96 Mich. 404 | Mich. | 1893
This bill is filed to establish the complainant’s title to a certain piece of land in Kent county, and to procure the cancellation of a deed which she claims clouds her title.
It appears that the land formerly belonged to R. G. Chaffee, the husband of Mary A. Chaffee, and was by him conveyed, with other lands, to his wife, a short time before his death, in 1886. The 40 acres in question constituted the Chaffee homestead, and on May 8, 1888, Mrs. Chaffee executed a deed of the same to the complainant. On the same day she also made a will, by which she disposed of all the other of her real estate and personal property. In the seventh clause of the will she states:
“I give, bequeath, and devise all the rest of my real and personal estate to Ella Burk, to whom I am under many obligations.”
It is contended by the complainant:
1. That the deed to her from Mrs. Chaffee conveys the*406 absolute title, and that tbe delivery to Mr. Burt was intended to be a delivery to her, to take effect after the death of the grantor, who had no right to recall it.
2. That, though there was no absolute delivery of the deed, and Mrs. Ohaffee had the power to recall and destroy it, yet the complainant took title under the will, which has since been probated, and is therefore in a position to contest the title claimed by the defendant under her deed, and does contest it on the ground that Mrs. Chaffee, at the time of its execution, was mentally incom-' petent to make a deed, and was unduly influenced to make it.
Defendant contends:
1. That the bill is multifarious.
2. That the complainant’s remedy is at law.
3. That there was no delivery of the deed to complainant.
4. That Mrs. Chaffee was mentally competent to make a deed to defendant, and was not unduly influenced to make it.
The court below found from the evidence that the deed made by Mrs. Chaffee to complainant was never delivered to her, but was intended by Mrs. Chaffee as a testamentary disposition, and was subsequently revoked; and that the deed to the defendant from Mrs. Chaffee was made and delivered to defendant, and was free from fraud or undue influence, and that Mrs. Chaffee was mentally competent to make it. The court thereupon dismissed the bill, with costs.
. We need not discuss the points raised by the defendant’s counsel that the bill is multifarious, or that complainant has a remedy at law. * It is apparent from the evidence in the case that the deed to complainant was never delivered to her to take effect as a deed, nor ever placed by Mrs. Chaffee in the hands of Mr. Burt for delivery, so that she had no right to revoke it at any time before her death; and the evidence falls short of proving that Mrs. Ohaffee was mentally incompetent to make the deed to the defendant, or that any fraud or undue influence was practiced
In Schuffert v. Grote, 88 Mich, 650, a deed was made from father to son, and actually delivered to the grantee. The father said he did not want it to go on record, and the son handed it back to him. The father afterwards destroyed it, and made a new deed to another. It was held that it was clearly his intent to make only a testamentary disposition of his property, and that his deed was subject to revocation. In the present case, the deed was never-delivered to the grantee, but placed in the hands of Mr. Burt, who was clearly the agent of the grantor, and not. of the grantpe.
In Pennington v. Pennington, 75 Mich. 600, the deed! was delivered to Mr. Niles, to be delivered to the grantee after the death of the grantor; and it was held that it was subject to the grantor's right to rescind or alter it at pleasure. There were as strong reasons in that case for holding a delivery of the deed as in the present.
The question under the case is one of intent, to be established by proofs. We are satisfied that Mrs. Chaffee never intended to place the deed to the complainant beyond recall, and she did recall and destroy it before deeding to. defendant.
We think the court below reached the correct conclusion, and the decree below will be affirmed, with costs.