?
AC: Yes I am.
AO: I have a hand presser locally but no machine 'pressing.
QR: Would the hand pressing be suitable work for her?
AO: I don’t know whether the employer would accept a machine presser instead of a hand presser, I would hav.e. to discuss that with. him.
QR: But .there are jobs in the local labor market for which she would be suitable is that correct?
AE: Very few of them, and that would be 5 miles.”
United States Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 53, 389 A.2d 249 (1978).